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“I have been having to explain myself since I was three or four years old. Texas legislators have 
been attacking me since I was in pre-K. I am in fourth grade now. When it comes to bills that 
target trans youth, I immediately feel angry. It’s been very scary and overwhelming. It just…it 
makes me sad that some politicians use trans kids like me to get votes from people who hate me 
just because I exist.” 
- Kai Shappley, age 10, testifying before the Texas Senate in opposition 
to Senate Bill 1646, which would characterize gender-affirming 










“I hope that the next generation of trans youth doesn’t have to fight the fights that I have. I hope 
they can be celebrated when they succeed, not demonized.” 









“I am a lifelong Missourian, I’m a business lawyer, I’m a Christian, I’m the son of a Methodist 
minister, I’m a husband, I’m the father of four kids: two boys, two girls, including a wonderful a 
beautiful transgender daughter. Today happens to be her birthday and I chose to be here. […] 
She plays on a girls volleyball team, she has friendships, she’s a kid. […] In so many ways this 
legislation is a solution in search of a problem. […] I came here today as a parent to share my 
story. I need you to understand that this language, if it becomes law, will have real effects on real 
people. It will affect my daughter. It will mean she cannot play on the girls volleyball team or 
dance squad or tennis team. It will mean she will not have the opportunity, that all of us had, to 
be part of a team. To be part of something bigger, greater than ourselves. I ask you: please don’t 
take that away from my daughter or the countless others like her out there. Let them have their 
childhoods. Let them be who they are.”  
- Brandon Boulware, father of a trans daughter, testifying before  the 
Missouri House of Representatives in opposition to HJR 53, which 
would bar trans kids from playing on sports teams in accordance with 
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After the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, which effectively 
legalized same-sex marriage in the United States, socially conservative advocacy groups quickly 
turned their efforts to the targeting of transgender people. On March 23, 2016, North Carolina 
signed into law House Bill 2 (HB 2), which mandated that individuals in government buildings 
(including public schools) use the restroom according to the sex assigned to them at birth as 
identified on their birth certificates (“House Bill 2 / SL 2016-3 (2016 Second Extra Session) - 
North Carolina General Assembly” 2016). Bills like HB 2 entered a number of state legislatures 
across the country between 2016 and 2018, most of which were defeated at either the legislative 
or judicial level. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, in which Gavin Grimm (a trans 
boy) was prevented from using the boy’s restroom at his high school in Virginia, is probably the 
most widely-known legal case about trans folks being prevented from using sex-segregated 
bathrooms in public buildings (“Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board” 2021). That case is 
ongoing, and Gavin has since graduated from high school. 
Since 2018, conservative advocacy groups have moved into the arena of locker rooms 
and school-sponsored athletics to pursue legislative and legal action against the inclusion of trans 
people in spaces according to their gender identity. As a result, there are number of ongoing 
efforts to, in some way, bar trans youth and young adults from competing in interscholastic 
and/or intercollegiate athletics. These efforts are not isolated incidents, they are the product of 
years of lobbying and policymaking pushed by conservative advocacy groups like the Heritage 
Foundation and the Alliance Defending Freedom. They are projects of a conservative movement 
that has historically sought to uphold racial segregation, restrict access to reproductive 
healthcare, and criminalize queer and transgender people’s lives. 
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The paper that follows presents an attempt to better understand how these attacks on trans 
people, particularly trans youth and young people, are being legally articulated in the context of 
antidiscrimination law. I specifically take up differing interpretations of Title IX that either 
suggest the statute implores us to discriminate against trans kids or protects them from such 
discrimination. I also choose to focus on how these arguments about Title IX and protection from 
discrimination on the basis of sex appear in the context of interscholastic and intercollegiate 
athletics. In part, I have made this choice because of my own experiences as a queer student-
athlete seeing instances of trans exclusion in mainstream athletics discourse. However, I have 
also chosen to focus on trans (in/ex)clusion in school-sponsored sports because I believe Title IX 
offers an unique opportunity for us to reimagine sex discrimination in the United States, to 
embrace more intersectional and prescriptive methods of interpreting the law, and to effect 
broader change in the ways we understand the role(s) of antidiscrimination law in ensuring 
sociolegal equality. I also operate within a feminist analytical framework, placing gender at the 
center of my approach to these issues of law and sports. 
Chapters I, II, and III offer histories and overviews of relevant fields of study in the 
context of the inclusion of transgender student-athletes in school-sponsored sports. Chapter I 
starts with a brief introduction to feminist and transgender studies’ approaches to sex/gender 
distinctions generally, and the space of sports specifically. It also describes how feminist legal 
scholars have recently rearticulated the value of engaging with antidiscrimination law as a mode 
of substantive, material change for queer and trans folks. Chapter II moves more directly into the 
world of sports by historicizing the ways in which sex and gender have been regulated at elite 
levels of competition. Stage legislatures across the country have proposed mechanisms of “sex 
testing” that have either been deployed in international elite competition historically or continue 
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to be used today. Yet, the history of sex/gender verification testing reveals how illusory and 
incoherent categories of sex and gender actually are, calling into question the ways in which they 
are deployed as means by which to either discriminate against trans folks in sports explicitly or 
implicitly bar them from competition in the first place. Then, Chapter III turns to the history of 
Title IX to help explain how language regarding protection(s) from discrimination on the basis of 
sex came to influence the development of school-sponsored sports, namely through the proactive 
expansion of opportunities for girls and women to participate in interscholastic and 
intercollegiate athletics.  
Chapters IV, V, and VI subsequently take analytical approaches to two ongoing legal 
disputes—Soule v. Connecticut and Hecox v. Little—regarding the inclusion of transgender 
student-athletes, specifically trans girls and women, in sports. Chapter IV takes a closer look at 
the language of sex and gender in Soule and Hecox and explores the importance of such language 
in legal claims predominantly about “sex discrimination.” Chapter V moves to a recent 
rearticulation of “sex discrimination” made by the United States Supreme Court in Bostock v. 
Clayton County. In that case, the Court reasoned that Title VII protections from sex 
discrimination in the workplace effectively included protections from discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation and transgender status. Bostock has since been understood as a victory for 
LGBTQ rights. I take a closer look at the textualist approach the Court takes in Bostock, 
evaluating both how the decision can, in my view, resolve Soule and Hecox, and how it has 
important limitations for furthering projects of queer and trans politics. Chapter VI aims to push 
past the limitations of Bostock’s textualism and move towards more intersectional, prescriptive 
means of interpreting Title IX and antidiscrimination law more broadly. I argue that 
intersectionality provides an extremely useful method by which the law could both better 
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understand the operations of discriminatory power and positions of marginalized groups of 
people. And I suggest that Title IX is an unique focal point to begin such intersectional analyses 
because of the ways in which it has already been interpreted in affirmative and prescriptive ways 
in the context of interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics.  
There are, perhaps, more pressing issues, inside and outside of the legal context, that 
more immediately threaten the lives of trans people right now. Indeed, as state legislatures have 
proposed and passed a number of bills effectively banning trans kids from playing sports, they 
have also begun introducing legislation criminalizing trans people’s access to gender-affirming 
healthcare (ACLU 2021, Conron et al. 2021; Harvard Law Review 2021; Schmidt 2021; 
Schneiberg 2021). And articulating a legal argument defending the inclusion of trans student-
athletes’ rights to play sports does not immediately address arenas of marginalization and 
domination—like prisons, welfare programs, the immigration system, homeless shelters, and job 
training centers—that may be more consequential to the everyday sustaining of trans life (Spade 
2015, xiv).  
However, there are currently 68 bills in 33 states being actively debated in state 
legislatures right now (as of April 22, 2021) aiming to bar transgender students from playing 
sports (Freedom For All Americans 2021). And these bills are almost always being introduced in 
conjunction with bills barring or criminalizing gender-affirming healthcare for trans youth—
there are currently 40 such bills being considered in 21 states (Freedom For All Americans 
2021). These bills thus present real challenges and threats to the lives of trans people across the 
country, and need to be immediately responded to in some way. My project tries to hold both this 
call for immediate legal advocacy and larger demand for more transformative change hand-in-
hand, negotiating liberal and radical approaches to legal reform and queer and trans politics. I do 
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not propose that any solutions this paper suggests are end-all means by which to resolve all 
forms of queer and trans discrimination and systemic oppression. Rather, I hope to analyze 
possible remedies for immediate challenges at hand and orient such approaches to the law toward 









































I. Feminist inquiries in sex, gender, and antidiscrimination law 
Sex/gender difference is an essential point of inquiry for feminist theory, queer theory, 
and feminist activism. Thus, the moment that sex/gender segregation becomes entirely 
acceptable (if not celebrated) within the arena of sports, feminists immediately invoke Simone de 
Beauvoir’s question of “what is a woman?” (Beauvoir 1949 [2009], 5). Beauvoir defines woman 
as an Other within masculinist culture: an immanence opposed to transcendence, a fixed nature 
opposed to self-determinate subject (Beauvoir 1949 [2009]; Young 1979, 13). And Beauvoir saw 
sports as a relevant issue pertaining to sex/gender difference, writing that “in sports, the goal is 
not to succeed independently of physical aptitudes: it is the accomplishment of perfection proper 
to each organism […] a female ski champion is no less a champion than the male who is more 
rapid than she: they belong to two different categories” (Beauvoir 1949 [2009], 345). Though 
Beauvoir seems to accept that men are physically stronger than women, she clarifies that 
apparent disparities in physical power “have no significance” because the arena of human 
possibilities is governed by economic and social situations, not biology (Beauvoir 1949 [2009]). 
Beauvoir asserts a claim central to a major vector of feminist theory and work that is wary of 
biological essentialisms and instead turns to economic and social systems as means of 
understanding sex and gender. Starting with Beauvoir’s work is useful in the context of 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics because of sports’ investment(s) in certain 
deterministic approaches to sex and gender—through mechanisms like biology. Beauvoir asks us 
to think deeper about what conditions may (have) produce(d) circumstances of inequality, even 
within those arenas, like sports, where sex/gender hierarchies are taken as a given. 
 Other feminist scholars and philosophers have added to Beauvoir’s remarks on sports in 
both ontological and phenomenological ways. According Iris Marion Young, sports have been 
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constructed as spaces meant to exhibit the body-subject (men) whilst women are constructed as 
the body-object, making the two mutually-exclusive (Young 1979, 14-15). In other words, sports 
come to epitomize masculinist culture and become foundational to structures of masculine 
privilege and ideology (Young 1979, 18). As Susan Cahn puts it: there is “an enduring 
opposition between sport and womanhood” (Cahn 1994, 207). Bartky adds to this articulation of 
the masculinist origin of sports by thinking about the discipline of femininity performed in 
everyday gestures and movements (Bartky 1990, 405). The primary concern is that as sports 
reinscribe masculinist culture, the very scope of bodily existence and movement for women 
becomes increasingly limited (Young 1980, 140). These means of thinking about feminine 
movement, embodiment, and sports inevitably also come to inform the definition(s) of (“proper”) 
womanhood (Bartky 1990, 408; Schneider 2000, 41; Young 1979, 15). Ultimately, modern 
sports comes to express and maintain the perception of sex/gender differences (Burke 2004, 
136). 
 While these authors highlight the mutually exclusive nature of feminine embodiment and 
sports, we can also analyze how sports lean on biological constructions of sex/gender in order to 
articulate supposed sex/gender differences as biological facts that appear in competition. The 
problem with this discourse of sex/gender difference is that it is severely limited and fails to 
effectively account for what may produce differences in sports-related outcomes between men 
and women. Young and James Fallows illustrate this limitation by deconstructing the concept of 
“throwing like a girl” (Fallows 1996; Young 1980). The idea of “throwing like a girl” often 
arises out of a notion that “girls do not bring their whole bodies into the motion as much as the 
boys” (Young 1980, 142). If we contrast Young’s conclusion that girls are socialized to treat 
their bodies as weak limitations with the assertions that “throwing like a girl” reflects real bodily 
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difference(s) based on one’s sex/gender, then we develop a more complex understanding of what 
it “means” to “throw like a girl” (Fallows 1996, 72; Young 1980, 142). In fact, there is not any 
bodily, structural reason for why men and women should throw in different ways. So, the notion 
of women’s inferior physicality is an artifact of social relations and not necessarily a reflection of 
a biological reality (Fallows 1996, 72-73).  
 Fallows and Young point to how a construction of possibilities ends up creating what is 
known as “throwing like a girl.” For any given person, a set of possibilities and potentialities 
exist. And while these possibilities may be in flux depending on changing circumstances, some 
restrictions (or resistances) to possibilities are stronger and firmer than others. The construction 
of masculine and feminine bodily existence, or the gendering of bodies more generally, is one of 
the ways that bodies’ possibilities are regulated. Sex and gender can often come to define one’s 
conceptualization of “I can” and “I cannot” (Young 1980, 147). In more practical terms relevant 
to “throwing like a girl,” sex/gender difference is being artificially created by the limitations we 
often place on the experiences for girls (and boys) vis-à-vis athletic activity. Indeed, the problem 
is not necessarily how “males and females are put together differently” but more about how boys 
are actively taught and encouraged to learn how to throw in a particular manner while girls rarely 
exist in environments “that encourage them in the same way” (Fallows 1996, 79). Men and 
women often spend their younger years in very different ways, depending on what is socially 
acceptable (Fallows 1996, 79). And new motor skills (like throwing a ball) become more 
difficult to learn as we age, so the task of learning how to throw with your whole body becomes 
less likely to happen later in life. Thus, “throwing like a girl” is less about any sort of biological 
sex/gender difference(s) and more invested in how we define and regulate possibilities, 
opportunities, and potentialities for people based on their sex and/or gender. 
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 Fallows’s and Young’s work is instructive in a broader context of understanding gender 
vis-à-vis interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics because it delegitimizes claims of innate 
physiological differences based on a person’s sex and/or gender. Central to concerns with 
permitting men and women to compete against one another in competition is the belief that men 
broadly possess bodily superiority (superior physical strength, for instance) over women. Yet, 
Fallows and Young demonstrate that such hierarchical approaches to gender in sports fall short 
of effectively capturing the ways gender and senses of embodiment are not simply grounded in 
biology or physiology but rather informed by processes of socialization.  
 This mode of thinking amongst feminist scholars also aligns with critiques of how the 
very concepts of sex and gender have become naturalized when they are actually permeable and 
fluctuating. Western societies have often legitimated gender through claims of differences in sex 
physiology (differences in genitalia, for instance), so we often assume a direct line can be drawn 
between biological sex and socialized gender (Lorber 1994). Such a line is illusory. Sex and 
gender are distinct means of categorization: they are both social constructions that are taught, 
learned, emulated, and enforced (Lorber 1994).  
 Feminist scholars have long analyzed the interaction between gendered embodiment in its 
biological, social, and experiential relation(s) to the world, with the most recent work embracing 
a plurality of sexed and gendered existences that exceed the male/female sex binary. The human 
body is not simply “a mosaic of natural parts” (i.e. biological sex) “and nurtured parts” (i.e. 
socially-constructed gender) (Fausto-Sterling 2014, 310). Rather, our bodies are dynamic 
systems that respond to “social input” in ways that the terms “nurture” and “nature” cannot 
capture (Fausto-Sterling 2014, 310). There may be “some aggregate physical differences 
between men and women[,]” but to argue that males are on average taller and stronger than 
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females “is almost meaningless” because the categories have themselves been constructed in 
divisive ways (Fausto-Sterling 2014, 310). Indeed, our bodies have been socialized into being 
“male” and “female” through processes of medicalization—processes that are perhaps most 
evident when medical interventions are deployed to “affirm” and/or supposedly “correct” a 
person’s sex immediately after birth (Chase 2006; Kessler 1990; Spade 2006). Gayle Rubin 
famously refers to the division of the sexes as the sameness taboo: “a taboo against the sameness 
of men and women, a taboo dividing the sexes into two mutually exclusive categories, a taboo 
which exacerbates the biological differences between the sexes and thereby creates gender” 
(Rubin 1975, my emphasis). Sex is therefore not a naturalized phenomenon, it is a concept 
brought into being through the perceived need for sex/gendered organizational mechanisms and 
hierarchical structures. As Judith Butler notes, “the production of sex […] ought to be 
understood as the effect of the apparatus of cultural construction designated by gender” (Butler 
1990, 10, author’s emphasis). For Butler, sex has just been gender all along (Butler 1986; Butler 
1990).  
 Just like sex, gender is a process of socialization that starts from birth. Margaret Lorber 
and Rubin argue for the historical necessity of the gender distinction for structuring the division 
of labor (Lorber 1994; Rubin 1975). Other scholars like Butler and Monique Wittig discuss 
gender as a means of reproducing both itself and heterosexuality (Butler 1990, 26; Wittig 1993). 
Regardless of why gender is prescribed, it is constructed from the moment a sex category is 
assigned. The sex category is made to become gender through gender markers and “once a 
child’s gender is evident, others treat those in one gender differently from those in the other, and 
the children respond to the different treatment by feeling different and behaving differently” 
(Lorber 1994). And Butler argues that the body itself only comes into being, in part, due to the 
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marking of its gender (Butler 1990, 12). In other words, gender creates particular meaning for 
any given person, informs the way they are perceived by the world around them, and plays a part 
in shaping who they become. 
 Riki Anne Wilchins takes up work done by Butler regarding the notion that the ways in 
which we discuss physical features of the body exist on the “far side of language” (Butler 1990, 
155; Wilchins 2006, 549). These features on the far side of language tend to be associated with 
the category of “sex” and give the illusion of “being unmarked by a social system” of gender 
(Butler 1990, 155). But, as Butler points out, the features actually “gain social meaning and 
unification through their articulation within the category of sex” (Butler 1990, 155). In other 
words, the features of bodies said to make up the categories of sex are only able to do so through 
a process of socialization into being that way.  
 Wilchins is a little clearer than Butler: “Characteristics of mine that are truly innate, that 
originate ‘on the fare side of language,’ ought to be totally apparent to you whether you’d ever 
seen another human being or not” (Wilchins 2006, 549). Wilchins says that if these physical 
features (the penis, the vagina, breasts, testicles, etc.) have some kind of inherent meaning (i.e. 
that a person is male, female, man, woman), then they would have to be recognized as such by an 
alien or a dog, as well as another person (Wilchins 2006, 549). This does not happen, though, 
because readings of the body are “culturally relative, contingent upon the context in which you 
locate” said body (Wilchins 2006, 549). Indeed, “[a]lmost everything about bodies is discovered 
through comparison from the collection of meanings stored in a common language” (Wilchins 
2006, 551). A category so reliant upon certain parts of the body, like sex, thus becomes much 
less (if at all) a fixed, deterministic category and much more a social construction. Wilchins’s 
Mackey 17 
work thus alludes to the permeability of sports regulations relying on categories of sex that 
proclaim to be universal and/or definitive. 
 The sex/gender regulation of competitive sports, at best, struggles with ambiguities of sex 
and gender, repeatedly relying on the supposed self-evidence of the sex binary. Competitive elite 
sports naturalize a strict division between men and women through sex-segregated competition 
and, as discussed in the next chatper, the use of various testing mechanisms to verify the sex of 
competitors presumes the ability to use bodily surveillance to verify unambiguous sex difference.  
Of course, the project of understanding sex and gender is also taken up by sports scholars 
in a number of ways. Alison Carlson, for instance, takes up the issue of sex/gender verification 
tests and the ways in which they refuse to account for a woman’s “sense of self” (Carlson 2007).  
Angela J. Schneider further contends that the sports community has given too much power to the 
medical community in how it determines who is (in)eligible to compete in women’s 
competitions (Schneider 2010, 48). And Krane et al. and Mariah Burton Nelson demonstrate how 
masculinity and femininity are embedded in the ways we understand sports, particularly as they 
are coded as spaces meant for men, even when women are included (Burton Nelson 2007; Krane 
et al. 2007). However, the evaluation of sex and gender in sports scholarship has rarely moved 
into the realm of understanding both concepts’ social (de)construction and such an analysis’s 
implications on sex/gender segregation in sports.  
 Understanding sex and gender has been enriched by the development of queer and 
transgender studies perspectives (Stryker and Aizura 2013; Stryker and Whittle 2006). As Rita 
Felski argues, “[g]ender […] remains both essential and impossible for feminism, which shifts 
between a radical questioning of the ontology of femininity and an insistence upon its real 
effects” (Felski 2006; 572). Thus, as feminists began engaging with queer studies, they became 
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increasingly interested in the figure of the transgender individual (Proser 2006, 258). The trans 
subject was understood as a “definitely queer force that ‘troubled’ the identity categories of 
gender, sex, and sexuality[,]” a subject who can simultaneously exist within and outside of the 
sex/gender binary and subvert (hetero)normative sexual desires (Cromwell 2006; Proser 2006, 
258). And trans people were already ever-present in movements that feminists were paying much 
attention to, like the gay rights movement, though their presence and contributions were rarely 
acknowledged or appreciated (Devor and Matte 2006, 387). The acknowledgment of trans lives 
produced new and contradictory possibilities for feminist theory to develop complex and deeply 
fraught understandings of the meaning of gender, the social practices that exceed the sex binary, 
and to further trouble simplistic understandings of the relation between gendered bodies and the 
world. 
 As feminists initially began to consider the precarious positions of trans folks, and trans 
women in particular, there was significant disagreement amongst feminist activists and scholars 
regarding the place of trans people within a feminist politics. The call to exclude transgender 
people, especially trans girls and trans women, from feminism is best epitomized by Janice 
Raymond’s infamous 1979 text, The Transsexual Empire, which, among other things, claimed 
that trans women were a “social problem” produced by “the sex roles and identities that a 
patriarchal society generates” (Raymond 1994, 16). In effect, Raymond argued that trans women 
were not really women and trans men were not really men. She claimed that trans women were 
“constructs of an evil phallocratic empire and were designed to invade women’s spaces and 
appropriate women’s power” (Stone 2006, 223). The arguments presented by Raymond, though 
refuted by a significant number of feminist, trans, and queer studies scholars, continue to be put 
forth in “both academic and popular media contexts” (Pearce 2018, 32). In popular discourse 
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today, those who identify as feminists and maintain views similar to Raymond’s are often 
described as “trans exclusionary radical feminists,” or TERFS, or “gender critical feminists” 
(Fahs 2018, 145). 
  TERFs make up a small, but vocal, minority; transgender studies has pushed feminist 
scholars to produce more productive understandings of sex/gender and embodiment. As Butler 
published Gender Trouble and effectively argued that sex has just been gender all along, trans 
studies scholars also engaged in work that was critical of mainstream feminism’s insistence upon 
definitions of womanhood that reconstructed particular experiences of embodiment. Emi 
Koyoma writes, “[t]he question of trans[gender] inclusion […] pushed [feminists] to the position 
of having to defend the reliableness of such absurd body elements as chromosomes as the source 
of political affiliation” (Koyoma 2006, 704). And feminists quickly found that attempting to 
make universal distinctions between transgender women and cisgender women was often 
nonsensical and “fraught with many bizarre contradictions” (Koyoma 2006, 704).  
 Sandy Stone contributes particularly important ideas within the context of the inclusion 
of transgender athletes in interscholastic and intercollegiate competition. Stone discusses the 
“treacherous area” that medical doctors and trans people navigate when any given trans person 
has a trans identity that “is something different from and perhaps irrelevant to physical 
genitalia” (Stone 2006, 232, author’s emphasis). This “diagnostic battlefield” remains 
particularly troubling for trans people in sports as regulations at the interscholastic, 
intercollegiate, and international/elite levels of competition have begun to establish specific, 
medicalized boundaries between who can and cannot compete in certain sex/gender-segregated 
competitions (Stone 2006, 232). These regulations adopt a specific understanding of transness as 
being born in the “wrong body,” which, while being the experience of a number of trans people, 
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adopts a “myth by which Western bodies and subjects are authorized” such that “only one body 
per gendered subject is ‘right’” and “[a]ll other bodies are wrong” (Stone 2006, 231). Indeed, it 
seems necessary to disrupt or destroy “the power of the medical/psychological establishment and 
their ability to act as gatekeepers for cultural norms,  as the final authority for what counts as a 
culturally intelligible body” (Stone 2006, 232). Stone’s contribution, then, is invested in being 
extremely critical of how trans people’s bodies are being medicalized, and thus also of how 
medicine has become a means of defining how bodies should be (properly) gendered, including 
but not limited to the realm of sports. 
 Beyond troubling sex/gender binaries, both feminist and transgender studies engage in 
considering the mechanisms necessary to produce (trans)gender justice. One of the key strategies 
discussed by scholars and activists alike is legal action and advocacy, especially in the arena of 
antidiscrimination law. The pursuit of civil rights protections is itself fraught. In the context of 
LGBT people, and trans folks in particular, legal reforms are understood as means by which 
communities might achieve a sense of recognition and inclusion from the nation-state (Juang 
2006, 706; Spade 2015, 8; West 2014, 56). This “struggle for recognition” is a “cornerstone of 
modern US political, social, and cultural activity” and enmeshed in the way we understand the 
history of civil rights in America (Currah. 2006, 14; Juang 2006, 706). Indeed, gay rights 
activists have constructed a “usable past” in order to “coordinate a coherent, long-term [legal] 
strategy based on a model of incremental progress toward greater equality and acceptance within 
the mainstream” (Minter 2006, 145 and 153). However, in the process of participating in such a 
legal strategy, the gay rights movement largely marginalized the trans community for fear that 
trans people would “co-opt or derail the hard-won resources and political power that gay people 
had worked so long to achieve” (Minter 2006, 153). As a result, there has been a sharp 
Mackey 21 
splintering between the mainstream gay rights movement and trans movements as homosexuality 
became increasingly normalized and trans folks continued to bear the brunt of racist, classist, 
ableist, and nationalistic systems of oppression. 
 Queer social movements have thus “had to contend with why legal change in the form of 
rights has not brought the deep transformation they were seeking” (Spade 2015, 1).  As the 
mainstream gay rights movement made same-sex marriage its priority at the turn of the century, 
it fell into the trap of cooperating in a kind of “queer liberalism”: “an unsettling […] attempt to 
reconcile the radical political aspirations of queer studies’ subjectless critique with the 
contemporary liberal demands of nationalist gay and lesbian US citizen-subjects petitioning for 
rights and recognition before the law” (David. Eng, J. Halberstam, and José Esteban Muñoz qtd. 
in West 2014, 96). And while projects of anti- and nondiscrimination law may have been a good 
starting point, they largely failed to attend to the “material conditions of inequality” like ongoing 
economic and educational inequality, broader problems “that create daily dangerous and deadly 
situations for poor, gender-transgressive people[,]” and the very means by which gender 
classifications are codified into law (Juang 2006, 708; Spade 2006, 218 and 231).  
 Dean Spade notes that LGBT movements primarily approached legal reforms and the 
politics of inclusion through advocacy for antidiscrimination and hate crime legislation (Spade 
2015, 38). In doing so, he argues, these movements opted-in to inclusion and recognition “rather 
than questioning and challenging fundamental inequalities” created by the institutions they 
sought to reform (Spade 2015, 30). Again, the ways which gay marriage reform was framed 
made the entire enterprise actually only beneficial and accessible to those gays and lesbians with 
the most privilege (Spade 2015, 31). The campaign for gay marriage thus demonstrates how 
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“formal legal equality at best opens doors to dominant institutions for those who are already 
closest to inclusion” and very few queer folks end up materially benefitting (Spade 2015, 37).  
 Spade concludes that antidiscrimination laws often fail trans people because they are not 
adequately enforced, legal help is often inaccessible to those in need, providing discriminatory 
intent is almost impossible, and the laws inevitably “strengthen systems that perpetrate 
[transphobia]” (Spade 2015; 40, 41, and 47). Discrimination law also takes up a 
“perpetrator/victim dyad” that “creates the false impression that the previously excluded or 
marginalized group is now equal, that fairness has been imposed, and the legitimacy of the 
distribution of life chances [has been] restored” (Spade 2015, 42-43). The result is that 
discrimination cases become highly individualized such that courts can deny systems or 
programs are entirely flawed and oppressive, “all the while producing and relying on the 
racialized-gendered images that promote [the] programs” in the first place (Spade 2015, 60). 
Instead of participating in such a politics of recognition and inclusion, Spade suggests we adopt a 
critical trans politics that seeks to “transform current logics of state, civil society security, and 
social equality” (Spade 2015, 1). The fight is not to be had for legal equality but for the 
“dismantling of systems of state violence that are killing trans people” (Spade 2015, 160).  
 A challenge for Spade’s and others’ rejection of legal advocacy for recognition and 
inclusion, though, is that it fails to completely account for the material consequences of being 
legally unintelligible (West 2014, 99). As Isaac West argues, “[l]egal recognition, if only 
understood as a site of normalcy, underinvests itself in the productive threat posed by unexpected 
articulations of equality, and radical separatists’ claim to autonomy and sovereignty 
misunderstand the sources and possibilities of agency” (West 2014, 99-100). In other words, 
while legal recognition can fail to account for the material conditions of those facing 
Mackey 23 
discrimination and/or oppression, a turn away from seeking such recognition may underestimate 
the ways in which queer subjects can subvert and/or transform the law. Furthermore, the law 
does exert certain power and control over people’s lives, meaning that a radical rejection of legal 
reform can leave those already marginalized and oppressed peoples subject to increased 
discipline and punishment at the hands of the state. 
 West compares this dilemma within queer studies and queer activism to the tension of the 
ideology thesis and the indeterminacy thesis within critical legal studies (CLS) (West 2014, 100-
101). For CLS scholars, the ideology thesis asserts that the legal system privileges those in 
power while granting minimal protections to the less privileged. As a result, equality is prevented 
as “the privileging of individual rights over the collective good hinders the ability of 
disadvantaged groups from bonding together and demanding legal changes” (West 2014, 100-
101). The indeterminacy thesis posits that legal rhetoric “render it ‘internally and externally 
inconsistent’’ as abstract concepts like “equality, privacy, and freedom of expression can be 
interpreted in any number of ways” (West 2014, 101). The product of such rhetorical 
indeterminacy is “contradictory case law” and “incomplete and fragmented answers to complex 
social issues” (West 2014, 101). For example, such terms like sex, male, and female have existed 
as discrete, fixed, and unambiguous categories within the law for years, it is only recently that 
courts have started to signal more appropriately complex understandings of such words 
(Greenberg 2006).  
 Ultimately, West suggests “a two-track approach” to transgender studies and legal 
advocacy (West 2014, 105). This approach embraces an “impure politics” of “both legal 
inclusion and perpetual critique of the legal system” (West 2014, 105 and 191, author’s 
emphasis). Such a positioning towards the law seems to adequately account for the limitations of 
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what the law can currently do and take heed of the necessary short-term benefits of life that 
recognition and inclusion can provide. It is thus within an impure politics that we might be able 
to better articulate claims for transgender justice. Inspired by West’s method, this thesis will use 
a legal lens to understand the terms of transgender student-athletes’ inclusion and exclusion from 
competing in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics. Given the wave of legislation hostile 
towards trans youth during the 2020-2021 legislative session, it seems a liberal approach to legal 
reform is necessary in order to immediately account for and remedy challenges to trans people’s 
abilities to compete in sports, gain some kind of access to healthcare, and/or obtain legal 
documentation affirming their gender identity. Indeed, as I argue in Chapters IV and V, the 
legislative and legal attacks being levied against trans folks, both inside and outside the context 
of school-sponsored sports, aim to not only limit their autonomy and agency but also seek to 
codify legal mechanisms by which to deny trans people’s right(s) to exist. Nevertheless, my 
engagement with the law tries to remain engaged with Spade’s “radical trans politics,” keeping 
an eye on the ways in which systems like antidiscrimination law can only do so much to 
materially protect and sustain trans lives. 
 The next chapter moves from strictly scholarly work within feminist, transgender, and 
legal studies into the history of sex/gender difference and testing in competitive athletics in order 
to start placing such scholars in conversation with the larger topic of legal discourses regarding 
the inclusion of transgender student-athletes in athletics. As trans people face legislative and 
legal battles regarding their eligibility to participate in sports, it is helpful to look at how gender 
has historically been regulated in the space to help guide our thinking about the unique dilemmas 




II. (A history of) biological sex/gender difference in competitive athletics 
 
 Transgender (student-)athletes occupy a very particular space within competitive athletics 
due to a history of sex/gender segregation within sports. The essentialization of sex/gender 
difference(s) has greatly influenced the means by which athletes compete: men compete in men’s 
competition, women compete in women’s competition. Indeed, the concept of sex difference(s) 
is informed by athletics’ insistence on values of “fair play” and an “even playing field,” which 
reinforce the perceived need for sex/gender segregation. Transness inherently destabilizes the 
constructions of sex and gender in sports because it disrupts the perception that these categories 
are fixed and/or immutable. Trans athletes are thus understood as threats to “fair play” and the 
assumed nature of athletic competition.  
 As a result of the perceived threat to (what is seen as) necessary sex/gender segregation 
in athletic competition, rules have historically been imposed to regulate the ways in which 
sex/gender is understood within sports. The most prominent example of these rules lies in the 
codification of sex/gender-verification testing at the elite levels of competition. Though 
sex/gender segregation exists in sports, and other spaces, at the scholastic, collegiate, and 
amateur levels of competition, it is most regulated-in-practice at the elite level of competition. As 
a result, in this chapter I look to the history of sex/gender testing as a means of evaluating the 
importance of strict, binary understandings of sex and gender, the ways in which sex/gender 
categories are deemed necessary for competition, and how these categories of regulation end up 
tripping over their own unwillingness to accept the nuances of sex and gender. Furthermore, as 
more legislative bodies in the United States consider, and pass, legislation barring trans student-
athletes from participation in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics, the likelihood that 
sex/gender-verification testing becomes an enforcement mechanism for such laws grows. In 
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other words, though sex/gender testing only exists at elite levels of competition right now, it is 
very likely that these kinds of tests are considered as means to enforce new laws banning trans 
students from competing in high school and collegiate athletics. 
 I rely heavily on Lindsay Parks Pieper’s recent historicization of sex/gender testing 
carried out by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and International Association of 
Athletics Federations (IAAF, now known as World Athletics) as part of the narrative presented 
below. However, I seek to contextualize Pieper’s work within feminist critiques of biological sex 
and socialized gender. The aim of this historicizing is to illustrate how instrumental strict 
definitions of sex and gender are to sports, critique the construction of those two categories 
within athletics, and thus reveal the particular difficulties trans athletes face when trying to exist 
within the space of competitive athletics. 
 Since the ancient Greek Olympics, the place of women within the space(s) of 
(competitive) athletics has been “foreign at best” (Schneider 2010, 40). Indeed, essential to 
Pierre de Coubertin’s proposal for the revival of the Olympic Games in 1894 was the suggestion 
that the Games be reserved for men (Pieper 2016, 14). Coubertin defended such exclusion by 
arguing that women’s bodies were weaker than men’s, immediately introducing gender hierarchy 
at what would soon become one of the highest levels of competition for contemporary 
competitive athletics (Henne 2015, 93). Women were not permitted to compete until the turn of 
the century, with 22 women participating in the 1900 Olympics within their own sex/gender-
segregated category of competition. Sex/gender segregation was immediately deployed in order 
to “protect the integrity of women’s competition” under the logic that women were “weaker and 
physically inferior” when compared to men (Henne 2015, 93-94).  
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 Despite the conviction that a strict separation between men and women is crucial for fair 
play amongst women, these tests have never provided evidence for the definition of an exact 
sex/gender binary. The very term(s) for the testing, which has occurred in different forms since 
the 1960s, have shifted from sex verification, women’s medical examinations, sex checks, sex 
controls, femininity tests, gender tests, gender controls, and gender verification (Pieper 2016, 3). 
However, instead of clarifying the boundaries of sex and gender, the history of these tests reveal 
that they inevitably reflect an arbitrary attempt to transpose the science of sex onto a fallacious 
desire for sex/gender segregation in sports. 
 Though official means of sex/gender testing did not begin until the mid-twentieth 
century, concerns regarding “ambiguously sexed” women or male athletes dressed as women 
arose immediately after Coubertin’s reintroduction of the Olympics (Pieper 2016, 16). In 1936, 
IOC anxieties regarding sex/gender segregation were furthered after two former European 
women’s champions, Zdenek Koubková and Mark Edward Louise Weston, underwent sex-
reassignment surgery (Pieper 2016, 29). Both athletes’ surgeries gained international attention 
and heightened sex/gender anxieties at the IOC by directly demonstrating the instability of sex 
and gender, challenging the sex/gender-segregated nature of sport (Pieper 2016, 29).  
 In the same year, female competitor Dora Retjen was “discovered” to be a man after 
finishing fourth in the women’s high jump (Henne 2015, 94; Pieper 2016, 29). Though Retjen 
was later determined to have an intersex condition, anxiety about “hermaphrodites” and those 
with “sex ambiguities” fostered recommendations that female competitors undergo physical 
inspection to ensure that they were “actually” female (BBC Sport n.d.; Henne 2015, 94; Pieper 
2016, 16). Retjen nevertheless provoked IOC concerns about “gender fraud” because they 
presented a challenge to binary sex/gender segregation in sports and questioned the strict 
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separation between “male” and “female.” Sex/gender differences were seen as instrumental for 
the very existence of women’s sports, at least at the elite level of competition. Ideas regarding 
gender verification and gender fraud thus pervaded international athletic competition long before 
the enactment of official, scientific sex/gender verification testing. 
 These anxieties of sex/gender distinctions vis-à-vis segregation in sports led to the 
institution of sex/gender regulatory mechanisms at both the IAAF and the IOC. In 1946, the 
IAAF began to require that women get physician’s letters verifying their biological sex, and 
beginning in 1948 the IOC required that women submit affidavits, signed by a doctor, that 
certified that they were women (Pieper 2016, 31). The turn to medical verification of sex identity 
marks an important shift in the governance of sex in sport. The medicalization of sex/gender 
becomes bound up in the perceived need for sex/gender segregation in sports as medicine is 
deployed as an authoritative force in debates of sex and gender. This relationship between 
medicine and sports sets up a particularly troubling scenario for trans athletes today as “the 
medicalization of trans identities forces trans people to conform to rigid disciplinary gender 
norms in order to access medical technologies” (Spade 2015, 68). Just as medicine continues to 
use gender as an “administrative force” today, sports’ turn to medical sex/gender verification 
illustrates its own (re)deployment of gender as a means by which to govern athletes (Spade 2015, 
68). We thus see the medicalization of sex/gender becoming increasingly involved with the 
(re)socialization of gender through sex/gender segregation in sports. Subsequently, the 
management of athletics and sports is also bound up in contemporary understandings of 
medicine, though the relationship is complex and at times adversarial. 
 Following the regimes of medical testimony, the first “test of femininity” at the elite level 
of competition was introduced in 1966 at the European Championships of Athleticism in 
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Budapest (Bohuon and Rodriguez 2016, 29). The test involved “a gynecological and 
morphological examination […] in which the visible genitals […] as well as muscular strength 
and respiratory capacity, had to remain below the capacities deemed as masculine” (Bohuon and 
Rodriguez 2016, 29). These kinds of tests were also known as “nude parades[,]” and were 
instituted, in part, due to Western anxieties about the rise of the USSR and its female athletes’ 
success in international competition (Pieper 2016, 36). The imposition of these physical exams 
demonstrates a very specific understanding of sex and gender in sports, one that centers the parts 
of the body that exist on the far side of language and appear to be essential markers of maleness 
and femaleness but actually are not (Butler 1990, 155). These tests also reveal that sports are 
concerned with a particular kind of embodiment that is narrowly defined as masculine or 
feminine and conforms to specific medicalized understandings of the body. Clearly, though, this 
kind of understanding of embodiment is threatened by any variance in sex/gender expression, 
whether it be on the body or not. The physical examinations, and later tests, thus participate in a 
circuitous logic to justify their existence: the tests require particular, gendered conformity to 
normalized categories of sex/gender; are challenged by deviations from those norms; and thus 
seek to eliminate those people and bodies who do not fit neatly into the predetermined 
categories. Rarely, if ever, are the premises structuring the perceived need for the tests called into 
question. 
 After being deemed unethical and too embarrassing for athletes, these kinds of physical 
examinations were replaced, in 1967 by the IAAF and in 1968 by the IOC, with the Barr body 
test (Bohuon and Rodriguez 2016, 29; Henne 2015, 100 and102). The test takes a buccal smear 
in order to identify a Barr body chromosome, one of which would be present in the normalized 
female body, none would be present in the normalized male body (Priyadharscini and Sabarinath 
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2013; Carr n.d.). The Barr body test, though, had several flaws. Importantly, any chromosomal 
order understood as nonnormative would result in an athlete failing the test and being barred 
from competition, and women with androgen insensitivity syndrome (AIS) failed the test despite 
actually “compet[ing] at a biological disadvantage because they [could not retain] testosterone” 
as much as most other women—given the premise that testosterone levels are markers of future 
athletic success (Henne 2015, 102). The typical explanation for the Barr body test seems to fall 
short in this example of women with AIS because they are exclusively being denied participation 
in athletic competition because their body is not deemed normatively female. Furthermore, if 
sex/gender testing is most concerned with maintaining fairness in a world where men are 
inherently stronger than women, then there is no material reason to exclude women with AIS 
because their gender nonconformity actually puts them at a disadvantage if testosterone is 
understood as a performance-enhancing hormone. Furthermore, if women with AIS were able to 
compete effectively against women with more “regular” levels of testosterone, then there may be 
less evidence to suggest that testosterone is a marker of inherent athletic superiority. 
 The initial move to require women competitors to receive doctor’s notes confirming that 
they were women, the transition to physical examinations at competitions, and the eventual 
institution of the Barr body test illustrate a means by which competitive sports sought to 
(re)construct strict binaries of sex/gender through what appear to be ever-more sophisticated 
methods of sex detection. In reality, though, the shifts from different types of sex detection 
demonstrate the instability and incoherence of sex and gender. Anne Fausto-Sterling’s work on 
biological sex and the socialization of gender most clearly demonstrates this kind of instability. 
 Biological sex can be understood as the product of several stages of biological 
development through which a fetus becomes a human baby and is subsequently socialized into 
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gender. The Barr body test focuses on chromosomal sex, which is the product of an X or Y-
bearing sperm and X-bearing egg. Chromosomal sex is widely understood as a double set of 
autosomes: a person either has an X and Y or two Xs (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 4). Sex does not end 
here, though. Once a fetus has chromosomal sex, it begins the development of “fetal gonadal 
sex,” which involves the development of testes at the eighth week of fetal development or the 
ovaries at the twelfth week of development (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 4). These gonads in turn begin 
producing hormones, which creates “fetal hormonal sex” (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 4).  
 Once the gonads begin producing hormones, the fetus begins developing “internal 
reproductive sex,” which involves the development of the uterus, cervix, and fallopian tubes, or 
the vas deferens, prostate, and epididymis (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 5). Genital sex, which is of 
particular interest to athletic physical examinations of sex/gender, does not develop until the end 
of the fourth month of fetal development. By birth, then, there are five “layers of sex” and these 
layers “do not always agree with one another” (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 5). In other words, there 
are at least five stages in the development of what we understand as “biological sex” where an 
adjustment in hormone production or gonad development may disrupt the supposed uniformity 
of “male” and “female.” For example, male gonadal development requires action by the Sry and 
Sox9 genes in the correct sequencing (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 19). In the absence of either of these 
genes, male fetuses develop as females would, just without female gonads. Fetuses otherwise 
understood as female face similar requirements of the FoxL2, Wnt4, and Rspo1 genes, in the 
proper sequence, for the proper development of female gonads (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 19).  
 As part of Fausto-Sterling’s deconstruction of biological sex, she describes the 
“bipotentiality” of sexual development (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 20). There is a plethora of 
important “moments of indifference” during fetal development when uniform biological sex may 
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be disrupted (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 22). For instance, there is a moment when both XX and XY 
fetuses have identical phalluses before responding to fetal hormonal sex (testosterone or 
estrogen). It is at this moment, or any other moment of indifference/bipotentiality, when “all that 
needs to happen is [for] something out of the ordinary [to switch] or derail the process of sexual 
development at one of the levels from chromosomal to genital sex” (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 22). 
This kind of disruption results in intersexual development, also called disorders of sexual 
development (DSDs) (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 25).  
 The nuance of biological sex thus highlights the problem(s) with using medical or 
scientific verification, including the Barr body test, as a means by which we determine whether a 
woman is truly a woman. Even Murray Barr, the micro-anatomist who developed the test, 
warned against its use as a determination of sex (Pieper 2016, 66). In 1956, Barr published an 
article that argued for limited use of the chromosomal check because of the frequent situations in 
which “the body cells are at variance with the obvious sexual anatomy” (Barr qtd. in Pieper 
2016, 66). In 1959, the test was further critiqued in the medical field when scientists Susumy 
Ohno and Theodore S. Hauschka verified that the Barr body only identified one X chromosome, 
not both (Pieper 2016, 66). This finding meant that prior to 1959, an individual with XXY sex 
chromosomes would have been identified as a woman when post-1959 they were labeled as a 
man (Pieper 2016, 66). Chromosomal sex was thus much less clean-cut than previously thought, 
and the ability for a chromosomal sex test (like the Barr body test) to operate as a means to 
administratively regulate sex/gender faltered. 
 By 1987, Barr was explicitly arguing that his test be abandoned as a control mechanism 
in competitive athletics (Pieper 2016, 66-67). And while the medical community generally 
disagreed with the IAAF and IOC’s understanding of the significance of sex chromosomes, all 
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three institutions sought to maintain medicalized means by which to separate men and women 
(Pieper 2016, 69). As medicine developed more complex, albeit still restrictive, means by which 
to categorize bodies into certain sexes and genders, the sports community was still invested in 
sex/gender segregation and the means by which one could “prove” one’s claim to a certain 
sex/gender. Of course, the process of “proving” identity was at the mercy of the sports 
institutions writing rules governing which bodies constituted which sexes/genders, severely 
limiting the agency of athletes who were/are gender nonconforming, intersex, and/or trans. 
 The Barr body test was replaced by several different regimes of regulation and control 
between the IAAF and the IOC. In 1990 and 1991, the IAAF developed policies that controlled 
sex/gender in new ways. With the starting point that sex/gender controls were necessary in order 
to keep “male masqueraders” out of women’s competition (despite there not being evidence of 
such instances occurring), the IAAF began to adopt the idea of “physical checkups,” later called 
“health checks” (Pieper 2016, 149-150). The IAAF terminated all sex chromatin testing. 
However, it had already partially substituted these tests with drug/doping controls that required 
athletes provide urine sample in the presence of officials. While athletes provided urine samples, 
officials could easily conduct a visual inspection of genitalia, returning to the primary concern of 
males masquerading as females (Pieper 2016, 150).  
 As part of their newly instituted “health checks,” the IAAF required physical inspections 
of all athletes, male and female, though this regulation faced quick backlash at the 1991 World 
Championships in Athletics and was quickly terminated in 1992 (Pieper 2016, 150 and 160). 
Members of a number of countries’ medical teams voiced concerns that “health checks” were 
simply a “reversion to the ‘nude parades[,]’” some team doctors even refused to do the 
examinations themselves (Pieper 2016, 150). Female athletes also recognized the health checks 
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as too similar to physical examinations done prior to Barr body testing, calling the checks a 
“peek-and-probe” examination (Pieper 2015, 151). Interestingly, some members of the 
Australian sports federation deemed the inspection of men as “pointless” (Pieper 2015, 151). 
This perception that testing men would be pointless reveals how gender hierarchy structured, and 
continues to structure, sports because it both (re)articulates women’s inferiority vis-à-vis men’s 
physical prowess and neglects to regulate male-ness as much as it does female-ness. In other 
words, testing women is seen as important in order to “discover” any unfair advantages they may 
have—advantages that are almost always associated with sports’ construction of male-ness. In 
contrast, testing men is deemed unnecessary because men are assumed to have those advantages 
associated with male-ness already. Regardless, the IAAF scrapped the universal application of 
health checks, but it still maintained a right to “check any ‘questionable’ competitor on a case-
by-case basis” (Pieper 2016, 151).  
 While the IAAF initially reverted to an earlier system of sex/gender testing through 
physical examination, the IOC replaced the Barr body test in 1991 with the polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) test (Henne 2015, 103; Bouhuon and Rodriguez 2016, 29; Pieper 2016, 160). The 
PCR test sought to identify the Sry gene, which is typically located on the Y sex chromosome 
and leads to the development of male gonads in its subjects (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 19; Heine 
2015, 103; Settin et al. 2008; “SRY Gene: MedlinePlus Genetics” n.d). In contrast to the Barr 
body test’s investigation of the presence of “femaleness,” the PCR test was interested in 
identifying the presence of “maleness” within women as means of excluding said women from 
competition. In other words, “female athletes no longer had to prove that they were women but 
that they were not—at least in part—male” (Heine 2015, 103). Just like the perception that men 
should not be subject to sex/gender testing, the PCR test’s investigation of male-ness within 
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women privileges the notion that said male-ness inherently leads to an unfair advantage within 
women’s competition. The PCR test thus further institutionalizes a patriarchal sex/gender 
hierarchy that structures the ideology of sex/gender segregation in sports. 
 The IOC first widely used the PCR test at the 1992 Winter Games in Albertville, France. 
By the time the Games were set to begin, twenty-two French scientists had signed a petition 
denouncing PCR use on medical and ethical grounds; French ministers had called on the 
president of the IOC at the time (Juan Antonio Samaranch) to not use the test; and the French 
Medical Association’s ethics commission threatened disciplinary action against any French 
doctor who participated in PCR verification at the Olympics (Pieper 2016, 152-153). 
Internationally, a number of doctors and medical professionals critiqued the IOC’s use of the 
PCR test because of its “combination of inappropriate genetic techniques, prejudice of the IOC’s 
‘female only’ test, the IOC’s failure to consider naturally produced biological differences, and 
the consequential stigmatization caused by a positive result” (Pieper 2016, 153). Despite these 
protests, the IOC decided to use the PCR test for the 1992 Winter Games in Albertville and the 
1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona. PCR testing remained in use at the Olympics through the 
1998 Games, with the IOC Executive Board voting to stop the testing in 1999. Like the earlier 
objections to using the Barr body test, scientific and medical consensus formed to reject genetic 
tests as appropriate for determining the legitimacy of the sex identity necessary to compete in 
women’s sports. 
 By 1999, sex/gender controls in international competitive athletics had effectively ceased 
due to mounting pressure from the medical community and the athletes themselves (Erikainen 
2019, 114). The IOC’s Athletes’ Commission, formed in 1981, played a large part in advocating 
for the end of sex/gender verification protocols, but they also argued that the IOC maintain its 
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right to suspicion-based checks (Pieper 2016, 175). For instance, female Olympians largely 
supported sex/gender testing for two reasons. First, they tended to fail to recognize the flaws in 
the control methods, both in the controls’ insistence on stable biological sex differences and the 
risks of false negatives (Barr body) and false positives (PCR test) (Pieper 2016, 166). And 
second, many female Olympians accepted the need for protection from gender-transgressive 
people (Pieper 2016, 165). In part, these controls also served to verify these women’s own 
womanhood after passing the tests. Women competing in the Olympics understood, and often 
continue to understand, sex/gender testing and/or suspicion-based checks as necessary to ensure 
“fair” competition. Indeed, the irrational fear of men masquerading as women in order to 
compete at the elite levels of athletics persists. 
 Regardless of the IAAF’s and IOC’s public moves to eliminate sex/gender testing and 
verification protocols, sex/gender regulation and the control of “womanhood” within sports 
continued in three ways. First, the need to account for institutional anxieties about men 
masquerading as women found a helpmate in anti-doping regulations (Pieper 2016, 175). The 
need for urine samples with officials present basically replicated the “nude parades” of the mid-
twentieth century. Second, both the IAAF and IOC maintained rights to inquire about 
“suspicious” athletes (Erikainen 2019, 115; Pieper 2016, 176). IAAF and IOC officials could/can 
effectively look at an athlete, deem them “suspicious,” and require that they undergo the PCR 
test. This kind of approach relies heavily on presumptions about the outward appearances of 
sex/gender, overtly punishing strong-looking women (especially women of color and of the 
Global South) and perpetuating the polarization of athleticism and womanhood (Pieper 2016, 
175 and 176).  
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 While during the 20th century the concern of the IOC and IAAF focused on 
“masquerading men,” in 2003 the IOC came to what is known as the Stockholm Consensus, a 
policy that directly addresses the participation of transgender athletes in Olympic competition 
(IOC Medical Commission 2003; Müller 2016, 419; Pieper 2016, 176). If they wanted compete 
at the Olympics, transgender athletes had to undergo sex-reassignment surgery and alter external 
genitalia, receive legal recognition by “appropriate official authorities,” and undergo hormone 
therapy “appropriate for the assigned sex” in order to minimize “gender-related advantages” 
(IOC Medical Commission 2003; Müller 2016, 419; Pieper 2016, 176). In 2015, the IOC 
released new guidelines for transgender athlete participation after recognizing that new cultural 
norms and laws of many of its member nations were accounting for an importance of “autonomy 
of gender identity in society” (International Olympic Committee 2015). The IOC clarified that 
athletes who transition from female to male may compete without restriction in the male 
category while those who transition from male to female and want to compete in the female 
category must declare their gender identity as female, demonstrate that their total testosterone 
level has been below 10 nmol/L for at least 12 months prior to first competition, and must 
maintain such a level of testosterone throughout the time period they wish to compete in 
(Erikainen 2019, 129; International Olympic Committee 2015). 
 Regulations of sex and gender, particularly as they relate to the construction of female-
ness, have also developed in the context of athletes with hyperandrogenism. In April 2011, the 
IOC’s Medical Commission recommended new guidelines for the participation of female 
athletes that “target[ed] female athletes with hyperandrogenism” (Erikainen 2019, 127; Henne 
2015, 90). The commission argued that elevated levels of androgen production within women 
with hyperandrogenism provided those athletes with an unfair advantage. Indeed, the 
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commission noted that “‘[t]he androgenic effects on the human body explain why men perform 
better than women in most sports and are, in fact, the very reason for the distinction between 
male and female competition in most sports’” (IOC qtd. in Henne 2015, 90; Pieper 2016, 182). 
This kind of framework maintains hegemonic conceptualizations of male athletic superiority, and 
subsequently calls the “womanness” of women with hyperandrogenism into question. Women 
with elevated levels of androgens thus became deviant female athletes, subject to new kinds of 
sex/gender controls (Pieper 2016, 182). The IOC’s Medical Commission’s recommendations 
were adopted in June 2012 (International Olympic Committee 2012). The IAAF adopted similar 
protocols almost immediately (Erikainen 2019, 127; Pieper 2016, 182; World Athletics 2011).  
 Initially, the IOC required that women with hyperandrogenism be assessed to either have 
testosterone levels under a “normal ‘male range’” of 260 to 1,000 nanograms per deciliter, or 
demonstrate that “she is resistant to the effects of androgens to compete in women’s events” 
(Henne 2015, 91). Athletes suspected of having hyperandrogenism were also made to be 
“examined and diagnosed” at select reference centers in Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, 
Sweden, or the United States (Pieper 2016, 182). No resource centers existed on the African 
continent or in India, and once athletes were diagnosed with hyperandrogenism, they had to 
undergo “treatment” at their own expense (Pieper 2016, 182). A reciprocal exam to account for 
men with abnormal levels of androgens was not considered (Pieper 2016, 184). As seen earlier in 
the backlash regarding the IAAF’s proposed “health checks,” sex/gender verification testing is 
not understood as necessary for men because the markers of unfairness in women’s competition 
are inherently coded as associated with male-ness. So, elevated levels of testosterone in a male 
competitor would not be seen as necessarily unfair but rather as simply a kind of natural gift of 
sorts. Here, then, we see a significant gap in how men’s and women’s competitions are 
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constructed in relation to a concept of fairness. And that gap is structured by a hierarchical 
understanding that males are physically superior to females. 
 On March 19, 2013, the Sports Authority of India (SAI), following the IAAF and IOC, 
adopted a policy that set a bar of 2 nmol/L for eligibility in the women’s category of competition 
(Government of India’s Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports 2013). If women were found to have 
levels of testosterone higher than that, they were to be evaluated by a physical examination by a 
medical panel. In June 2014, Dutee Chand, an Indian runner who had just competed in the 
women’s Asian Junior Athletics championships, was sent a letter from the Athletics Federation 
of India that requested she submit to a “Gender verification test” (Erikainen 2019, 1). Chand 
went to a SAI training camp and underwent medical exams, including blood tests, gynecological 
examination, karyotyping, and an ultrasound (Erikainen 2019, 1). These examinations concluded 
that Chand had female hyperandrogenism and SAI notified her that she was not eligible to 
compete in the female category (Erikainen 2019, 136).  
 Chand quickly filed an appeal to the Court of Arbitration of Sports (CAS), which 
suspended the IAAF’s and SAI’s regulations on hyperandrogenism due to a “lack of evidence 
about the presumed link between (endogenous) testosterone and athletic advantage” (Erikainen 
2019, 136). This CAS ruling permitted athletes with female hyperandrogenism like Chand and, 
perhaps more famously, Caster Semenya to compete in international competition. However, in 
2017, the IAAF put its support behind a study done by Stéphane Bermon and Pierre-Yves 
Garnier that supposedly provided evidence that “female athletes with high endogenous 
testosterone have a (statistically) significant performance advantage over other women” 
(Erikainen 2019, 138-139). Despite this study’s reliability and methodology being immediately 
called into question, the IAAF informed CAS in March 2018 that it had created a new set of 
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regulations regarding women with female hyperandrogenism (Erikainen 2019, 139). These new 
regulations were published on April 26, 2018, and required that these athletes must be 
“recognized at law either as female or as intersex (or equivalent)[,]” must reduce their levels of 
testosterone to below 5 nmol/L for at least six months prior to competition, and maintain said 
level of testosterone for as long as they want to be eligible to compete (World Athletics 2018; 
World Athletics 2019). These new regulations only applied to athletes in the female 
classification in so-called “restricted events”: the 400m run, the 800m run, any hurdles event, the 
1500m run, and the mile. The new rules also avoided language of “female hyperandrogenism” 
and leaned more towards DSD language (Erikainen 2019, 140). Chand’s case in the CAS was 
thrown out, making her once again ineligible to compete. 
 In June 2018, Semenya announced that she would challenge the IAAF’s new rules; 
however, she lost this legal challenge in the CAS on May 1, 2019 (BBC Sport 2019). Semenya 
appealed the CAS decision to the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, which initially granted 
an injunction on June 3, 2019, permitting Semenya to compete, but reversed said ruling on July 
30, 2019, while it continued to consider the legal challenge (Mather and Longman 2019). On 
September 8, 2020, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland ruled against Semenya’s 
challenge, upholding the IAAF’s rules on DSDs and effectively barring Semenya from 
international competition unless she agrees to lower her levels of testosterone (Dawson 2020; 
Dunbar and Imray 2020). 
 In this chapter, I have tried to outline a brief history of sex/gender testing mechanisms in 
order to elucidate the means by which sex and gender are regulated in competitive athletics. The 
regime of sex/gender testing at the most elite levels of competition are important to take note of 
because they are being called upon by US state legislatures as means by which to determine the 
Mackey 41 
“biological sex” of those trying to compete in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics. For 
example, on April 14, 2021, Florida’s House of Representatives passed the “Fairness in 
Women’s Sports Act,” which effectively requires genital inspections of student-athletes whose 
gender has been called into question (Altman 2021; Padget 2021). Indeed, a number of 
legislative bills attempting to bar trans youth from competing in sports point to external genitalia, 
chromosomal sex, and/or circulating levels of testosterone as determinants of a person’s sex, all 
of which (as this chapter has described) have been used at the most elite levels of athletic 
competition. Though I will return to issues of sex/gender testing in later chapters, recognizing its 
history in athletics is important in order to better contextualize the ways in which “sports” create 
particularly-gendered spaces hostile to nonconformity.  
In the next chapter, I turn to the history of Title IX as a means of evaluating how these 
kinds of gendered regulations interact with antidiscrimination law in the US. I aim to historicize 
Title IX’s passage and development so as to better understand how “sex discrimination” has been 
affirmatively interpreted and opened up opportunities for gender equity in interscholastic and 


















III. Historicizing Title IX’s perception of sex/gender and transgender discrimination 
 
The governance of sex in elite sports takes on a different tenor when state anti-
discrimination law encounters institutions of sports competition. Namely, Title IX has been used 
as a mechanism by a number of legal advocates in efforts to eliminate sex discrimination in the 
United States. Schools are “central to reproducing hegemonic cultural norms” in the US and thus 
Title IX’s potential to articulate means by which we might resolve forms of gender injustice in 
the education system has immense implications (Currah 2006, 7). Furthermore, Title IX has been 
implicated in the development of American interscholastic and intercollegiate sports since its 
passage in 1972, making it an instrumental part of how sex and gender have been (re)produced in 
sports for the past 50 years. In this chapter, I turn to a brief history of Title IX, both within and 
outside of the context of sports, in order to better understand how the law has already been used 
to intervene in the space. In evaluating how Title IX has been articulated historically, within the 
context of sports, and recently in the defense of transgender students’ rights, I hope to glean a 
means by which we might (re)interpret Title IX as a tool for the inclusion of transgender student-
athletes in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics. 
 On June 23, 1972, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, which “bars sex 
discrimination in education programs and activities offered by entities receiving federal financial 
assistance[,]” was passed in Congress (United States Department of Justice 2012; United States 
Department of Justice 2015). In its original text, Title IX states that “No person in the United 
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subject to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance” (United States Department of Justice 2012; United States Department of Justice 
2015). The passage of Title IX has since been widely understood as one of the most, if not the 
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most, important piece of legislation affecting women’s sports in the United States (MacKinnon 
1987, 122; Theberge and Birrell 2007, 168).  
 However, Title IX faced numerous legal challenges in the immediate years after its 
passage, and its scope and breadth are still contested. Some argue that Title IX has largely 
“departed from the law’s original purpose[,]” moving away from “eliminating institutional 
barriers to educational opportunity for women and girls, and toward […] changing the way we 
think about sex differences, gender roles, and sexuality in general” (Melnick 2018). And they 
question whether the impact of Title IX on athletics “is actually good for women’s education” 
(Melnick 2018). Regardless, Title IX has enabled the inclusion of women in interscholastic and 
intercollegiate athletics in the United States, and has recently become a means by which the 
rights of transgender students and student-athletes are advocated for.  
 Prior to the passage of Title IX, athletes were able to seek redress for sex/gender 
discrimination through the Fourteenth Amendment (Holliday 1996, 261). Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a sex/gender discrimination claim had to show a “close nexus between 
state participation and the challenged regulation[,]” and then determine the validity of the 
regulation based on a two-pronged test: does the regulation serve an important government 
objective? and is the regulation substantively related to achieving that objective? (Holliday 1996, 
261).  
 Three legal cases decided in 1973 demonstrate the ways in which sex/gender 
discrimination in sports was adjudicated prior to the passage and institution of Title IX. In 
Morris v. Michigan Board of Education, the court provided an injunction that permitted girls to 
compete with boys in non-contact sports competitions (Holliday 1996, 262; Morris v. Michigan 
State Board of Education 1973). The court based its injunction on the plaintiffs’ demonstration 
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that girls could compete on boys teams without harm, and that no alternative, comparable 
competitive programs sponsored girls’ participation. Brendan v. Indiana School District 
followed suit with the court ruling that generalized discrimination was not permissible based on 
paternalistic arguments of physiological sex differences (Holliday 1996, 262). And in Brenden v. 
Independent School District the court ruled that when women are denied access to the only team 
available for participation in a particular sport, when said team is predominantly male, “their 
rights to participate in that sport are entirely obliterated” (Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 
1972; Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 1973; Holliday 1996, 262). Morris, Brendan, and 
Brenden demonstrate how sex/gender discrimination in sports were adjudicated prior to Title IX; 
however, their focus on exclusion leaves open the opportunity for Title IX to address broader 
forms of discrimination. 
 Title IX’s wording has origins in the wording of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which “prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex[,] and national 
origin” (United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission n.d.; Wiles 1996, 269). 
Several amendments to Title IX were proposed soon after its passage. Most prominently, Senator 
John Tower (R-TX) introduced the “Tower Amendment” in 1974, which suggested that revenue-
generating sports be exempt from Title IX (The National Coalition for Women and Girls in 
Education, n.d.; Wiles 1996, 269). In 1975, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) introduced “A bill to 
amend Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and to preserve academic freedom[,]” 
which attempted to remove athletics from the jurisdiction of Title IX (Helms 1975; Wiles 1996, 
269). Neither the Tower Amendment nor Helms’s amendment passed. 
 In July 1974, Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) introduced the “Javits Amendment,” which 
directed the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to create and publish 
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regulations pertaining to Title IX that addressed intercollegiate sports competition and consider 
the “nature of particular sports” (Gender Equity in Sports 2006; Wiles 1996, 269-270). In 1975, 
HEW issued regulations permitting sex/gender segregation based on comparative skill and in 
contact sports, mandating schools “make affirmative efforts” to provide women with athletic 
opportunity and support, and requiring schools “conduct an annual survey to ascertain interest 
levels for both men and women for particular sports” (Wiles 1996, 270). Sex/gender segregation 
was thus, through the Javits Amendment, made to “prevent male domination of a team, redress 
past discrimination of a team, and prevent injuries to female athletes” (Holliday 1996, 261). The 
Javits Amendment, though, clearly assumes male superiority and female inferiority, at least in 
the context of sports, which (as discussed in the prior chapter) is a seriously flawed framework 
with which to approach sports competition. The HEW’s proposed rules were published on June 
4, 1975, and went into effect on July 21, 1975 (National Collegiate Athletic Asso. v. Califano 
1978). However, HEW’s 1975 regulations received considerable criticism and were reworked 
into finalized regulations, which were published on December 11, 1979 (“History of Title IX” 
2019). These new regulations introduced per capita funding for scholarships provided to male 
and female athletes and allowed for “nonequivalent funding for football and basketball if the 
differences were due to ‘nondiscriminatory factors,’ such as equipment cost, injury rate, and 
facilities” (United States Department of Education 2020; Wiles 1996, 270). Within the sphere of 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics, then, Title IX came to be understood as a mechanism 
by which to reduce/eliminate sex/gender inequality within existing athletics programs and 
proactively compensate for past sex/gender discrimination within sports at institutions (Holliday 
1996, 261; Wiles 1996, 271).  
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 Title IX’s scope was regularly (re)interpreted by the courts in the years following its 
passage. One of the first major legal challenges to Title IX came from the National Collegiate. 
Athletics Association (NCAA) as HEW was taking public comment on its proposed regulations. 
On February 17, 1976, the NCAA filed suit against HEW, “‘seeking a declaration that the Title 
IX regulations [were] illegal as they applied to athletic programs of institutions of higher 
education’” (Beene 2013, 69; “History of Title IX” 2019; National Collegiate Athletic Asso. v. 
Califano 1978; The National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education, n.d.; Trahan 2016). 
The NCAA, on behalf of itself and its members, sought exemption from HEW’s regulations 
because they “reach collegiate athletic programs[, which] do not directly receive federal 
assistance” (National Collegiate Athletic Asso. v. Califano 1978). The court ruled against the 
NCAA, finding that “the NCAA lacked standing as an organization, and that no injury to the 
NCAA was found” (Beene 2013, 71). The NCAA appealed the decision twice in 1978, both of 
which failed (Beene 2013, 73; National Collegiate Athletic Asso. v. Califano 1978). 
Nevertheless, the NCAA’s challenge evidenced a primary objection to Title IX’s reach into 
interscholastic and intercollegiate sports: that sports did not receive federal funding and were 
thus exempt from federal regulation. 
 The next major legal challenge regarding Title IX’s scope came in the 1982 case 
University of Richmond v. Bell, in which the University of Richmond (UR) was asked to 
cooperate with a Title IX investigation by the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR), which had replaced HEW in 1979 through the Department of Education Organization 
Act (Ribicoff 1979; University of Richmond v. Bell 1982). UR refused to cooperate with OCR’s 
request to “investigate and regulate” its athletics department because the department did not 
receive federal funds “and therefore would not be within the reach of Title IX” (University of 
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Richmond v. Bell 1982). OCR threatened to initiate enforcement procedures, prompting UR to 
file a legal complaint seeking “injunctive and declatory relief” from OCR’s requests (University 
of Richmond v. Bell 1982). Ultimately, the district court ruled in favor of UR, favoring a narrow 
definition of Title IX’s language of “program or activity.” The court demanded that a program or 
activity must directly receive federal financial assistance in order to be subject to Title IX 
regulation. 
 Later that year, in Haffer v. Temple University, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
in such a manner that contradicted the University of Richmond v. Bell decision. In Haffer, eight 
women charged Temple University with sex discrimination in the university’s athletic 
department. Temple denied the discrimination complaint and argued that Title IX only applied to 
educational programs or activities that “directly [receive] federal funds” (Haffer v. Temple 
University 1982, author’s emphasis). However, the courts sided with the plaintiffs’ argument that 
Temple’s athletics department was subject to Title IX regulations because it “indirectly benefits 
from the receipt of federal funds; because Temple’s athletic program indirectly benefits from the 
large amounts of federal financial assistance furnished to the University in the forms of grants 
and contracts” (Haffer v. Temple University 1982). In other words, Temple received federal 
financial assistance that may or may not have directly gone to its athletic department, but even if 
that money did not go to athletics it freed up funds that may or may not have done so. The Haffer 
plaintiffs also suggested that Temple’s athletic department did directly receive federal funds, 
which the district court agreed with (Haffer v. Temple University of Commonwealth System of 
Higher Education 1981). Effectively, Haffer took an expansive approach to the scope of Title 
IX, a decision that almost directly contradicts University of Richmond.  
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 This disagreement within the process of adjudicating Title IX’s scope eventually led to 
the Supreme Court’s taking up of Grove City College v. Bell. Of prime concern in Grove City 
was the question of what constitutes an educational program or activity (Wiles 1996, 271).  In 
Grove, the Department of Education (DOE) had requested Grove City College (GCC) to sign an 
“Assurance of Compliance” form for the 1979 Title IX regulations. GCC refused to sign the 
document despite 482 of its students being eligible for and/or receiving Basic Education 
Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) or Guaranteed Student Loans (GSLs) (Wiles 1996, 272). DOE 
threatened to revoke some of this student financial aid if GCC did not sign the compliance form, 
ultimately producing the Grove case. While the DOE understood its financial aid to students as 
aid to GCC as an institution, GCC simply saw such assistance as aid to individuals. The Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of the DOE, with an important caveat that only BCC’s financial aid office 
had to comply with Title IX because it was the only department directly affected by the BEOG 
and GSL assistance. The Court ruled that Title IX only applied to those parts of an institution 
that directly received federal financial assistance and could not be used to impose institution-
wide compliance. 
 After the Grove decision, “Title IX effectively no longer applied to intercollegiate sports” 
(Wiles 1996, 273). The Court’s decision faced a decent amount of scrutiny, particularly because 
it ignored Congress’ intention for Title IX to “broadly affect institutions” (Wiles 1996, 273). 
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Grove, partially joined by Justice Marshall, made this very point, 
noting that “the Court […] ignores the primary purposes for which Congress enacted Title IX” 
(Grove City College v. Bell 1984). He elaborated: 
 
 [A]llowing Title IX coverage for the College’s financial aid program, but rejecting 
 institution wide coverage even though federal moneys benefit the entire College […] may 
 be superficially pleasing to those who are uncomfortable with federal intrusion into 
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 private educational institutions, but it has no relationship to the statutory scheme enacted 
 by Congress (Grove City College v. Bell 1984). 
 
Justice Brennan argued that Congress understood financial aid to students as the same thing as 
aid to institutions, and that the Court’s decision as it stood was “absurd” because while GCC’s 
financial aid office could not discriminate on the basis of sex, every other part of the college was 
not prohibited from doing so (Grove City College v. Bell 1984). Regardless, Grove gutted Title 
IX’s scope and authority, triggering congressional response by means of the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987.  
 Introduced on February 19, 1987, by Senator Edward Kennedy, the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987 (CRRA), also known as the Grove City Bill, revised and/or clarified 
language in Title IX (and a few other pieces of legislation) (“Civil Rights Restoration Act of 
1987 (1988 - S. 557)” n.d.). Though the CRRA was vetoed by President Reagan, the Senate 
overrode the veto and it was enacted on March 22, 1988 (“Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 
(1988 - S. 557)” n.d.; Kennedy 1988). The CRRA clarified the interpretation of Title IX’s 
“program or activity” language, stating that the term applies to “all of the operations of […] a 
college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education” 
(Kennedy 1988). Thus, the CRRA re-expanded the scope of Title IX, and effectively made all 
intercollegiate athletics programs subject to its regulations.  
 Almost immediately, the NCAA began considering gender equity more seriously, 
publishing a “Gender-Equity Study” of its member institutions in 1992 (“History of Title IX” 
2019; Wiles 1996, 275). In the same year, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools was 
decided. In Franklin, a petitioning student filed a complaint under Title IX after facing sexual 
harassment from a sports coach (Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch. 1992). The student 
sought compensation for damages, but the district and appellate courts dismissed the case on the 
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grounds that Title IX did not authorize awards of damages (Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. 
Sch. 1992). The Supreme Court reversed the decision to dismiss, deciding that plaintiffs alleging 
sex discrimination under Title IX are entitled to compensatory damages, effectively putting 
significant liability pressures on institutions should they be found to discriminate on the basis of 
sex (Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch. 1992; Wiles 1996, 274). The CRRA expanded the 
scope of Title IX while Franklin gave it teeth. The NCAA and schools across the country began 
expanding women’s athletics programs to become Title IX compliant. 
 This history of Title IX adjudication largely informs how it has developed since 1992 
within the sphere of interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics. Since 1979—with revisions and 
clarifications in 1996, 2003, and 2005—OCR has outlined a three-part test to determine if an 
interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics program is Title IX compliant (“Intercollegiate 
Athletics Policy: Three-Part Test -- Part Three Q’s & A’s” 2020). In order to be compliant, an 
institution must meet one of the following criteria: 
 (1) The number of male and female athletes is substantially proportionate to their 
 respective enrollments; or 
 (2) The institution has a history and continuing practice of expanding participation 
 opportunities responsive to the developing interests and abilities of the underrepresented 
 sex; or 
 (3) The institution is fully and effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of the 
 underrepresented sex (“Intercollegiate Athletics Policy: Three-Part Test -- Part Three Q’s 
 & A’s” 2020; Simon 2004, 126). 
 
These rules apply to “approximately 16,500 local school districts, 7,000 postsecondary 
institutions, as well as charter schools, for-profit schools, libraries, and museums” (United States 
Department of Education 2020). However, though most institutions are not Title IX compliant, 
no institution has actually lost any federal moneys as a result of such noncompliance (“Title IX 
Q&A” n.d.). These institutions often face damages and legal fees in lieu of losing government 
assistance. 
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 Title IX’s relationship with transgender rights, both inside and outside of interscholastic 
and intercollegiate athletics, is a relatively new one. Just as Title IX followed in the footsteps of 
Title VII so do the adjudication of transgender discrimination cases originate in Title VII-based 
claims. Indeed, courts look “to Title VII when construing Title IX” (Whitaker v. Kenosha 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ. 2017). Tronetti v. Healthnet Lakeshore Hospital, for 
instance, marked one of the first times a district court accepted a claim of discrimination based 
on gender transition as constituting sex discrimination under Title VII (Tronetti v. TLC Healthnet 
Lakeshore Hosp. 2003). In 2006, Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm Inc expanded on Tronetti by 
asserting that claims of harassment targeting trans employees specifically constitutes 
discrimination based on sex stereotypes under Title VII (Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc. 
2006). And in Schroer v. Billington and Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic Group, 
district courts ruled that the withdrawal of job offers based on gender transition or transgender 
status constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII (Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic 
Group 2008; Schroer v. Billington 2008). These Title VII cases laid the groundwork for later 
legal challenges arguing that Title IX protected the rights of trans students. 
 On October 26, 2010, OCR sent out a Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) on bullying that 
expressed the DOE’s interpretation of Title IX with respect to trans students for the first time. 
The letter stated that though Title IX “does not prohibit discrimination based solely on sexual 
orientation, Title IX does protect all students, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) students, from sex discrimination” (Ali 2010, 8). This DCL was followed by a now-
rescinded 2016 DCL that more explicitly expressed the OCR’s interpretation of Title IX as it 
pertains to discrimination based on a student’s gender identity (Lhamon and Gupta 2016). It was 
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primarily after these DCLs that district and appellate courts took up issues of transgender 
discrimination in schools.  
 The locus of contestation for trans rights in schools has been the use of restrooms 
according to one’s gender identity. Like sports, restrooms are often spaces of sex/gender 
segregation left unquestioned. However, courts have begun to understand that the exclusion of 
trans students from the restrooms that align with their respective gender identities is a form of 
sex discrimination, and thus in violation of Title IX. In Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School 
District and Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. the courts ruled that excluding trans students 
from restrooms according to their gender identities violated Title IX (Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ. 2016; Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ. 2017). The recent case 
of Adams v. Sch. Bd., decided by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on August 7, 2020, 
reaffirmed this interpretation of Title IX, ruling that such exclusion from restrooms constitutes a 
punishment of students’ gender nonconformity and presents a harm to trans students (Adams v. 
Sch. Bd. 2018; Adams v. Sch. Bd. 2020). And the widely reported case of Grimm v. Gloucester 
County School Board has also been recently ruled on, at the appellate level, in favor of Grimm 
(Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. 2020).  
 The judgments in favor of plaintiffs in Adams and Grimm are, in part, the product of 
Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, which was decided on June 15, 2020, by the Supreme Court 
of the United States. Bostock combined three cases (the other two being Altitude Express, Inc., et 
al. v. Melissa Zarda and William Allen Moore, Jr. and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. 
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) in which plaintiffs alleged they were fired 
because they were homosexual or transgender, which they claimed violated their rights under 
Title VII (Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia 2020). Bostock is particularly remarkable because 
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it rearticulates the Court’s understanding of “discrimination on the basis of transgender status” in 
relation to “sex discrimination,” effectively positioning the former as a form of the latter. In the 
Court’s decision, Justice Neil Gorsuch writes that “[a]n employer who fires an individual for 
being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have 
questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the 
decision, exactly what Title VII forbids” (Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia 2020). In Bostock, 
the Court effectively understands discrimination based on a person’s transgender status as a form 
of sex discrimination, which seems to suggest that instances of trans discrimination in 
educational institutions receiving federal assistance constitute violations of Title IX. Given 
Bostock’s new precedent establishing transgender status as a protected category, there are 
newfound potentials for articulating Title IX’s ability to protect trans students and student-
athletes from discrimination in schools and sports.  
 After the Court’s June 2020 ruling, OCR published two letters on August 31, 2020, that 
clarified its interpretation of Title IX post-Bostock. The first letter was a notice of investigation 
(NOI) to Shelby County Schools, which revealed OCR’s revised interpretation that 
discrimination against a student on the basis of their sexual orientation constituted a violation of 
Title IX (Richey 2020). The second letter, though, was a revised statement of interest in Soule v. 
Connecticut that argued that despite Bostock’s reading of sex discrimination under Title VII 
extending protections to trans people, Title IX still did not protect transgender people’s rights to 
compete on sex-segregated sports teams (Richey 2020). OCR argued the one of Title IX’s goals 
was to specifically protect girlss and women’s opportunities in athletics and that Bostock’s 
context of Title VII differed enough from Title IX that discrimination against trans people in 
school-sponsored sports need not trigger a Title IX violation (Richey 2020). 
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 However, on January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden issued Executive Order 13988 on 
“Preventing and Combating Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Sexual 
Orientation” (Biden 2021). This executive order, in part, directed federal agencies to interpret the 
prohibition of sex discrimination as (also) prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity or sexual orientation, given the Court’s logic in Bostock (Biden 2021). OCR has since 
rescinded its statement of interest in Soule v. Connecticut (Goldberg 2021). 
 Interpretations of antidiscrimination law, particularly Title IX protections from sex 
discrimination, are thus subject to a constant flow of revising, revisioning, and 
reconceptualization. Since 1972, Title IX has been deployed as a mechanism through which to, 
in part, expand opportunities for girls and women in sports. Yet, only recently have Title IX 
protections been considered as extending to trans students and/or trans student-athletes. And 
because of Title IX’s history of promulgating opportunities for primarily cisgender girls and 
women in school-sponsored sports, moves to interpret the statute as extending to transgender 
girls and women have been met with a number of legal challenges bound up in the language of 
“sex” and “discrimination.”  
In the next chapter, I begin to analyze the language of sex and gender in the context of 
Title IX in two ongoing legal cases: Soule v. Connecticut and Hecox v. Little. I particularly 
attempt to demonstrate how the law’s interpretation(s) of sex and gender are too simple and 
deterministic, failing to account for the ways in which sex and gender broadly operate as social 
constructions and specifically structure hierarchies of power and ability in sports. In other words, 
I suggest that antidiscrimination law wants the language of sex and gender to do things that it 
cannot do—like impose inherent meaning of a body or suggest innate physiological advantage in 
sports. Despite the fluctuating meanings of sex and gender, legal claims like those presented in 
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Soule and Hecox suggest that singular interpretations of these categories are necessary in the 
context of articulating a claim of sex discrimination. Yet, investments in specific definitions end 
up (re)constructing the gender binary and hierarchies that almost always disadvantage women 
and trans folks. The language of sex and gender in claims of sex discrimination is thus extremely 
important because it ends up determining whose lives and experiences are visible to the law, and 

































VI. The language of sex, gender, and Title IX in Soule and Hecox 
 
According to Title IX, no person shall “be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” on the basis of sex (United 
States Department of Justice 2012; 2015). Because sex is essential to the legal determination of 
discrimination under Title IX, claims articulating a violation of the law must rely on particular 
understandings and/or definitions of sex and/or gender. In Soule v. Connecticut and Hecox v. 
Little, the language of sex and gender is understood in fundamentally different ways that greatly 
affect the ways in which arguments in favor of and against the inclusion of trans student-athletes 
in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics are made. The issue of trans inclusion in sports is 
particularly involved with the embodiment of sex, or how sex appears on the body, making the 
discussions of sex and gender all the more charged and legally fraught. This section addresses 
how the language of sex and gender is understood and interpreted in Soule and Hecox, and how 
such language comes to affect the concept of “sex discrimination.” First, I provide overviews of 
both cases to provide necessary context for the following chapter(s). Then, I show that Soule 
takes a rather hostile and irregular position on the language of sex and gender, making the 
language almost essential to the entire case that the plaintiffs present to the court. Hecox, on the 
other hand, presents a much more liberal participation in the language of sex and gender, though 
its reliance on medical discourses reveals how much of a hold the field of medicine has on which 
bodies are understood as “properly” sexed and “properly” gendered. Finally, I describe the threat 
that Soule presents to trans people in the United States and the legal system more broadly 
through its engagement in what Judith Butler calls the “far side of language.” Ultimately, Soule 
aims to codify a means by which it could be argued that the legal recognition of transgender 
people could constitute a form of sex discrimination in and of itself. Any ruling in favor of the 
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plaintiffs in Soule would thus put all trans people in the country in immanently more precarious 
sociolegal positions. 
 
A. Case overviews 
i. Soule v. Connecticut 
 On May 9, 2013, the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference (CIAC), the sole 
governing body of interscholastic sports in Connecticut, adopted new language in Article IX, 
Section B of its bylaws, regarding rules of eligibility that allowed for transgender students to 
“participate in CIAC athletic programs consistent with their gender identity” (The Connecticut 
Association of Schools 2013, 7). Seven years later, on February 12, 2020, three high school track 
athletes—Selina Soule, Chelsea Mitchell, and Alanna Smith—filed a legal complaint for 
injunctive relief and damages against the CIAC and a number of local school boards in 
Connecticut, challenging the CIAC’s transgender policy. The complaint alleged that the CIAC 
policy violated Title IX by effectively providing more opportunities to those students born 
biologically male than those born biologically female. The Soule complaint also names two 
Black trans girls, Terry Miller and Andraya Yearwood, in its filing, both of whom have filed to 
intervene as defendants in the case.  
 The Plaintiffs in Soule are being represented, in part, by the Alliance Defending Freedom 
(ADF), a “religious liberty” advocacy organization that has been designated as a hate group by 
the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) (“Alliance Defending Freedom” n.d.). Among other 
things, ADF has supported the recriminalization of sex between LGBTQ adults, defended state-
sanctioned sterilization of transgender people, and argued that queer people “are more likely to 
engage in pedophilia (“Alliance Defending Freedom” n.d.).  
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 The Soule complaint argues that the CIAC’s policy regarding transgender students 
violates Title IX based on a particular understanding of sex discrimination, biological sex, and 
gender. This understanding is best understood through a footnote at the beginning of the 
complaint, which says: 
 
Because Title IX focuses on equal opportunities between the sexes, because this 
Complaint is precisely concerned with effects of biological differences between males 
and females, because the terms “boys” and “men’ are commonly understood to refer to 
males, and to avoid otherwise inevitable confusion, we refer in this complaint to athletes 
who are biologically male as “boys” or “men,” and to athletes who are biologically 
female as “girls” or “women.” This Complaint uses the names preferred by each student 
rather than legal names (Soule et al. 2020, 2, my emphasis).1  
 
The complaint also contrasts “boys” as “those born with XY chromosomes” with “those who are 
born female—with XX chromosomes” (Soule et al. 2020, 3). Given this understanding of sex, 
the Soule complaint argues that the CIAC policy “ignor[es] the physical differences between the 
sexes” that make sex/gender segregation in some sports, like track and field, necessary (Soule et 
al. 2020, 11). The plaintiffs point to puberty as the moment when males start producing levels of 
testosterone great than females, which provides boys with “a wide range of physiological 
changes that give males a powerful physiological athletic advantage over females” (Soule et al., 
12). Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege, “female puberty brings distinctive changes to girls and 
women that identifiably impede athletic performance” (Soule et al. 2020, 13, my emphasis). 
Therefore, according to the complaint, by the time students governed by the CIAC policy are 
 
1 Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Soule et al. v. Conn. 
Ass'n of Sch., Inc. et al., No. 3:20-cv-00201 (D. Conn. 2020), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/soule_et_al_v._ct_association_of_school
s_et_al.pdf and/or https://adflegal.org/sites/default/files/2020-
04/Soule%20v.%20Connecticut%20Association%20of%20Schools%20-%20Complaint.pdf.   
Hereafter I refer to and cite this complaint as: (Soule et al. 2020, page number). 
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competing against one another, there are absolute physiological advantages that boys (biological 
males) have over girls (biological females). 
 The plaintiffs go to great lengths to demonstrate this absolute advantage, providing 
comparisons of the best-performing boys and girls athletes in the 60m, 100m, 200m, 400m, and 
800m races. They also point to how different standards are set for boys and girls in different 
competitions in a variety of sports (ex. height of the net in volleyball, hurdle height in track, 
standard weight used by shot-putters) (Soule et al. 2020, 14). The complaint also cites Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman, a professor at Duke Law, who has written about sex segregation and sports 
in the past. Since the Soule complaint’s initial filing, and ADF’s continued use of her work, 
Professor Coleman has clarified her support for current NCAA policy regarding the inclusion of 
transgender student-athletes (Hecox 2020, 31).2 The Soule complaint also points to CeCe Telfer, 
the first trans woman to win an NCAA championship (she won the NCAA Divison II women’s 
400m hurdles in 2019), as a means of demonstrating that testosterone-suppressing drugs do not 
meaningfully account for the absolute advantages that biological males enjoy over biological 
females (Soule et al. 2020, 20).  
 Importantly, the plaintiffs construct a narrative of transgender student-athletes that 
suggests “a larger wave of males claiming transgender identity as girls and women” and results 
in the displacement of “those born female—girls” from “varsity spots, playing time, medals, 
advancement to regional meets, championship titles and records, recognition on the victory 
podium[,]” and opportunities for collegiate recruitment, among other things (Soule et al. 2020, 
 
2 Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief, Hecox v. Little, No. 1:20-cv-00184 (D. 
Idaho 2020), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/hecox_v._little_complaint.pdf. Hereafter 
I refer to and cite this complaint as: (Hecox 2020, page number). 
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21). This narrative refuses to acknowledge that trans girls are “actual” girls, so the complaint can 
argue that “girls” are losing opportunities to “biological males.” Indeed, the complaint argues 
that “if the law permits males to compete as girls in high school, then there is no principled basis 
on which colleges can refrain from recruiting these ‘top performing girls’ (in reality males) for 
their ‘women’s teams’ and offering them the ‘women’s’ athletic scholarships” (Soule et al. 2020, 
22, my emphasis). A key part of Soule’s claim thus hinges on an insistence that trans girls are 
not really girls, so a policy that provides trans girls with opportunities according to their gender 
identities (like the CIAC’s) is inherently a violation of Title IX. 
  In its articulation of the impacts of the CIAC policy’s (negative) impacts on the 
plaintiffs, the Soule complaint alleges that Terry Miller and Andraya Yearwood have “taken” 
opportunities away from female track athletes because they were identified as male at birth 
(Soule et al. 2020, 24). The plaintiffs argue that Terry and Andraya have, in part, displaced a 
number of other “female athletes” by effectively disrupting the processes by which girls qualify 
for championship competition (Soule et al. 2020, 24-39). For example, the complaint charges 
Terry and Andraya with denying Chelsea Mitchell a gold medal at the 2019 CIAC State Open 
Championship Women’s Indoor Track 55m because they finished first and second, respectively, 
while Chelsea finished third (Soule et al. 2020, 30). Interestingly, Chelsea beat Terry twice the 
next year in the 55m at the Connecticut State Class S Championship and the State Open, though 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers insisted that said result had no bearing on the ongoing legal proceedings in 
Soule (Associated Press 2020; McFarland 2020). 
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs in Soule argue that “boys” are “competing in CIAC girls’ 
track and field events” and are thus “depriv[ing] many female athletes of opportunities to achieve 
public recognition, a sense of reward for hard work, opportunities to participate in higher level 
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competition, and the visibility necessary to attract the attention of college recruiters and resulting 
scholarships” (Soule et al. 2020, 33). Furthermore, the plaintiffs say they “feel stress, anxiety, 
intimidation, and emotional and psychological distress from being forced to compete against 
males with inherent physiological advantages” in girls competition: Chelsea gets physically ill 
before races in which she competes against trans girls and Selina is depressed after losing 
championship competition spots to trans girls (Soule et al. 2020, 38).  
The Soule complaint culminates in two charges against the CIAC: the CIAC is violating 
Title IX by “failing to provide effective accommodation for the interests and abilities of girls” 
and by “failing to provide equal treatment, benefits[,] and opportunities for girls” (Soule et al.  
2020, 46 and 48).  
Since filing the suit in February 2020, Chelsea Mitchell has been recruited to run track at 
and currently attends William & Mary, Selina Soule has been recruited to run track at and 
currently attends the College of Charleston, and Alanna Smith continues her high school track 
career in the CIAC (Barnes 2020; Soule 2020). As of June 2020, Terry Miller was still unsure 
whether she would continue running track and Andraya Yearwood had decided to attend North 
Carolina Central University, though she decided she would no longer be running competitively 
(Barnes 2020). 
 
ii. Hecox v. Little 
 On February 13, 2020, Idaho State Representative Barbara Ehardt introduced House Bill 
500 (HB 500), named the “Fairness in Women’s Sports Act,” to the Idaho state legislature 
(Ehardt 2020). By March 18, 2020, HB 500 was passed by both Idaho legislative bodies, and on 
March 30, 2020, it was signed into law by Idaho Governor Bradley Little (Ehardt 2020; Richert 
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2020). Effectively, HB 500 “categorically bars women and girls who are transgender, and many 
who are intersex, from participation in school sports consistent with their gender identity […] by 
requiring proof of ‘biological sex’” in ways that are purposefully trans- and intersex-exclusive 
(Hecox 2020, 2-3). The most important section of the law, in the context of Hecox, is the 
following: 
 
Interscholastic, intercollegiate, intramural, or club athletic teams or sports that are 
sponsored by a public school or any school that is a member of the Idaho high school 
activities association or a public institution of higher education or any higher education 
institution that is a member of the national collegiate athletic association (NCAA), 
national association of intercollegiate athletics (NAIA), or national junior college athletic 
association (NJCAA) shall be expressly designated as one (1) of the following based on 
biological sex: (a) Males, men, or boys; (b) Females, women, or girls; or (c) Coed or 
mixed. (2) Athletic teams or sports designated for females, women, or girls shall not be 
open to students of the male sex. (3) If disputed, a student may establish sex by 
presenting a signed physician's statement that shall indicate the student's sex based solely 
on: (a) The student's internal and external reproductive anatomy; (b) The student's normal 
endogenously produced levels of testosterone; (c) An analysis of the student's genetic 
makeup (Ehardt 2020). 
 
HB 500 attempts to explicitly define biological sex within the context of sports and then presents 
a blanket means by which any person may call any athlete’s sex into question through a dispute 
process that can only be resolved by fitting into particular understandings of sex. Furthermore, 
the bill “does not specify what reproductive anatomy, genetic makeup, or normal endogenously 
produced testosterone levels” constitute a “normal” male or female (Hecox 2020, 30).  
 On April 15, 2020, Lindsay Hecox, a Jane Doe, a Jean Doe, and a John Doe (represented 
by the American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Voice, and Cooley LLP) filed a complaint against 
the state of Idaho, alleging that HB 500 “discriminates on the basis of sex and transgender status 
and invades fundamental privacy rights” (Hecox 2020, 5). Lindsay Hecox, the lead plaintiff in 
the Hecox filing, is a trans woman attending Boise State University. Prior to HB 500’s passage, 
she was planning on trying out for the Boise State cross country team in August 2020 (Hecox 
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2020, 6). Jane Doe is a 17-year-old cisgender girl attending Boise High School and she is being 
represented by her mother and father, Jean and John Doe (Hecox 2020, 6). The Hecox complaint 
ultimately alleges that HB 500 violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, deprives the plaintiffs of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, 
constitutes an unconstitutional means of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, 
presents a lack of fair notice to relevant actors under the Fourteenth Amendment, and violates 
Title IX by discriminating against transgender people on the basis of sex and/or transgender 
status (Hecox 2020, 43-53). 
 In contrast to the complaint in Soule, the Hecox complaint goes to great lengths to clarify 
differences between gender identity and biological sex. For instance, Hecox details the process 
by which trans people experience gender dysphoria and are medically treated for such a 
diagnosis in order “to eliminate the clinically significant distress [and help] a transgender person 
live in alignment with their gender identity” (Hecox 2020, 35). Hecox also explains that the 
precise treatment for gender dysphoria looks different for each person, and that while hormone 
therapy and other medical interventions may be necessary, “[n]ot all transgender people need 
surgical treatment to alleviate their dysphoria” (Hecox 2020, 35-37). This articulation of the 
(medicalized) experience of trans folks is necessary because, as Hecox enumerates, “[e]ven 
women [and girls] who have had gender-affirming genital surgery to treat gender dysphoria” 
would be barred from sports competition under HB 500 because they would not have the 
“correct” internal reproductive anatomy to be considered “women” nor would they meet the 
hormone requirement because their hormone levels would most likely not be considered 
“endogenous” (Hecox 2020, 39-40). HB 500 is thus an explicit attempt to bar all trans girls and 
women from sports in Idaho. 
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 The Hecox complaint also raises concerns about the processes by which HB 500 outlines 
an athlete’s sex could be disputed. “Female athletes who are successful, who have features that 
are considered masculine, or who simply become someone’s target,” according to Hecox, “may 
[now] have their sex ‘dispute[d]’” and thus be subject to medical sex/gender verification testing 
(Hecox 2020, 41). This aspect of HB 500 is what most affects someone like Jane Doe because 
the means by which a dispute can be started under the Idaho law basically allows for any given 
woman or girl’s gender to be scrutinized for no reason other than that their “biological sex” is 
inconsistent with that of a “normal female.” Furthermore, the testing required to receive 
sex/gender verification under HB 500 is expensive, can reveal extremely private personal 
information to the state officials responsible for checking a student’s sex/gender verification, and 
“can cause trauma and trigger past sexual and other types of trauma” (Hecox 2020, 41-42). This 
fear of having one’s sex/gender disputed and scrutinized will, according to the Hecox complaint, 
deter a number of women and girls from deciding to participate in competitive athletics and will 
increase the stigma and shame that trans athletes currently experience (Hecox 2020, 43).  
 An amicus brief filed at the appellate court by the National Women’s Law Center 
(NWLC), and supported by 60 other organizations “committed to racial and gender justice and 
LGBTQ rights[,]” further elucidates a concern regarding HB 500’s implications for cisgender 
women and girls: that it will disproportionately affect Black and brown girls (NWLC 2020, 1 and 
7).3 HB 500, they argue, “rests on old, fundamentally inaccurate and harmful stereotypes 
 
3 Brief for Amici Curiae National Women’s Law Center, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law and 60 Additional Organization in Support of Appellees and Affirmance, Hecox v. 
Little et al., Nos. 20-35814, 20-35815 (US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Dec. 2020), 
available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/nwlc_ecf-stamped-hecox-
amicus-12.21.2020.pdf. Hereafter I refer to and cite this document as: (NWLC 2020, page 
number). 
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regarding athleticism, biology, and gender, which particularly harm girls who are transgender 
and Black and brown […] These stereotypes frequently result in such girls being told outright 
that they are not, in fact, girls” (NWLC 2020, 7). The NWLC’s brief and the Hecox complaint 
outline brief histories of sex/gender verification testing—which I have also done in Chapter II—
and then the NWLC shows how such testing has historically disproportionately affected Black 
women and women from the Global South (NWLC 2020, 21). They point to international and 
widely-known examples of athletes—like Caster Semenya, Santhi Soundarajan, Dutee Chand, 
and Serena Williams—to show how suspicion-based testing is most often weaponized against 
Black and brown women deemed not “feminine” enough by their peers to compete. HB 500 puts 
the power of suspicion in the hands of coaches, administrators, and fellow athletes to judge what 
a woman’s body should look like, and this power will be used to specifically police the bodies of 
Black and brown women in Idaho (NWLC 2020, 23-24).  
 On August 17, 2020, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho ruled in 
favor of Lindsay Hecox’s motion for preliminary injunction, halting HB 500’s implementation 
until the courts can rule definitively on the constitutional and statutory challenges to the law 
(Hecox v. Little 2020).4 Though the District Court rules primarily on whether the plaintiffs in 
Hecox have standing to challenge the law’s constitutionality, it also recognizes a valid Title IX 
challenge given the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County. 
 
4 Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149442, 107 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 
(Callaghan) 758, 2020 WL 4760138 (United States District Court for the District of Idaho 
August 17, 2020, Filed), available at https://advance-lexis-
com.proxy.wm.edu/api/document?collection=cases&id=urn:contentItem:60M6-62S1-JS0R-
23B2-00000-00&context=1516831. Hereafter I refer to and cite this document as: (Hecox v. 
Little 2020, page number) 
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On November 12, 2020, Hecox was appealed by the Attorney General of Idaho and two 
Intervenors—Madison Kenyon and Mary Marshall, cross country and track athletes at Idaho 
State University who competed against Juniper Eastwood, a trans woman who used to run for the 
University of Montana, and had “‘deflating experiences’” (Hecox v. Little 2020, 8). Kenyon and 
Marshall are being represented by the ADF. The case is currently being adjudicated in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
B. Language in Soule v. Connecticut 
 The language of sex and gender is so instrumental to the case presented by the plaintiffs 
in Soule that it tries to be clear of its definition(s) of sex/gender from the second page of the 
brief: 
 
Because Title IX focuses on equal opportunities between the sexes, because this 
Complaint is precisely concerned with effects of biological differences between males 
and females, because the terms “boys” and “men” are commonly understood to refer to 
males, and to avoid otherwise inevitable confusion, we refer in this complaint to athletes 
who are biologically male as “boys” or “men,” and to athletes who are biologically 
female as “girls” or “women” (Soule et al. 2020, 2).  
 
The complaint articulates the “biological differences” that it is concerned with in a myriad of 
ways that primarily focus on chromosomal sex (boys are “those born with XY chromosomes” 
and girls are “those who are born female […] with XX chromosomes) and supposed 
physiological differences between the sexes (Soule et al. 2020, 3 and 11). Physiological 
differences, according to the Soule complaint, are essential to the very notion of providing 
athletic opportunities to women because “ignoring differences in male and female physiology 
[…] would for many sports ‘effectively eliminate opportunities for women to participate in 
organized competitive athletics’” (Soule et al. 2020, 11-12). Furthermore, the complaint argues 
that puberty operates as a juncture for when sex-related physiological differences become too 
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powerful for female athletes to overcome as levels of circulating testosterone in males makes it 
“impossible for girls and women in the vast majority of athletic competitions” to win (Soule et 
al. 2020, 12). 
 In addition to its arguments of inherent male-superiority, the Soule complaint asserts that 
there is also inherent female-inferiority within competitive athletics as “female puberty brings 
distinctive changes to girls and women that identifiably impede athletic performance” (Soule et 
al. 2020, 13). These notions of male superiority and female inferiority are touted to be 
“inescapable biological facts of the human species, not stereotypes, ‘social constructs,’ or relics 
of past discrimination” (Soule et al. 2020, 14). The Soule complaint thus relies on an 
understanding of sex and gender that make the two effectively synonymous and cements 
sex/gender differences that aim to naturalize sex/gender hierarchies. In other words, the 
complaint affirms essential, biological differences between men and women that are understood 
to be undeniable, unalterable, and mark men as superior and women as inferior. 
 The naturalization of gender differences in Soule is ultimately essential to both Title IX 
claims of sex discrimination made in the complaint. First, the complaint argues that the CIAC 
has failed to “provide accommodation for interests and abilities of girls […] by permitting males 
to compete in girls’ track and field events (Soule et al. 2020, 47, my emphasis). By failing to 
account for the profound, inescapable physiological differences between girls and boys, the 
Soule complaint suggests that the CIAC has failed to accommodate for the (inferior) abilities of 
girls in relation to those (superior) abilities of boys. And by allowing trans girls (whom the Soule 
complaint only ever refers to as “boys” or “biological males”) to compete in girls’ competition, 
cisgender girls (“girls” or “females”) have lost opportunities relative to their male counterparts. 
The second claim of sex discrimination under Title IX made in Soule further elaborates on the 
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issue of lost opportunities by arguing that “the CIAC policy that permits males to participate in 
girls’ events and be recognized as winners of girls’ events” fails to “provide equal treatment, 
benefits[,] and opportunities in athletic competition to girls” (Soule et al. 2020, 49). Both claims 
enumerate harms to the plaintiffs as “loss of the experience of fair competition; loss of victories 
and the public recognition associated with victories […] loss of visibility to college recruiters; 
emotional distress, pain, [and] anxiety” (Soule et al. 2020, 47-49).  
 Clearly, the Soule complaint fails to confront any nuance in the ways in which we might 
understand sex and gender. And it effectively refuses to acknowledge and/or respect the 
gendered experiences of trans people, as evidenced by its refusal to even address trans girls as 
“trans girls” but rather as “males” or even “boys.” Soule even goes so far as to suggest that 
“wave[s]” of “males” are “claiming transgender identity as girls” and thus more and more 
(“real”) cisgender girls are losing opportunities in athletics (Soule et al. 2020, 21). Not only is 
such a claim false because there is no evidence that an increasing number of trans women are 
displacing cis women in competitive athletics but it further exemplifies Soule’s unwillingness to 
acknowledge that trans girls and women are girls and women. 
 Indeed, the denial of trans girls’ existence (at least as girls or women) is so instrumental 
to Soule that the case is currently stalled at the appellate court because the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
requested that the district court judge recuse himself after asking them “to refrain from 
continuing to refer to the transgender females involved in [the] case as ‘males’” (Chatigny 
2020).5 In his denial of the plaintiffs’ recusal request, Judge Robert N. Chatigny wrote that “for 
 
5 Order denying Motion to Transfer/Disqualify/Recuse Judge, Soule et al. v. Connecticut 
Association of Schools, Inc. et al, No. 3:20-cv-00201, (D. Conn. 2020), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/soule_et_al_v._ct_association_of_school
s_et_al_-_order_denying_recusal_request.pdf. Hereafter I refer to and cite this document as: 
(Chatigny 2020). 
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plaintiffs’ counsel to continue to call these transgender youth ‘males’ would be needlessly 
provocative, and inconsistent with norms of civility in judicial proceedings” (Chatigny 2020). 
Even more, Judge Chatigny notes how “calling transgender girls ‘males’ can cause significant 
mental and emotional distress […so] referring to these transgender youth as ‘transgender 
females’ would be consistent with ‘science, common practice, and perhaps human decency’” 
(Chatigny 2020). Judge Chatigny’s refusal to recuse himself importantly demonstrates how 
courts already have a conception of how to talk about trans people and understand some of the 
stakes in the language of sex and gender. Furthermore, his argument against recusal illumines 
how out-of-legal-standard the complaint and argument in Soule really are in their insistence that 
we refer to trans girls and women as “males.”  
In their petition for writ of mandamus to the appeals court, the ADF argues for recusal by 
insisting that “[f]actually and scientifically, Petitioners’ claim is exclusively about human 
biology and the substantial advantage in physical capabilities that the bodies of male humans 
enjoy after passing through even early stages of male puberty” (Soule et al. petition 2020, 3).6 
The gender identities of trans girls are, according to the ADF, “objectively irrelevant to the 
deprivation of equal opportunity inflicted on women and girls by competition against males 
because it is irrelevant to the physiological advantages in athletic capability” (A Soule et al. 
petition 2020, 4). The ADF asserts that the plaintiffs in Soule “must refer to the two athletes 
[Andraya Yearwood and Terry Miller] who have taken opportunities from girls in Connecticut in 
the way that is relevant to physiology and to Title IX: by their sex” (Soule et al. petition 2020, 4). 
 
6 Petition for writ of mandamus to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut,  
Soule et al. v. Connecticut Association of Schools, Inc. et al, No. 3:20-cv-00201 (US Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit  2020), available at https://adflegal.org/sites/default/files/2020-
07/Soule-v-Connecticut-Association-Schools-Mandamus-Petition.pdf. Hereafter I refer to and 
cite this document as: (Soule et al. petition 2020, page number). 
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Thus, instead of realigning to legal norms that would, according to Judge Chatigny, still allow 
for the case to “be fully and fairly litigated consistent with professional ethics and constitutional 
protections[,]” the plaintiffs in Soule double-down on the language of sex and gender they use in 
their complaint (Chatigny 2020). Indeed, at some level, Soule’s entire case rests on how the law 
chooses to understand the language of sex and gender. 
 
C. Language in Hecox v. Little 
 In contrast to the Soule complaint, Hecox levies several legal challenges against HB 500 
in Idaho, only one of which being that is presents a violation of Title IX. The Hecox complaint 
suggests that sex discrimination under Title IX “encompasses discrimination against individuals 
because they are transgender, because they are women and girls (whether cisgender or 
transgender), and because they depart from stereotypes associated with sex” (Hecox 2020, 50). 
This particular interpretation of sex discrimination under Title IX is a nod towards Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989), in which the Supreme Court held that gender stereotyping 
constituted sex discrimination. The argument follows that discrimination against trans folks is, in 
some way, a form of gender stereotyping and thus a form of sex discrimination.  
 Further, the Hecox complaint challenges the ways in which HB 500 tries to define sex. 
The complaint argues that “[n]either Title IX, its regulations, nor its guidance purports to define 
‘sex’ based on endogenous hormone levels, internal or external reproductive anatomy, or 
chromosomes” (Hecox 2020, 51). Even more, the complaint provides its own definitions and 
explanations for sex/gender terms. For instance, it differentiates between gender identity and 
biological sex such that “‘gender identity’ is the medical term for a person’s internal innate sense 
of belonging to a particular sex” (Hecox 2020, 33). Every person, according to the complaint, has 
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a gender identity, “there is a significant biologic component underlying gender identity” and 
“gender identity is durable and cannot be changed by medical intervention” (Hecox 2020, 33). 
Though this definition may problematically assume that gender identity must inherently link to a 
particular sex category or identification, it still elaborates on a distinction between sex and 
gender that Soule neglects. 
 Hecox also clarifies that “[t]he term ‘biological sex’ is imprecise” because sex attributes 
can include “chromosomes, certain genes, gonads, the body’s production of and response to 
certain hormones, internal and external genitalia, secondary sex characteristics, and gender 
identity[,]” some of which may not always align “in typical ways” (Hecox 2020, 33). Sex 
designation/determination, Hecox points out, “usually occurs at birth based on the infant child’s 
genitals” and “[m]ost people have a gender identity that aligns with the sex they are assigned at 
birth” (Hecox 2020, 33-34). However, trans people have “a gender identity that does not align 
with the sex they [were] assigned at birth[,]” which can lead to “gender dysphoria,” “a serious 
medical condition that, if left untreated can result in severe anxiety and depression, self-harm, 
and suicidality” (Hecox 2020, 34). And while treatment for gender dysphoria can take myriad 
forms—surgical intervention not always being necessary—Hecox stresses that “a critical part of 
treatment is affirming ‘social transition’: the process by which a person expresses themselves 
consistent with gender identity” (Hecox 2020, 35). When it comes to the context of athletics, 
“forcing a girl who is transgender out of spaces designated for girls is extremely harmful and can 
result in serious health consequences” (Hecox 2020, 35). Importantly, the Hecox complaint 
refers to trans girls as girls, using inclusive and affirming language tossed aside by HB 500 and 
the Soule complaint. 
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 The Hecox complaint’s Title IX claim thus takes a significantly different approach to the 
language of sex and gender than Soule does by both being inclusive and affirming of trans people 
in said language. The language used in the Hecox complaint is also more aligned with legal 
standards than Soule’s is. For instance, in the District Court of Idaho’s granting for preliminary 
injunction in Hecox the court actually relies on definitions of “sex,” “gender identity,” 
“cisgender,” “transgender,” “gender dysphoria,” and “intersex” put forward by the plaintiffs’ 
complaint (Hecox v. Little 2020, 5). This use of the language in the Hecox (preliminary) decision 
demonstrates how legal norms and standards lean towards the language put forward by the 
Hecox complaint while Soule’s stalling-out in the appellate court exemplifies how out-of-
standard that complaint’s language is. 
 However, the rhetoric deployed in Hecox, and broadly accepted within the legal 
community and judiciary, presents its own problems. Namely, despite challenging popular 
understandings of sex and gender, the complaint still leans heavily into medicalized language as 
a means of seeking validation for its claims. For example, the complaint asserts that a trans 
person “is someone who has a gender identity that does not align with the sex they are assigned 
at birth[,]” and that this results in gender dysphoria, “the diagnostic term for the condition where 
clinically significant distress results from the lack of congruence between a person’s gender 
identity and the sex they are designated at birth” (Hecox 2020, 34). This particular articulation of 
transness wades into Sandy Stone’s “diagnostic battlefield” in which we specifically come to 
understand transness as being born in the “wrong body” (Stone 2006, 231 and 232). The product 
of this “wrong body” narrative is a world in which we attribute one type of sexed body per 
gendered subject and regulate or discipline those bodies that may not conform to such a 
paradigm (Stone 2006, 231).  
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 While Stone’s work focuses on physical parts of the body associated with certain cultural 
norms of sex and gender, Hecox focuses on the role of hormones as a mechanism by which we 
might be more inclusive of trans people and their bodies. For instance, the complaint describes 
how the lead plaintiff, Lindsay Hecox, is being “treated with both testosterone suppression and 
estrogen” as part of her treatment for gender dysphoria (Hecox 2020, 13). This hormone 
treatment, it argues, “lowers her circulating testosterone levels and affects her bodily systems 
and secondary sex characteristics” (Hecox 2020, 13). And Lindsay’s hormone treatment is 
consistent with existing NCAA guidelines regarding the inclusion of trans women in varsity 
intercollegiate athletics (Hecox 2020, 14; NCAA Office of Inclusion 2011).  
 Still, Stone’s critique of the medicalization of trans people’s bodies applies to the Hecox 
complaint because it points toward medical knowledge of transness to make its case. Indeed, the 
medical and psychological establishment remain “gatekeepers for cultural norms […] the final 
authority for was counts as a culturally intelligible body” (Stone 2006, 232). In other words, as 
the Hecox complaint participates in medical discourse about transness as a means of obtaining 
authority for its claims, it also reifies the ability for medicine to determine who and what kind of 
body counts as properly cisgender or transgender. The complaint even provides a photo of 
Lindsay in which she has long hair, appears to be wearing makeup, and is dressed in “feminine” 
clothing so as to demonstrate how her hormone treatment for gender dysphoria “properly” aligns 
with her identity as a trans woman. The point is not to critique Lindsay here but instead to be 
critical of how a very particular narrative of transness is being provided to the courts through the 
use of medical discourses. A trans student-athlete with less access to medical resources, for 
example, may be less intelligible to the court in a case like Hecox, which means that the medical 
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field maintains a great deal of power—socially and legally—to determine whose bodies count in 
“x” category and whose bodies do not. 
 Stone’s critique, along with arguments presented by scholars like Judith Butler, Emi 
Koyoma, and Riki Anne Wilchins, are important to keep in mind in the context of a case like 
Hecox because it pushes the legal logic of the complaint to questions essential to broader action. 
For instance, why is hormone treatment for one year necessary in order for a trans girl or woman 
to compete in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics? What if that trans student-athlete cannot 
obtain access to such treatment? What if a trans student-athlete does not currently want to 
undergo hormone treatment? should they still be restricted from competition? Why are certain 
medical interventions required by athletic governing bodies and others are not? What if a 
student-athlete identifies as nonbinary and wants to compete in a sports category different from 
the sex they were assigned at birth? These questions exist somewhat outside of the scope of the 
project at hand, but they remain instrumental to broader discussions of how we might work to 
further understand the nuances of the language of sex and gender in sports. 
 
D. The Far Side of Language and the Threat of Soule v. Connecticut 
 Because Title IX articulates a particular concern over discrimination “on the basis of 
sex,” the language of sex and gender is essential to how any claim of discrimination is made 
under the statute. In Hecox v. Little, the language of sex and gender is articulated in such a way 
that makes it legally reasonable to argue that discrimination against trans folks because they are 
trans constitutes (a form of) sex discrimination, perhaps under particular conditions, like medical 
transition. This argument is supported by the Supreme Court’s June 2020 decision in Bostock v. 
Clayton County, which I will take up in the next chapter to demonstrate how a textualist 
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approach to Title IX (following Bostock) resolves both Hecox and Soule. In this last section, 
though, I would like to further elucidate the argument and implications of harms in Soule, 
particularly as they relate to that case’s reliance on trans-exclusionary language.  
In Soule, the plaintiffs express a number of affectual harms that exist outside of the 
context of being (theoretically) denied opportunities through the inclusion of trans athletes in 
competition. “The Plaintiffs[,]” according to the complaint, “are demoralized […] they also feel 
stress, anxiety, intimidation, and emotional and psychological distress from being forced to 
compete against males with inherent physiological advantages in the girls’ category” (Soule et al. 
2020, 38). Selina Soule has “suffered depression after being excluded from participation in State 
finals because top places in the girls’ ranking were occupied by males” and Chelsea Mitchell 
“has felt physically sick before races in which she knew she would have to race against a male” 
(Soule et al. 2020, 38). This enumeration of emotional and psychological harms is important 
because it both encapsulates the complaint’s transphobic rhetoric and exemplifies a larger move 
to portray trans women and girls as an inherent threat to cis women. 
First, it is necessary to (appropriately and) explicitly describe the complaint in Soule as 
transphobic for two reasons: (1) it purposefully refuses to acknowledge the trans girls it names in 
its complaint as trans girls and (2) its investment in affectual claims of intimidation, emotional 
distress, and physical illness whilst in the presence of trans girls. While the Soule complaint does 
refer to Terry Miller and Andraya Yearwood by their chosen names, it fervently refuses to refer 
to them as trans girls. Instead, the complaint insists on referring to Terry and Andraya as “males” 
and uses other language inconsistent with the imperative to affirm trans people’s experiences and 
identities. Furthermore, when the complaint asserts that Chelsea Mitchell “felt physically sick” 
before she competed against Terry and/or Andraya because of their mere presence in the race, it 
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is creating a direct link between their existence as trans girls and Chelsea’s feelings of distress 
(Soule et al. 2020, 38). The complaint teeters on the edge of language of disgust in some of its 
descriptions of how Soule’s plaintiffs felt about competing against trans girls. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED), to be transphobic is to be “hostile towards […] transgender 
people” (“Transphobic, Adj.” n.d.). The Soule complaint clears the bar of hostility towards Terry 
Miller and Andraya Yearwood, and generally poses a greater threat to trans youth in Connecticut 
(if not also the rest of the country). The complaint and its rhetoric are transphobic. 
Furthermore, the language that the Soule complaint uses to explain the harms of the 
CIAC’s inclusive policy towards trans youth is not only hostile towards trans people but also 
takes a step towards constructing trans girls and women as inherent threats cisgender girls and 
women. Given the context of interscholastic competitive athletics, the complaint articulates this 
supposed inherent threat through the language of universal, absolute physiological differences 
between the male and female sexes. Indeed, the plaintiffs are “demoralized,” according to the 
complaint, because there is no hope of “experiencing the thrill of victory” when competing 
against trans girls “with inherent physiological advantages” (Soule et al. 2020, 38). This 
construction of trans girls and women in sports as inherent threats to cis girls and women 
operates in two ways. First, it aims to argue that trans girls and women disrupt notions of a level-
playing field because of their supposed superior physiological capabilities. And second, it 
anchors its characterization(s) of trans girls and women in Butler’s “far side of language,” 
insisting that cis women be understood as inherently, universally inferior to men in sports. 
I want to take up the argument of fair play first. Disputes over what kind of biological 
advantages exist for males over females in the context of sports are extremely contentious, 
remain unresolved, and often fail to acknowledge and/or account for transgender people. Instead 
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of (re)hashing these ongoing debates over biological/physiological advantages, I will focus 
specifically on the advantages listed in the Soule complaint. Soule situates the turning point in 
male and female development at puberty, at which point, according to the complaint, the levels 
of circulating testosterone in males increases to levels ten to twenty times higher than those 
levels that occur in females (Soule et al. 2020, 12). This testosterone “drives a wide range of 
physiological changes that give males a powerful physiological athletic advantage over females,” 
according to the complaint (Soule et al. 2020, 12). Furthermore, the Soule complaint argues that 
“female puberty brings distinctive changes to girls and women that identifiably impede athletic 
performance,” making girls and women increasingly inferior to boys and men in sports (Soule et 
al. 2020, 12). Soule thus naturalizes a patriarchal, misogynistic hierarchy in sports through its 
understanding of the sex binary. 
 Importantly, Soule’s explanation of the sex binary expresses neither a willingness to think 
critically about the nuances of sex differences nor an effort to understand the unique positions of 
trans folks within discourses of sex difference. Indeed, by only addressing the trans girls its 
complaint targets as “males,” the complaint fails to accurately conceptualize the biological and 
physiological experience(s) of trans girls and women. The complaint also relies on testimony and 
an article written by legal scholar Doriane Lambelet Coleman—whose work has been used to 
show that trans girls and women would inevitably displace all cis girls and women in sports—
even though her work has only ever made comparisons between male and female athletes and 
failed to account for trans girls and women not being “male athletes.” In other words, the Soule 
complaint relies heavily on the idea that we can assume that trans girls and women in sports will 
have the same results as men. Not only is such logic flawed because it inherently assumes that 
trans girls and women are simply “males” but also, because of its refusal to acknowledge trans 
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girls and women as girls and women, it fails to understand that trans girls and women would not 
inherently put out the same competitive results if they identified as men (for any number of 
reasons including, but not limited to, possible gender-affirming hormone treatment). 
 Furthermore, if testosterone is the locus for athletic (dis)advantages, then it seems more 
fair for everyone if we simply segregate athletic competition(s) based on levels of testosterone. 
In other words, even if we take Soule’s word that testosterone is an inherently-performance-
enhancing hormone, then it seems that the best course of action would be to simply separate 
levels of competition on the basis of testosterone levels. Or, if Soule and its supporters would 
like to argue that other “physiological” factors structure the hierarchy of athletics, then we can 
account for those factors as well. The point is that the locus of athletic (dis)advantages is not sex 
itself. Being identified as male at birth does not inevitably make one faster or stronger than every 
other person identified as female at birth, gonads do not determine athletic success or advantage, 
and the presence or absence of a Y chromosome does not make a person more or less athletic. 
“Sex” is thus being used as a proxy for other things that people are concerned may (or may not) 
disrupt the level-playing-field and fairness. And there’s a great unwillingness to move towards 
non-sex categories of athletic competition because to do so would more explicitly demonstrate 
that “physiological advantages” occur in a variety of ways, most of which are probably not 
inherently or exclusively dependent on a person’s sex or hormone/androgen levels.   
 The Soule complaint’s reliance on the notion of “physiological differences” and 
“physiological advantages” between males and females also relies on a particular participation in 
what Judith Butler calls “the far side of language” (Butler 1990, 155). The complaint profoundly 
insists that the physiological advantages it describes “are inescapable biological facts of the 
human species, not stereotypes, ‘social constructs,’ or relics of past discrimination” (Soule et al. 
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2020, 14). Thus, it insists that its articulation of the category of “sex” is “unmarked by a social 
system” of gender (Butler 1990, 155).  
The complaint, though, is wrong in its assertion that its characterization of “physiological 
advantages” and “sex” are “inescapable biological facts,” and not “social constructs” (Soule et 
al. 2020, 14). First, the language of “physiological difference” and “physiological advantage” 
lacks necessary specificity. Physiology differs widely amongst all people, and sometimes these 
differences express themselves through challenges to the level-playing-field in ways people are 
less concerned with (Michael Phelps’s large wingspan, for instance). And in Soule, 
“physiological advantages” are solely the byproducts of elevated levels of circulating 
testosterone in “biological males” that occur during and after puberty. Yet, even testosterone can 
be said to be socially constructed, at least in part, because of social norms that link the hormone 
to virility and physiological superiority (Jordan-Young and Karkazis 2019). Further, testosterone 
may do certain things to a body that might make it more inclined to run a faster 1500 meter race 
or jump a little farther in the long jump; however, that bodily relation to testosterone is certainly 
not a universal one given that some people’s bodies actually cannot retain the hormone in their 
systems (ex. androgen insensitivity syndrome). “Physiological advantages,” then, arise in any 
number of ways, some of which may be tied to characteristics that the category of “sex” attempts 
to capture, but some of which also exist outside of the paradigms of sex.  
The way that Soule weaponizes the language of “sex” can also be subject to critical 
scrutiny that reveals the category’s social construction. In other contexts, Butler and Fausto-
Sterling have effectively deconstructed sex to demonstrate that it is at least not a binary and that 
the meanings we place on the terms “male” and “female” are not inherent or essential (Butler 
1990; Fausto-Sterling 2012). And Suzanne Kessler’s work demonstrates how we literally 
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medically (re)construct sex and gender onto the bodies of children who do not meet social norms 
of the sexed body at birth (Kessler 1990).  
In the space of sports, we can simply look at the history of sex/gender testing at elite 
levels of international competition to show how the categories of “sex” have never been as stable 
as people have wanted them to be. The constant shifting of testing mechanisms, the moving-of-
the-line of demarcation for what counts as “male” and what counts as “female,” and the 
regulations adopted to expel those people whose lives and bodies defy supposed bodily norms all 
demonstrate ways in which sports actively participate in the social construction of sex. The Soule 
complaint’s usage of “physiological advantages” and “biological sex” thus reach out to the far 
side of language in search of some apparent, inherent capital-t truth that is not actually there. 
The very social construction of the ways in which we understand and account for “physiological 
advantages” and the inability for a category like “sex” to succinctly or effectively capture the 
nuances of human physiological development, demonstrates the absence of authority in Soule’s 
claims. In other words, Soule is using “physiological advantages” and “sex” as if they have some 
innate, essential power behind them that makes the complaint’s legal claims any more legible 
and affirmative. The complaint’s refusal to acknowledge the ways in which these words are 
socially constructed, and the very sense that they are so, disrupts any kind of leverage the 
plaintiffs think they hold by using them. 
It is important to recognize these two things—the idea of inherent, universal 
“physiological advantages” experienced by all “biological males” and the supposedly coherent 
category of “sex”—as social constructs because the Soule complaint has deployed them in such a 
way that to accept both as true would be to also accept that trans girls and women should not be 
recognized as girls or women. The language of “physiological advantages” implies that these 
Mackey 81 
advantages are almost exclusively and universally experienced by “males,” reifying the idea that 
cisgender women are inherently inferior to men in the arena of sports. This logic is deeply 
problematic because it opens up the possibility for a rational basis for the exclusion of trans girls 
and women from sports. This argument can only be made if we (1) accept that girls and women 
are consistently and universally inferior to men in sports, (2) refuse to recognize the myriad of 
factors that the category of “sex” cannot adequately capture in terms like “male” and “female,” 
and/or (3) do not recognize trans girls and women as girls and women. The Soule complaint does 
all three. 
The logic in Soule is also extremely dangerous because through trying to form a rational 
basis for the exclusion of trans girls and women from sports it (re)articulates an understanding of 
sex and gender that not only refuses to acknowledge trans girls and women but also 
(re)constructs trans girls and women as immediate threats to cisgender girls and women. Indeed, 
Soule may find unusual allies in trans exclusionary radical feminists also seeking to develop a 
narrative in which the boundaries of womanhood cannot possibly be understood to encompass 
the lives and experiences of trans women. This narrative is so troubling because it contends that 
any discussion of transgender recognition and/or rights is a zero-sum game for cisgender girls 
and women. In other words, any (re)affirmation of transgender rights is strictly understood as a 
loss of some sort to cisgender girls and women. And this is the framework within which Soule 
operates: transgender girls and women are having their rights affirmed by being allowed to 
compete, which (according to the complaint) threatens the rights and opportunities of cisgender 
girls and women in sports. 
Of course, the logic that leads to this zero-sum game falls apart at all three points of 
contention. At all levels of competitive athletics, but especially at the interscholastic and 
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intercollegiate levels, it seems remiss to argue that girls and women are consistently and 
universally inferior to men. James Fallows and Iris Marion Young, in their deconstructions of 
“throwing like a girl,” demonstrate how biological constructions of bodily difference are at least 
in part informed by the sets of possibilities and potentialities the social world allows to exist for 
girls and boys (Fallows 1996, Young 1980). Second, “sex” cannot do what the sports world 
wants it to do. It cannot neatly account for widespread differences in physiology that appear 
across all populations of people and that may or may not disrupt our notions of fair play. Sex, at 
least as it is deployed in Soule, is a poor proxy for other characteristics of embodiment that may 
or may not have implications on how successful any given person is in sports. Finally, to not 
recognize trans girls and women as girls and women is to deny them the agency and autonomy 
they ought to have with regards to their gender. To not affirm trans people in their identities is to 
deny them their ability and right to exist as who they are. And when we do not affirm and respect 
trans people, we know that their social positions and health outcomes become increasingly 
precarious. 
Soule presents an easier target for critique because of its explicit use of hostile anti-trans 
arguments and repudiated biological “facts.” Hecox, though, holds central the need for affirming 
gender identity while also accepting the legitimacy of medical intervention as a pre-condition for 
trans girls and women to be affirmed as women in sports. In some ways, then, despite seeking a 
ruling that would find exclusion of transwomen in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletic 
competition as a form of sex discrimination, the affirmation of the NCAA’s policy for 
transgender inclusion also affirms the idea that the “biological male” haunts the existence of the 
trans girl and trans woman. 
Mackey 83 
A key argument in the Hecox complaint is its assertion that HB 500 goes to extreme 
lengths to prevent trans girls and women from competing in sports. It makes this argument, in 
part, by comparing HB 500 to NCAA and IOC policies regarding the inclusion of transgender 
athletes, particularly trans women. The NCAA mandates that trans women undergo at least 12 
months of testosterone suppression treatment prior to competing on a women’s team (NCAA 
Office of Inclusion 2011). The IOC has a similar requirement by which trans women must 
demonstrate that their total testosterone levels have been below 10 nmol/L for 12 months prior to 
their first competition and throughout the time period they wish to compete (Erikainen 2019, 
129; International Olympic Committee 2015). HB 500, then, goes beyond the scope of national 
and international sports regulatory bodies’ own guidelines allowing for the participation of trans 
women in elite athletics. 
Hecox thus brings forward Lindsay Hecox, a trans woman who has done everything 
required by the relevant institutions in order to compete in intercollegiate athletics, as the 
challenger to HB 500. Yet, (at least in part) arguing that HB 500 is a wrongfully discriminatory 
piece of legislation by contrasting it to well-established institutional regulations at more elite 
levels of sports competition suggests that HB 500 is only wrong because it goes too far. That is, 
Hecox does not refute the claim that some kind of regulation of trans women’s bodies is 
necessary in order for them to “fairly” compete in sports. Hecox subsequently ends up relying on 
the same exact premise that motivates the Soule complaint: that trans girls and trans women are 
simply “biological males” with preexisting physiological advantages inherent in their bodies 
through their maleness. The only difference between the two complaints in the deployment of 
this logic is that Hecox is less overt in its affirmation of such a flawed system for understanding 
sex and gender. 
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So, it becomes important to not only argue that someone like Lindsay Hecox should be 
allowed to compete in women’s sports because she is a trans woman but also that existing 
regulation of trans people’s bodies as prerequisites to competition are incredibly flawed. Stone’s 
“diagnostic battlefield” reappears in NCAA and IOC rules regarding the inclusion of trans 
athletes because both end up (re)constructing notions of which (trans) bodies are “right” and 
which are “wrong.” Furthermore, the NCAA and the IOC continue to solely understand trans 
women as “biological males,” putting language like “physiological advantages” and 
“testosterone” at the center of the ways in which we are told to understand trans women, at least 
in the context of sports. But, again, we cannot and/or should not be effectively treating trans 
women in sports as if they were/are biological males and there is little to no evidence for claims 
that testosterone is the mechanism by which we can and/or should measure athletic capacity or 
capability (Jordan-Young and Karkazis 2019). This particular critique of NCAA and IOC 
policies does not even account for the ways in which the “trans-inclusionary” regulations 
reinforce a reliance on class-based constructions of transness, are implicated in the racialization 
of transness and gender more broadly, and systematically reaffirm notions of male superiority 
and female inferiority (both inside and outside of a sports context).  
This chapter has focused on the language of sex and gender in Soule and Hecox because, 
as I hope to have shown, the language is essential to the implications of both cases. Particularly 
when we are engaging with the law, the language we use becomes extraordinarily important 
because of the law’s power to inevitably determine who gets to live and thrive and who is left as 
a subject to deferred death. In the case of Soule, we are presented with a legal argument that 
deploys, among other things, a logic that portrays transgender girls and women as ever-present 
threats to cisgender girls and women. Soule also only seeks injunctive relief under Title IX, 
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meaning that if the court were to rule in their favor it would establish a precedent for accepting 
such a logic as enough to make a claim for sex discrimination. Thus, Soule presents an extremely 
dangerous effort to codify legal precedent establishing legal recognition and/or protection of 
trans girls and women as a form of sex discrimination (presumably against cisgender girls and 
women). It bears insisting, then, that if such a thing were to happen, the consequences for trans 
people across the US would be disastrous, both within and outside of legal antidiscrimination 
contexts. 
In the next chapter, I look to the Supreme Court’s June 2020 ruling in Bostock v. Clayton 
County as a means to resolve Soule and Hecox immediately, avoid the risk of validating the 
argument for sex discrimination in Soule in any way, and (re)establishing precedent that makes 
bills like HB 500 illegal. I engage heavily with the textualist interpretation of the law presented 
in the Bostock opinion to propose that even when the law is interpreted in the most conservative 
manner, it still protects transgender student-athletes from being barred from competition 
according to their gender identity. I then turn to critiquing the Court’s textualism in order to 
elucidate the ways in which “sex discrimination,” as described in Bostock, fails to account for the 
unique ways in which trans girls and women, particularly those trying to compete in 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics, experience myriad forms of gender-based, racialized 
discrimination. In developing such a critique I hope to illustrate the limits and boundaries of 
Bostock, and point towards problems of antidiscrimination law that still need to be resolved in 





V. Resolving Soule and Hecox in a post-Bostock world 
In June 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in 
Bostock v. Clayton County, a case primarily considering whether being fired for being 
homosexual or transgender constituted a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. The Court’s 
opinion was written by Justice Neil Gorsuch, who took a strictly textualist approach to the statute 
in determining that “[a]n employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender 
defies the law” by violating Title VII and discriminating on the basis of sex (Bostock 2020, 33).7 
The ruling was widely seen as a victory for queer and trans people because it effectively 
established that discrimination against LGBT people because they were LGBT constituted sex 
discrimination. And Bostock is understood as a case that can have implications on cases outside 
of Title VII’s limited scope, like those that engage with Title IX. The defendants in Bostock 
presented this concern about scope as an argument to the Court, positing that a decision in favor 
of the plaintiffs “will sweep beyond Title VII to other federal or state laws that prohibit sex 
discrimination […like] sex-segregated bathrooms, locker rooms, and dress codes” (Bostock 
2020, 31). Interscholastic and intercollegiate sports were almost certainly on the defendants’ 
minds as well.  
In this chapter, I briefly articulate the Court’s textualist approach in Bostock and then 
argue that the case’s implications on Title IX effectively resolve Soule v. Connecticut and Hecox 
v. Little. I then aim to demonstrate the limitations of the Court’s textualist approach to Title VII’s 
 
7 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3252, 104 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. (CCH) P46,540, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 294 (Supreme Court of the United States 
June 15, 2020, Decided), available at https://advance-lexis-
com.proxy.wm.edu/api/document?collection=cases&id=urn:contentItem:604P-P051-JS0R-
21DV-00000-00&context=1516831 and/or https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-
1618_hfci.pdf. Herafter I refer to and cite this case as: (Bostock 2020, page number). 
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language in Bostock, the pitfalls of antidiscrimination law generally, and the ways in which the 
language of sex discrimination can still be used against trans student-athletes post-Bostock. I 
hope to establish these limitations in anticipation of Chapter VI’s intersectional, prescriptive 
approach to antidiscrimination law, with regards to protections for transgender student-athletes’ 
ability to compete in school-sponsored sports. 
 
A. A textualist reading of sex discrimination in Bostock v. Clayton County 
Bostock v. Clayton County was decided together with Altitude Express, Inc., et al. v. 
Zarda et al. and R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission et al. (Bostock 2020, 1). In all three cases, an employee was fired for either being 
gay or transgender (Bostock and Altitude Express involved firings of gay employees while R. G. 
& G. R. Harris Funeral Homes involved the firing of a trans woman, Aimee Stephens, who died 
a month prior to the Court’s ruling in June 2020). All three cases involved claims of sex 
discrimination in the workplace, which is outlawed in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(along with discrimination on the basis of race, color religion, and national origin) (Bostock 
2020, 2). The Supreme Court ruled that in all three cases the employers had violated Title VII 
because they had discriminated against an employee on the basis of sex. According to the Court: 
 
An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that. 
person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. 
Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII 
forbids (Bostock 2020). 
 
In its opinion, the Court also emphasized that it reached such a decision by interpreting “the 
express terms of the statute” and the “written word of the law” (Bostock 2020, 2). In other words, 
the Court took a strictly textualist approach to Title VII in Bostock, interpreting the statute “in 
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accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment” (Bostock 2020, 
4). Another way to think about this textualist approach is that the justices only work with the 
“plain statutory commands” and make no assumptions “about intentions or guesswork about 
expectations” that may or may not have been on lawmakers’ minds at the time of enactment 
(Bostock 2020, 33). In its textualist approach to Bostock, the Court makes three important legal 
maneuvers: (1) it defines sex as male and female, (2) it establishes a “but-for” test of 
discrimination, and (3) it argues that sex discrimination occurs when a person is intentionally 
treated worse because of their sex.  
 In its move to interpret Title VII as it was written and understood in 1964, the Court first 
aims to “determine the ordinary public meaning” of “sex” (Bostock 2020, 4 and 5). In Bostock, 
the employers (defendants) argued that in 1964 “sex” meant that someone was male or female 
based on their reproductive biology while the employees posited that “even in 1964, the term 
bore a broader scope, capturing more than anatomy and reaching at least some norms concerning 
gender identity and sexual orientation” (Bostock 2020, 5). The Court asserts that its approach to 
the cases does not rely on a resolution to the disagreement between the two parties regarding the 
definition of sex, and the employees’ lawyers do not depend on winning the debate over the 
definition to make their case, so “sex” in Bostock becomes understood as “referring only to 
biological distinctions between male and female” (Bostock 2020, 5).  
 The second textualist interpretation of Title VII’s language focuses on “what Title VII 
says about [sex,]” which is that it “prohibits employers from taking certain actions ‘because of’ 
sex” (Bostock 2020, 5). The ordinary understanding of “because of,” to the Court, is “‘by reason 
of’ or ‘on account of[,]’” which establishes a “but-for” test of causation (Bostock 2020, 5). In 
other words, Title VII becomes relevant in a sex discrimination complaint when an employer 
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takes an action against an employee that they would not have taken if not for the employee’s sex. 
Using the Court’s interpretation of “sex,” then, the but-for test becomes one of simply 
determining whether an employee would have been treated differently were they the opposite sex 
(to the Court, male or female). Furthermore, the but-for cause does not have to be the only cause 
of disparate treatment, “[s]o long as the plaintiff’s sex was one but-for cause of [an employer’s] 
decision, that is enough to trigger the law” (Bostock 2020, 6).  
 The last relevant textualist understanding of Title VII’s language (at least in relation Title 
IX and interscholastic/intercollegiate athletics) is the Court’s discussion of what would have 
been understood as “discrimination” in 1964. The Court comes to interpret the language of 
“discrimination” in Title VII as to treat persons differently, which means that to “discriminate 
against” means to treat an “individual worse than others who are similarly situated” (Bostock 
2020, 7). In cases of sex discrimination, the Court has also established precedent that “difference 
in treatment based on sex must be intentional” (Bostock 2020, 7). Taken together, these three 
interpretations of Title VII’s language lead the Court to conclude that “an employer who 
intentionally treats a person worse because of sex […] discriminates against that person in 
violation of Title VII” (Bostock 2020, 7, my emphasis). Put another way: “if changing the 
employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer [then] a statutory 
violation has occurred” (Bostock 2020, 9).  
 Given these three particular readings of Title VII’s language, the Court develops an 
important chain of logic that constructs discrimination against gay and transgender people as (a 
form of) sex discrimination. In other words, the Court argues that “it is impossible to 
discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating 
against that individual based on sex” (Bostock 2020, 9). In sum, the Court puts forth an 
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interpretation of homosexuality and transgender status that make them “bound up with sex” 
because to discriminate against a person for being gay or trans, in the Court’s opinion, “requires 
an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex” (Bostock 
2020, 10).  
 The Bostock opinion spends a lot of time parsing out this logic through a number of 
examples, but I choose to only describe one for brevity’s sake. In an attempt to answer 
employers’ arguments that they do not perceive their discrimination against gay and trans people 
as motivated by sex, the Court puts forth the idea that employer intentions mean little as long as 
it engaged in discrimination because of sex. The Court considers an example in which gay and/or 
trans job applicants would have to check a “gay” or “transgender” box on an application form 
(Bostock 2020, 18). If no information about sex was provided to the employer as they reviewed 
these applications and they chose to not hire people who checked either the “gay” or 
“transgender” box, then the employer would presumably be discriminating against gay and trans 
people but not because of their sexes. The Court refuses this logic because “[t]here is no way for 
an applicant to decide whether to check the homosexual or transgender box without considering 
sex” (Bostock 2020, 18). The Bostock ruling argues that in the instance in which a person does 
not know what “gay” or “transgender” mean, instructions would have to be written out 
describing the words, and such a task could not be done “without using the words man, woman, 
or sex” (Bostock 2020, 18). In all cases in which a gay or trans employee is discriminated 
against, then, the employer is intentionally participating in sex discrimination.  
 While this reading of discrimination against gay and trans employees may seem limited, 
it is seemingly necessary in the face of employer arguments that “sex must be the sole or primary 
cause of a diverse employment action for Title VII liability to follow” (Bostock 2020, 22). That 
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is, the Court acknowledges that “homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from 
sex[,]” but maintains that “discrimination based on homosexuality or transgender status 
necessarily entails discrimination based on sex; the first cannot happen without the second” 
(Bostock 2020, 19). So, even when an employer aims to explicitly and/or exclusively 
discriminate on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status, they nevertheless are subject to 
claims of sex discrimination. The Court’s logic and underlying textualist interpretations should 
be subject to critique, but before I move to Bostock’s limitations I want to first clarify how the 
case remedies Soule and Hecox. 
 
B. Title IX and sex discrimination post-Bostock 
 While the Court decided Bostock without considering its implications beyond Title VII, 
the decision has already had impacts on other cases involving sex discrimination. The most 
relevant application of the Court’s articulation of sex discrimination lies in Title IX claims—as 
anticipated by the employers in Bostock (Bostock 2020, 31). As noted in Chapter III, Title IX’s 
language is largely modeled after Title VII’s, which makes the quick application of Bostock to 
Title IX cases unsurprising (United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission n.d.; 
Wiles 1996, 269). And the application of Bostock in Title IX cases involving discrimination 
against transgender students has remained relatively straightforward: the Court has held that 
discrimination against transgender people constitutes sex discrimination; this makes 
discrimination against transgender students (because they are trans) in violation of Title IX. 
 The widely known case of Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board provides a clean-
cut example of how Bostock is being written into Title IX claims and judgments. In an August 
2020 appellate level ruling, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that because of Bostock, 
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“[the court has] little difficulty holding that a bathroom policy precluding Grimm from using the 
boys restrooms discriminated against him ‘on the basis of sex’” (Grimm v. Gloucestor Cty. Sch. 
Bd. 2020).8 Their ruling continues, saying that “[e]ven if the [Gloucester School] Board’s 
primary motivation in implementing or applying the policy was to exclude Grimm because he is 
transgender, his sex remains a but-for cause for the Board’s actions[,]” which constitutes a form 
of sex discrimination and leaves Gloucester’s School Board in violation of Title IX (Grimm v. 
Gloucestor Cty. Sch. Bd. 2020). The decision explains the but-for cause in simpler terms than the 
Supreme Court does in Bostock, saying that in cases of trans discrimination “the discriminator is 
necessarily referring to the individual’s sex to determine incongruence between sex and gender, 
making sex a but-for cause for the discriminator’s actions” (Grimm v. Gloucestor Cty. Sch. Bd. 
2020). The Fourth Circuit found that Gloucester School Board’s bathroom policy violated Title 
IX (Grimm v. Gloucestor Cty. Sch. Bd. 2020). 
 Thus, because of Bostock, discrimination against transgender students in schools 
precedentially constitutes a violation of Title IX. Yet, the Court notes in its opinion in Bostock, 
“we do not purport to address bathrooms, locker rooms, or anything else of the kind […] 
[w]hether other policies and practices might or might not qualify as unlawful discrimination […] 
are questions for future cases” (Bostock 2020, 31-32). It seems, then, that the question of whether 
Title IX’s protections against sex discrimination protect trans students from discrimination will 
have its own day before the Court. Nevertheless, Bostock is clear: discrimination against 
 
8 Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 27234, 2020 WL 
5034430 (United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit August 26, 2020, 
Decided), available at https://advance-lexis-
com.proxy.wm.edu/api/document?collection=cases&id=urn:contentItem:60P3-Y431-F1P7-
B3K5-00000-00&context=1516831. Hereafter this decision is referred to and cited as: (Grimm v. 
Gloucestor Cty. Sch. Bd. 2020). 
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transgender people is (a form of) sex discrimination. Given that precedent and clarity, we can 
move to resolve Soule v. Connecticut and Hecox v. Little in ways that permit trans student-
athletes to compete in sports according to their gender identities. 
 
i. Resolving Soule v. Connecticut 
 After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bostock, the complaint presented in Soule v. 
Connecticut is, at the very least, incomplete and incoherent. The plaintiffs in Soule seek relief 
under Title IX based on their understanding that they have lost opportunities to “biological 
males,” but in doing so it erases the presence of transgender discrimination. Indeed, the plaintiffs 
are asking for an injunction that would prohibit “males—individuals with an XY genotypes—
from participating in events that are designated for girls, women, or females” (Soule et al. 2020, 
49). This kind of injunction would constitute a form of discrimination based on transgender 
status, and therefore also a form of sex discrimination, triggering a Title IX violation. And the 
complaint’s unwillingness to acknowledge the existence of trans girls and women operates in 
stark contrast to Bostock, in which even a textualist/originalist approach to the law acknowledges 
the existence of trans girls and women. Further, even though Bostock strictly defines sex as 
“male” or “female,” the Court’s opinion is careful not to refer to trans girls or women as 
“biological males,” presumably because it knows that doing so would be grossly inaccurate.  The 
plaintiffs in Soule thus seek relief through a statute that their argument itself is in violation of. 
 
ii. Resolving Hecox v. Little 
 Given Bostock’s clarification that trans discrimination requires sex discrimination, 
Idaho’s HB 500 would compel all schools in Idaho to violate Title IX. Though HB 500 does not 
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explicitly discriminate against trans girls and women, it effectively makes it impossible for them 
to meet the standards required by the law. Trans girls and women seeking to participate in 
athletics at their schools are thus discriminated against—treated worse, to use the Court’s 
language in Bostock—because they are trans. Further, but for HB 500’s perception of trans girls 
and women as “of the male sex[,]” transgender student-athletes would not face the worse 
treatment (i.e. exclusion from participation in school-sponsored athletics according to their 
gender identity) that HB 500 subjects them to (“HOUSE BILL 500 – Idaho State Legislature” 
n.d.). To borrow language from the Hecox complaint, “barring [Lindsay] Hecox from girls’ and 
women’s athletic teams […is to] subject her to discrimination in educational programs and 
activities ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of her rights under Title IX” (Hecox 2020, 51). And 
though the Hecox complaint was filed pre-Bostock, the Court’s June 2020 ruling only serves to 
bolster such a claim. 
 
C. The limitations of Bostock and antidiscrimination law 
 While the textualism of Bostock may resolve Soule and Hecox—and inevitably present an 
important legal hurdle for pending legislation attempting to prevent trans student-athletes from 
competing in sports—the case has severe limitations. In this section, I develop critiques of the 
textualist interpretations I outlined in section A, return to some broader critiques of 
antidiscrimination law introduced in Chapter I, and express some concerns over how Bostock 
may be unable to effectively answer equal protection claims that aim to prevent trans student-
athletes from competing in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics. These limitations do not 
severely decrease the power and impact of Bostock, but they are meant to motivate a sense that 
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broader work, perhaps inside and outside legal advocacy, is necessary in order to protect the 
rights and interests of queer and trans people. 
 
i. Textualist interpretations fall short 
 The Court’s textualist approaches in Bostock, while initially helpful in remedying 
immediate attacks on trans people’s rights and lives, are severely limited. In this subsection, I 
briefly outline some critiques of the three assumptions discussed in section A. I show that all 
three assumptions fall short of advancing antidiscrimination law in ways that would holistically 
prohibit forms of discrimination and/or substantively improve the lives of queer and trans people. 
 
“Sex” 
First, the Court determines the ordinary public meaning of “sex” as a person being a 
“male” or “female” (Bostock 2020, 5). However, as discussed in Chapters II and IV, sex and 
gender are far more complex and less biologically determined than the Court’s interpretation in 
Bostock accounts for. The Court’s textualist approach to “sex” may not have been a key point of 
contention in Bostock because its logic was still sound within a sex binary, but in cases where the 
sexed body is more at the forefront of debates regarding sex discrimination it seems like 
textualism falls short. Indeed, the Court’s assumption that sex refers “only to biological 
distinctions between male and female” does very little for legal advocates trying to advance more 
nuanced ways of understanding sex discrimination, particularly as it relates to trans folks.  
Discrimination against trans youth and young people in sports is a particularly rich 
context to express the limitations of the Court’s interpretation of “sex.” For instance, at the core 
of Soule’s claim is that trans girls and women are simply “biological males,” or at least should be 
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understood as such by the law. If the courts found this claim persuasive in the context of sports 
(because sports are more biologically grounded than most forms of employment), then Bostock 
would serve to endorse anti-trans discrimination. Yet, as Chapter IV demonstrates, to equate 
trans girls with a class of biological males is to fundamentally misunderstand trans identity, 
categorically refuse that trans people exist, and dismiss the number of ways in which “biological 
sex” cannot be understood in a male-female binary. Yet, Bostock leaves Soule’s claims that trans 
people are bound by their “biological sex,” presumably their sex designated at birth, completely 
unresolved. Trans discrimination may still be a form of sex discrimination, but the Court has left 
the law vulnerable to being pushed to decide where the boundaries of sex “really” are. And given 
the history sex/gender testing in sports and Title IX’s authority to prohibit sex discrimination in 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics, claims about whether trans people should be allowed 
to compete in sports are bound to compel the law to clarify questions about “sex” in due time. 
 
“But-for” 
Second, the Court’s but-for test for differential treatment falls flat when considering the 
ways in which discrimination operates through a number of social frameworks at any given point 
in time. If we replace the Court’s language for the but-for test in Bostock with relevant Title IX 
language, we might get something like: would a student(-athlete) have been treated differently 
(or faced disparate treatment) were they the opposite sex? A “yes” answer that question would, 
presumably, trigger Title IX. But this test is too simplistic for two reasons. First, student-athletes 
already face a “separate but equal” treatment on the basis of sex. Thus, disparate treatment is 
insufficient to conceptualize the harm specific to trans girls and women in sports. Second, 
Mackey 97 
discrimination against women can be both a form of sex/gender discrimination and race 
discrimination. 
Under Title IX, sex/gender segregation in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics is 
permissible given that the segregation is equitable. This notion of equity is borne out of the 
three-part test discussed in Chapter III, which requires the number of male and female athletes is 
proportional to enrollment, an institution is expanding opportunities for the underrepresented 
sex, and the institution is accommodating the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex 
(“Intercollegiate Athletics Policy: Three-Part Test -- Part Three Q’s & A’s” 2020; Simon 2004, 
126). In practice, this “separate but equal” treatment is often subject to criticism by female 
athletes—a recent example being the differential access to and resourcing of weight rooms for 
women’s and men’s basketball teams at the NCAA Division I tournament (Sullivan 2021; Young 
2021). In other words, sex/gender segregation in interscholastic and intercollegiate remains 
inequitable by a number of metrics: on average, men’s teams receive double the amount of 
funding than women’s teams at the collegiate level; athletic scholarships are differentially and 
unequally distributed between men and women; and women’s sports continue to be treated as 
second-class competitions by governing bodies like the NCAA, at least when compared to the 
amount of money invested and produced by men’s competitions (Gerstmann 2019; Kirshner 
2021; and Meredith 2017). 
Importantly, though, this “separate but equal” policy approach and differential treatment 
has difficulty reckoning with the harms that trans girls and women trying to compete in 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics experience. Because segregation in sports hinges on 
the (incoherent, malleable, and illusory) category of “biological sex,” trans student-athletes 
generally, and trans girls and women in particular, are subject to increased scrutiny because their 
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“biological sex” may or may not “correctly” align with the gendered category of competition 
they want to compete in. In other words, trans girls and women become suspect as women 
because of their assigned sex at birth. As a result, they are susceptible to being understood, at 
least within athletics, as “biological males” with “physiological advantages” as compared to 
cisgender (read: “real”) girls and women.  
Deploying the but-for test in cases of sex discrimination leaves us only capable of 
understanding trans girls and women as “biological males.” Chapters II and V challenged the 
language and validity of this framework for understanding sex and gender inside and outside the 
law. But, the Court’s use of the but-for test in Bostock demonstrates its own inability to 
substantively understand the difference between sex discrimination and trans discrimination. I 
will briefly discuss the important difference(s) between the two when discussing the limits of the 
Court’s interpretation of discrimination, but first I want to emphasize the conceptual failure for a 
but-for account of discrimination that Black (trans) women face in sports. 
 The NWLC’s amicus brief in Hecox v. Little provides clear evidence in support of a but-
for approach to antidiscrimination law, and sex discrimination in particular, is flawed because it 
elides the ways in which Black girls and women in sports experience unique forms of 
discrimination. Their brief outlines the ways in which the sex discrimination imposed by HB 500 
would disproportionately affect Black and brown girls because of raced-gendered stereotypes 
regarding what girls competing in athletics are “supposed” to look like (NWLC 2020, 7). In other 
words, HB 500 would uniquely discriminate against Black and brown girls because their gender 
has been and would be disproportionately called into question by those with imparted authority 
and power to scrutinize a student-athlete’s gender under the law. HB 500 thus not only violates 
Title IX protections from sex discrimination but also enables forms of racial discrimination.  
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 Kimberlè Crenshaw details the uniquely precarious position that Black women occupy 
within the but-for framework of antidiscrimination law (Crenshaw 1989, 151). Key to 
antidiscrimination law, she argues, is the expressed desire to address how race or gender may 
impact otherwise fair or neutral decision-making processes, but this approach is limited as it only 
accounts for the ways in which this or that category determine outcomes (Crenshaw 1989, 151). 
And “[b]ecause the scope of antidiscrimination law is so limited, sex and race discrimination 
have come to be defined in terms of the experiences of those who are privileged but for their 
racial or sexual characteristics” (Crenshaw 1989, 151, author’s emphasis). In other words, the 
result of antidiscrimination law’s narrow approach to sex discrimination is that the paradigm for 
such discrimination “tends to be based on the experiences of white women” (Crenshaw 1989, 
151, my emphasis). Discrimination that uniquely affects Black women thus becomes 
unintelligible to antidiscrimination law through the but-for cause paradigm.  
 This acknowledgment of Black women’s position(s) vis-à-vis antidiscrimination law is 
paralleled by the ways in which they are forced to navigate the space(s) of competitive athletics. 
While sex/gender segregation in sports serves to reinscribe women’s physical inferiority, Black 
women in sports are all too often “implicitly masculinized because of their skin color and 
physiological difference” (Bailey 2016). For example, Serena Williams has faced intense 
amounts of popular scrutiny because she is a successful Black woman tennis player. Not only are 
Serena’s accomplishments undercut because she is a female athlete but her body, attitude, and 
words “have been misconstrued to reproduce stereotypes of Black women and reinforce [w]hite 
power” (Razack and Joseph 2021, 297). She is subject to racialized-gendered scrutiny, attacks 
that target her Black womanhood as a single construction (i.e. not simply her woman-ness and/or 
her Blackness).  
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Sports thus contribute to a culture of misogynoir, to borrow Moya Bailey’s term, in 
which Black women experience an “amalgamation of anti-Black racism and misogyny” (Bailey 
2016; Bailey and Bailey 2018). In an analysis of how Caster Semenya’s gender was scrutinized 
at the international level of competition and reported on by popular media, Bailey illustrates how 
misogynoir structures biomedical discourse and social norms (Bailey 2016). The misogynoir 
structures have become essential to hegemonic perceptions of Black women inside and outside 
of the sports context (Bailey 2016). The example of Caster Semenya demonstrates the ways in 
which sex/gender testing in sports has historically been used to regulate gender and race by 
constructing the “proper” female athlete as a white woman and increasingly subjecting the 
nonwhite (particularly Black) woman’s body to biomedical scrutiny. The NWLC brief in Hecox, 
then, correctly asserts that Black and brown girls and women would be subject to increased 
scrutiny under HB 500 because the culture of sports is invested in the anti-Black racism and 
misogyny of misogynoir.  
 In turn, the Soule complaint can be described as exhibiting a kind of transmisogynoir, a 
challenge to the very right of Black trans women to compete in interscholastic and intercollegiate 
athletics that even cisgender Black women in sports do not necessarily experience (Bailey and 
Bailey 2018). The complaint takes aim at Terry Miller and Andraya Yearwood both because they 
are trans girls and because they are Black, the first reason being perhaps more explicit than the 
latter. Indeed, while the Soule complaint simply articulates a challenge to CIAC policy that 
focuses on the inclusion of transgender student-athletes, its targeting of Terry and Andraya 
demonstrates a (re)inscription of transmisogynoir in sports—one that hinges on the premise that 
trans girls are not “really” girls. And Soule’s assumption that trans girls are not “really” girls is 
subtly supported by the already-present impulse in sports to scrutinize Black women athletes’ 
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gender. Just as Serena Williams faces forms of discrimination that uniquely target her Black 
womanhood so are Terry and Andraya facing attacks that center their Black trans womanhood.  
The “single-issue framework for discrimination” that a but-for test of discrimination 
adopts, then, seems incapable of understanding how Black women and Black trans women 
navigate forms of discrimination in sports (Crenshaw 1989, 152). When we look to the Court’s 
use of the test in Bostock, its insistence that we can “see” sex discrimination by hypothetically 
changing the sex of the person facing discrimination and determine if there would have been a 
different outcome is misguided. Indeed, Black women and Black trans women face forms of sex 
discrimination that are unintelligible to such a hypothetical, particularly in sports. And in the 
cases of trans people facing forms of discrimination especially, it seems problematic to assume 
that simply changing the “biological sex” of a trans person would have presumably made it such 
that an instance of discrimination would not have occurred. Indeed, despite Bostock’s helpful 
logic that trans discrimination is a form of sex discrimination, the two are, importantly, distinct. 
 
“Discrimination” 
 The Court’s textualism in Bostock defines “discrimination” as a difference in treatment 
when an individual or group is treated worse than others similarly situated. This definition, as the 
Court notes, is “roughly what [discrimination] means today” (Bostock 2020, 7). At first glance, 
this definition is appropriate in the context of Bostock because of the Court’s attempt to construct 
discrimination against trans people as a form of sex discrimination. However, this idea that trans 
discrimination cannot exist without sex discrimination, while helpful in the immediate address of 
discriminatory attacks on trans folks across the country, aims to make a false equivalence. 
Transgender discrimination and sex discrimination are not the same thing.  
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Using the Court’s definition of discrimination, it would appear that Bostock aims to argue 
that trans people facing discrimination are subject to disparate treatment because of their sex (sex 
being the differences between male and female, and nothing more). Yet, trans student-athletes 
are not strictly being barred from participation in sports because of their sex. Sex and biology 
may play a powerful role in the ways in which laws and regulations aim to discriminate against 
trans people, but their transness itself is also central to the discrimination they face. Indeed, their 
being trans—crossing, traversing, entangling, and ignoring of the boundaries and definitions of 
heteronormative, binary gender categories—is essential to the reasons for which they are subject 
to discrimination. The Soule complaint, for example, does not simply articulate a claim that 
would treat Terry Miller and Andraya Yearwood (and other transgender student-athletes) in a 
disparate manner because of their respective sex; it also positions their transness at the core of its 
argument, most notably by refusing to even recognize them as trans girls. In the case of HB 500, 
the new law may discriminate on the basis of sex by putting an undue burden on girls and 
women to “prove” their gender whenever they are called under suspicion, but it also specifically 
discriminates against trans girls and women by establishing standards for competition that most, 
if not all, of them would be able to meet. Again, the language of sex may be instrumental to a 
law like HB 500, but the law still discriminates against trans folks in unique ways that cisgender 
people do not face. The disparate treatment is not strictly sex-based.  
The equating of sex discrimination and trans discrimination also leaves open an important 
point of attack for anti-trans operatives seeking to specifically bar trans student-athletes from 
sports. As the Soule complaint attempts to claim, trans girls and women seeking to compete in 
athletics do not face discrimination if not allowed to compete in women’s categories because 
they can still compete in men’s competition. If anything, Soule insists, it would still be fairer to 
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keep trans girls and women in the men’s categories because of their (supposedly) inherent, 
permanent physiological advantages. This claim remains intact post-Bostock. There is a possible, 
legally intelligible argument to be made that discrimination against trans girls and women in 
sports is not sex discrimination, despite the Court’s ruling in Bostock. Antidiscrimination law 
pertaining to discrimination on the basis of sex remains capable of being weaponized against 
trans folks because Bostock simply equated sex discrimination and trans discrimination instead 
of clarifying the ways in which the two are different. 
By arguing against the claim that trans girls and women should just compete in men’s 
sports competitions/categories, we can quickly see how the Court’s simple account of “sex” and 
“discrimination” fail trans people. Fundamentally, trans girls and women cannot be understood 
as men. Even if we grant arguments like that presented in the Soule complaint that “biological 
sex” assigned at birth is incredibly important—though, we really should not be ceding this 
ground, as Chapters II and IV aimed to show—it is incredibly detrimental to the wellbeing of 
any given trans person to insist that they are not who they are. To forbid a trans girl or woman 
from competing in women’s competition while suggesting they can still compete in men’s 
competitions (because that is “who they really are”) is, in effect, a violent act. Yet, this is, 
perhaps, what a textualist reading of “sex discrimination” would ask us to do: to insist that trans 
girls and women are ultimately “biological males” and should thus be required to compete in 
men’s sports. Importantly, though, we would subsequently be treating trans girls and women in a 
disparate and/or differential manner, triggering the Court’s reading of discrimination. And we 
would be treating trans girls and women in sports differently not because they are girls or women 
but because they are trans.  
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Trans girls and women in sports experience discrimination not simply or only because 
they may not perform womanhood in the right way (though, that certainly could play a part in 
discriminatory intent) but because they are suspect as women in the first place. And the culture 
of sports has seemingly decided that “sex,” whatever that may mean at any given point in time 
(genitals, gonads, chromosomes, hormone levels, etc.), is the mechanism by which womanhood 
should be tested. As a result, trans girls and women are not understood by the sports world as 
women because they were often assigned the sex “male” at birth. In other words, sports, at least 
those that are sex/gender-segregated, are inherently invested in trans discrimination. Sex-
segregated sports lean on the construction of “biological sex” in order to both regulate “proper” 
expressions of gender and discriminate against trans people because they are trans. This kind of 
specific discrimination against trans folks exists inside and outside of the sports context, and 
operates in ways that “sex discrimination,” at least as the Court discusses it in Bostock, cannot 
possibly capture. 
Taken together, these critiques of the Court’s textualist approaches in Bostock simply aim 
to demonstrate what its judgment does not or cannot do. The case’s outcome, that discrimination 
against trans people constitutes sex discrimination, is a somewhat liberal reading of 
antidiscrimination law in that it provides a means by which legal advocates might better be able 
to defend trans folks from overt, clear, and public forms of discrimination. However, the 
methods by which the Court chose to reach its conclusion in Bostock reveal troubling logics that 
fail to account for myriad and complex ways in which trans people experience forms of 
discrimination—discrimination in sex-segregated state-operated institutions like prisons, lack of 
access to gender-affirming and gender-confirming healthcare, and vulnerability to gendered 
surveillance by the US security state, for instance (Spade 2015, 81-86). Certainly the Court’s 
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originalism, its unwillingness to push the language of the law to its limits, constrains the 
ramifications of Bostock. But this failure may not necessarily be the result of the Court’s 
textualism or stare decisis; rather, the Court’s relatively apparent disinclination to create a kind 
of broader precedent for antidiscrimination law’s understanding of queer and trans people keeps 
Bostock’s implications relatively focused on the relationship between sex discrimination and 
discrimination against trans people. And while the Bostock judgment may have been somewhat 
progressive in its conclusions, it is necessary to push the Court’s logic further in order to achieve 
more equitable outcomes and material benefits for queer and trans people. 
 
ii. What Title IX and antidiscrimination law cannot do 
 As discussed briefly near the end of Chapter I, feminist and legal scholars have often 
been critical of how transformative and/or effective antidiscrimination law can be for those 
subject to forms of discrimination and oppression. In the context of what antidiscrimination law 
can and cannot do for trans folks, I turn primarily to Dean Spade’s work on critical trans politics, 
which argues (in part) that “we must move beyond the politics of recognition and inclusion” in 
order to achieve real, transformative change (Spade 2015, 8). Antidiscrimination law can even 
operate in ways that end up sanctioning further violence against marginalized people, enabling 
“harmful systems to claim fairness and equality while continuing to kill us” (Spade 2015, 47). 
The Court’s decision in Bostock deals very strictly with antidiscrimination law given its 
particular (re)articulation of sex discrimination, so the ways in which it affects future arguments 
and rulings in antidiscrimination cases is subject to a critical trans critique. 
 The primary critique of antidiscrimination law in Bostock’s case may be to question what 
the case actually materially achieves for trans folks. As Spade notes, discrimination cases 
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involving employment have limited impact “given the staggering unemployment of trans 
populations stemming from conditions of homelessness, lack of family support, violence-related 
trauma, discrimination by potential employers, effects of unmet health needs, and many other 
actions” (Spade 2015, 41). In other words, Bostock does little to nothing to actually resolve 
systemic issues like trans poverty and inability to access affirming healthcare that preclude and 
structure the ways in which they may end up facing discrimination in the workplace. Title VII, 
after all, only applies to issues of employment, and will not offer protection to those trans people 
who are unemployed, those whose primary income is made through sex work, undocumented 
trans people, etc. Bostock only (maybe) expands legal protections of those select few trans 
people who are able to participate in the legitimated, capitalist market economy. Everyone else—
those nonwhite, not-“properly”-trans, those differently abled, indigenous, undocumented folks—
is left behind. 
  Even if we concede that Bostock achieved a successful extension of legal protections for 
trans people from discrimination on the basis of transgender status, though, the case’s ability to 
effectively protect trans folks from employment discrimination is still suspect. For instance, 
“discrimination and violence against people of color have persisted despite law changes that 
declared them illegal” (Spade 2015, 40). And antidiscrimination laws are rarely adequately 
enforced, with few people being able to afford counsel necessary to make legal claims of 
discrimination (Spade 2015, 40). So what does Bostock even do, given this framework? Very 
little. Insofar as we might be able to call the Court’s opinion in Bostock a “victory” for “trans 
rights,” “[t]he call to seek out formal legal equality through demands for inclusion […] not only 
fails to offer respite from the brutalities of poverty and criminalization, but also threatens to 
[re]produce the very conditions that shorten [trans] lives” (Spade 2015, 137). The post-Bostock 
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world looks very much the same as the pre-Bostock world for most, if not all, trans folks. Their 
lives have not materially changed simply because the Supreme Court loosely ruled that they can 
seek legal redress if they are discriminated against in the workplace on the basis of sex. 
Bostock’s impact, then, is severely limited in scope and efficacy. 
 
iii. Sex discrimination and equal protection 
 Because Bostock was precisely concerned with sex discrimination under Title VII, and 
because the current project is primarily concerned with sex discrimination under Title IX, I have 
said nothing about equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. While Soule’s 
entire case rests on two Title IX claims, the Hecox complaint does put forth a deprivation of 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment claim alongside its claim that HB 500 violates 
Title IX. Furthermore, just as Title IX has been weaponized by those arguing for the exclusion of 
trans student-athletes from competitions, so could such arguments be made under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, such an argument is not necessarily 
made in either Soule or Hecox.  
In short, the argument could be made that even if discrimination against trans folks 
constitutes a form of sex discrimination, such discrimination is at least somewhat necessary in 
the context of competitive athletics for the purposes of equity. In other words, the defendants in 
Hecox, for instance, could argue that there is a compelling state interest in discriminating against 
trans girls and women in order to safeguard and preserve opportunities for cisgender girls and 
women under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bostock alone would 
have a considerable amount of trouble answering such an argument, primarily because it 
involves a statutory claim and not a constitutional one but also because its attempt to tie trans 
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discrimination to sex discrimination would be an ineffective response to this kind of equal 
protection claim. Indeed, Bostock’s rearticulation of sex discrimination would force the Court 
into a bind were it to be confronted by an equal protection claim that insisted that the inclusion of 
trans girls and women in sports was in some way a form of sex discrimination itself. This kind of 
claim would also presumably include some of the dangerous logic presented in Soule that seeks 
to codify the legal recognition of trans people as sex discrimination. 
 To answer this kind of equal protection claim would be beyond the scope of this paper 
specifically, but it seems important to at least point out that Bostock would fail to respond to it 
effectively. In Bostock, the Court’s equivocation of sex discrimination and trans discrimination 
means that it has yet to confront the zero-sum game argumentation presented by complaints like 
Soule. In other words, the Court has not come to terms with how to approach antidiscrimination 
law arguments that suggest that the affordance of protections to trans girls and women presents a 
revocation of protections for cisgender girls and women. Further, the Court’s ruling in Bostock 
almost sets up sex discrimination to subsume trans discrimination. Trans discrimination becomes 
a form of sex discrimination, according to the Court’s logic. Bostock thus hierarchizes forms of 
sex discrimination, which makes the (re)construction of this hierarchy its only avenue by which 
to answer the zero-sum argument. Indeed, it seems as if the Court would have to determine 
whether transgender discrimination is of more or less concern to the law than cisgender sex 
discrimination in order to answer an equal protection claim. This hierarchic thinking, though, 
would only redevelop the zero-sum paradigm and pit the interests of cisgender women against 
those of transgender women. A more robust, nuanced analysis of the appropriate level of judicial 




In this chapter, I have attempted to take the textualist logic presented by the Supreme Court in 
Bostock v. Clayton County and apply it to Soule and Hecox as a means to resolve those two 
cases. I then turned to a critique of the Court’s textualism in order to illumine the limits of 
Bostock. While the June 2020 decision was certainly a victory for queer legal advocacy efforts, it 
still failed to accurately account for the ways in which queer people navigate and encounter 
discrimination in particularly gendered and racialized spaces. In the sixth and final chapter, I will 
argue for a more intersectional and prescriptive approach to antidiscrimination law, particularly 
in the context of sex discrimination. I hope to show that Title IX offers an unique opportunity for 
the law to be pushed toward prescriptive approaches to antidiscrimination because of its history 














VI. Towards prescriptive antidiscrimination law in sports, Title IX, and beyond 
In their article, “Reconstituting the Future: An Equality Amendment,” Catharine 
MacKinnon and Kimberlé Crenshaw write that “[d]iscrimination based on sex and gender […] 
has been recognized only very recently and merely by interpretation […] making its protection 
particularly thin and vulnerable” (Crenshaw and MacKinnon 2019). In response to the inequality 
that persists despite existing antidiscrimination law, they propose an Equality Amendment to the 
United States Constitution that extends both negative rights and affirmative rights to 
marginalized peoples. “Negative rights” are those antidiscrimination law is most accustomed to 
providing: those “rights that are predicated on discriminatory state action, state or federal[,]” or 
individual discriminatory action (Crenshaw and MacKinnon 2019). This framework is, in other 
words, prohibitive in nature—antidiscrimination law exists to prevent the supposed perpetrator 
of discrimination from treating the victim of such action in a disparate manner, individualizing 
the experience of discrimination (Spade 2015, 42). 
 In contrast, “affirmative rights,” in this context, constitutes a vision of “equality as a 
right, permitting legal claims for discrimination against nonstate actors and state actors alike who 
deny equal rights” (Crenshaw and MacKinnon 2019). Crenshaw and MacKinnon take up 
embedding positive rights in their proposed Equality Amendment by putting in language like 
“Congress and the several States shall take legislative and other measures to prevent or redress 
any disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups because of past and/or present inequality” 
(Crenshaw and MacKinnon 2019, my emphasis). The word “shall” “requires legislative and 
administrative authorities to implement this Amendment,” according Crenshaw and MacKinnon, 
“[t]here is no option not to” (Crenshaw and MacKinnon 2019). Affirmative rights thus go 
beyond simply prohibiting individual acts of discrimination; instead, they encourage (or require) 
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those in power to ensure equity through state action. The perpetrator/victim framework of 
negative rights disappears if antidiscrimination law turns to affirmative rights, making 
antidiscrimination less about individualized action(s) and more about creating systems, 
structures, policies, and laws that aim to foster equality from the get-go.  
 In this final chapter, I take up this affirmative rights framework in order to suggest that 
more intersectional, prescriptive approaches to antidiscrimination law would foster substantive 
change for marginalized peoples and make the law more able to “see” those people and 
experiences it has too often ignored or erased. The context of Title IX and interscholastic and 
intercollegiate athletics offers, in my view, an unique opportunity for such an approach to 
antidiscrimination law to be taken up because of the statute’s history of proactive equitable-
policymaking in schools. In other words, a reinterpretation of “sex discrimination” post-Bostock 
alongside a more intersectional methodology for evaluating claims of discrimination may help 
ensure the rights of trans people in school-sponsored sports. And this kind of (re)interpretation of 
the law in Title IX may serve as an example for broader changes to antidiscrimination law in 
other contexts. I start this chapter grounded in the contexts of Soule and Hecox, reasserting that 
there is no biological basis for discrimination against trans folks in interscholastic and 
intercollegiate athletics. Then, I briefly explain how a more intersectional approach to 
antidiscrimination law, particularly as an alternative method to the but-for test, may allow for the 
law to better understand uniquely precarious positions of oppressed peoples facing instances of 
individualized and systemic discrimination. I then return to the realm of antidiscrimination law 
with an intersectional method, suggesting that the law cannot, and should not, pit the interests of 
cisgender women against those of transgender women. Finally, I suggest that an intersectional, 
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prescriptive approach to Title IX protections would invest in an affirmative rights framework, 
which could have ripple effects in other realms of (antidiscrimination) law. 
 
A.  Trans discrimination in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics has no biological basis 
 Every legislative attempt to bar trans youth and young people from competing in 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics in the US has, in some way, relied on the construction 
of “biological sex” as a means by which to insist that trans folks should not be allowed to 
compete according to their gender identity. The male-female sex binary structures almost every 
level of competitive athletics—from rec sports at the local high school to elite competition at the 
Olympics. And while the binary has, historically, not been strictly enforced (through a 
mechanism like sex testing) at most non-elite levels of competition, legal complaints like Soule 
and pieces of legislation like HB 500 present new attempts to codify “biological sex” in the law 
as a means of discriminating against trans, intersex, and gender nonconforming people. Indeed, 
legislative attempts to prevent trans people from playing sports seek to enforce their laws 
through varying forms of sex/gender testing. 
 Yet, as discussed in Chapters II and IV, the history of sex/gender testing in sports 
demonstrates the very incoherence and illusory nature of “biological sex.” As testing 
mechanisms changed so did the lines between what counted as “male” and what counted as 
“female.” So, legislative attempts to (re)inscribe and/or (re)impose any kind of sex/gender testing 
regime in school-sponsored sports is not only (purposefully) hostile towards trans folks but also 
inherently faulty. In other words, just as the Soule complaint attempts to isolate the essential-ness 
of gender through the use of terms like “physiological advantages” and “sex,” so do most 
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attempts at preventing trans youth from playing sports, all of which neglect evidence that we 
cannot (and/or should not) naturalize binary sex and innate sex difference(s).   
 To demonstrate the complexity of sex and gender, we can simply turn to a quick critique 
of HB 500’s mechanisms for demonstrating sex: (1) internal and external reproductive anatomy, 
(2) normal endogenously produced levels of testosterone, and (3) genetic makeup (Ehardt 2020). 
HB 500 is unclear on whether a student-athlete would need to “prove” their sex through one or 
all of these requirements, but all three are suspect. First, internal and external reproductive 
anatomy do not always neatly fall into the categories of “male” and “female” that HB 500 would 
supposedly want them to. Development of “internal reproductive sex” is relatively complicated 
and can be disrupted by simple mis-sequencing of the Sry, Sox9, FoxL2, Wnt4, and/or Rspo1 
genes during fetal development (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 5 and 19). Furthermore, there are any 
number of reasons why a person may have certain internal reproductive anatomy that does not 
strictly align (in a sex-binary system) with their external reproductive anatomy. A person with a 
vagina and internal, undescended testes, for example, is unintelligible to HB 500’s first 
determiner of sex. People who have had hysterectomies performed for health reasons would also 
trouble HB 500’s first requirement.  
It is also unclear how external or internal reproductive anatomy are especially relevant to 
sports. If HB 500 is actually interested in “fairness,” it seems strange that it would fixate on 
external genitalia and internal reproductive anatomy since neither seems to really suggest 
superior athletic capabilities on their own. The need to know or verify a student-athlete’s 
external genitals in order to ensure fairness seems silly if we simply consider that HB 500 
suggests that the presence of a penis or vagina on a body conjures some kind of physiological 
(dis)advantage in sports. Apparently, having a penis, vagina, uterus, or testes has intense 
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ramifications on a person’s ability to, for instance, throw a baseball. Clearly, though, the 
presence or absence of certain external or internal reproductive anatomy does not actually lead to 
hierarchical potentials for athletic performance. Instead, HB 500’s first mechanism solely serves 
as a means by which to reconstruct “biological sex” as a uniform category for sorting people into 
the sex binary. And those student-athletes with bodies who may not neatly fit into such a 
binary—like trans youth, kids with intersex conditions or disorders of sexual development, and 
gender nonconforming folks—are simply not allowed to play sports. 
 Second, measuring levels of testosterone in order to determine any given person’s 
“biological sex” is a doomed endeavor. Despite arguments from policymakers that there exists a 
“sex gap” in levels of testosterone (T), women’s and men’s levels of the hormone generally 
overlap (Jordan-Young and Karkazis 2019, 183-184). In other words, T levels are not dimorphic 
and cannot be used to include or exclude any given person from the categories “woman,” “man,” 
“female,” or “male” (Jordan-Young and Karkazis 2019, 184-185). Policymakers and those who 
pay attention to sports (athletes and non-athletes) often subscribe to the logic that higher T levels 
correspond to better performance. But, as Rebecca M. Jordan-Young and Katrina Karkazis 
describe throughout their book, Testosterone: An Unauthorized Biography, the effects on T on 
the body vary widely and cannot be uniformly described as “enhancing performance” in all areas 
of activity or sport (Jordan-Young and Karkazis 2019). Testosterone does have effects on the 
body, particularly on the development of tissues like muscles and visceral fat, but no exact 
relationship between the hormone and physical development can be drawn because (1) hormones 
do not work in isolation and (2) changes in performance cannot neatly be correlated with 
changes in hormone levels (Jordan-Young and Karkazis 2019, 169-178). Testosterone, then, is at 
least much more complicated than a bill like HB 500 is willing to acknowledge. And at the very 
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least, using T levels to determine any given person’s “sex” would demonstrate a fundamental 
misunderstanding of how hormones actually operate in relation to people’s bodies. 
 Finally, there is too much variation in “genetic makeup,” chromosomal sex, to actually 
sort people into neat categories of “males with XY chromosomes” and “females with XX 
chromosomes.” As the history of the Barr body test at the IOC- and IAAF-levels of competition 
show, chromosomal sex does not binarize into XX and XY; rather, there are several different 
ways in which chromosomal sex can present itself in/on the body. Like internal and external 
reproductive anatomy, though, it seems strange for a policy interested in “fairness” in sports to 
fixate on chromosomal sex. The mere presence of an X chromosome instead of a Y chromosome 
(or vice-versa) does not substantively mean much for a person or their body. Sex chromosomes 
do tend to trigger certain kinds of sexual development in fetuses, but as Anne Fausto-Sterling 
points out, there are several “moments of indifference” during fetal development when the fetus 
could develop in a different way than we might otherwise expect (Fausto-Sterling 2012, 22 and 
25). So, the presence or absence of an X or a Y chromosome in a person cannot be used to 
uniformly assign them a certain gender nor do sex chromosomes fundamentally have an impact 
on a person’s athletic (cap)abilities. Like HB 500’s first requirement of reproductive anatomy, 
“genetic makeup” is being used not to actually ensure fairness but to specifically deny those 
people whose bodies do not fit neatly into XX and XY categories the opportunity to compete in 
school-sponsored sports. 
 Taken together, these three critiques of HB 500’s mechanisms for determining a person’s 
“biological sex” demonstrate that not only is “sex” an elusive category but using it as a 
determiner for prospective performance or success in sports is, at the very least, suspect. A 
person’s genitals, their levels of testosterone, and/or their chromosomal sex do not prescribe a 
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certain level of athletic ability, even when all three align in a male-female sex binary system. 
Therefore, the mechanisms that HB 500 deploys in order to ensure fairness do not actually 
ensure fairness. Instead, they aim to (re)construct the binary sex system in the specific context of 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics in order to purposefully prevent trans, gender 
nonconforming, and intersex people from playing sports. HB 500 is not interested in fairness in 
women’s sports, it is solely interested in discrimination. And “biological sex” provides no sound 
basis for discrimination in sports. 
 
B. An intersectional approach to protections against sex discrimination  
 In Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 1989 essay “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: 
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics” and in “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against 
Women of Color,” published in 1991, she articulates the ways in which “single-axis” analyses of 
Black women’s experience(s) of exclusion (and discrimination) fail to account for the ways in 
which “the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism” (Crenshaw 
1989, 140). Crenshaw argues that “any analysis that does not take intersectionality into account 
cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women are subordinated” 
(Crenshaw 1989, 140). In “Mapping the Margins,” Crenshaw clarified that intersectionality was 
not a “totalizing theory of identity” but rather a means of demonstrating “the need to account for 
multiple grounds of identity when considering how the social world is constructed” (Crenshaw 
1991, 1244-1245). Since Crenshaw’s introduction of the term, “intersectionality has increasingly 
influenced scholarship, research, and curricular choices in colleges and universities” as well as 
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become “an important form of critical inquiry and praxis […] within and outside the academy” 
(Collins 2019, 21 and 22).  
 Importantly, Crenshaw originally articulated intersectionality in the context of 
antidiscrimination law, specifically with regards to a Title VII claim in DeGraffenreid v. General 
Motors, in which five Black women made “not purely a race claim, but an action brought 
specifically on behalf of Black women alleging race and sex discrimination” (Crenshaw 1989, 
142, author’s emphasis). Intersectionality is thus, at least to some extent, rooted in analysis of 
antidiscrimination law. Indeed, Crenshaw goes about articulating intersectionality by 
demonstrating the limitations of “the top-down strategy of using a singular ‘but for’ analysis to 
ascertain the effects of race or sex” in a discrimination claim (Crenshaw 1989, 139). And as I 
discussed in Chapter V, the singular axis of sex discrimination does not effectively account for 
the experiences of trans girls and women in sports. 
 So, I turn to intersectionality as an answer to antidiscrimination law’s inability to 
understand the experiences of trans girls and women in sports. In part, this turn is a means by 
which to better elucidate the similarities and differences between “sex discrimination” and “trans 
discrimination.” But I also embrace intersectionality here because of its origins in understanding 
the particular experiences of Black women facing discrimination. As I noted in Chapter V, it is 
no coincidence that Black trans women are the targets of logics like those presented in Soule. 
Black cis girls and women and Black trans girls and women in sports are subject to particular 
forms of scrutiny that only an intersectional approach to antidiscrimination law can capture. 
 In this context of antidiscrimination law, protections against sex discrimination, and 
sports, I choose to take up intersectionality as methodology (Cooper 2016, 400). That is, I want 
to suggest that we should approach the subject of trans discrimination in interscholastic and 
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intercollegiate athletics by “thinking about how various social identity categories co-constitute 
and are constituted by other categories” (Cooper 2016, 402). And more broadly, I want to push 
towards a means of thinking about antidiscrimination law that adopts “an intersectional way of 
thinking about the problem of sameness and difference and its relation to power” (Chow et al. 
2013, 795). Intersectionality has always been about “the structural convergence among 
intersecting systems of power that created blind spots in antiracist and feminist activism” 
(Collins 2019, 26). Thus, antidiscrimination law must take up intersectionality as a heuristic that 
“recog[nizes] the significance of social structural arrangements of power, how individual and 
group experiences reflect those structural intersections, and how political marginality might 
engender new subjectivities and agency” (Collins 2019, 26). Embracing an intersectional method 
would, I think, work to greatly remedy cases of discrimination and perhaps construct better, 
more equitable futures. 
 Though a precise articulation of an intersectional method within antidiscrimination law 
and judicial processes seems beyond the scope of the project at hand, I do want to briefly 
describe how it helps contextualize discrimination against trans youth in interscholastic and 
intercollegiate athletics. Just as “[t]he intersectional effects of race and gender are facilitated 
within the U.S. sociolegal system, cumulatively stacking the deck against women of color” so do 
they, and histories of trans exclusion inside and outside of sports, structure the ways in which 
trans folks navigate school-sponsored sports (Crenshaw and MacKinnon 2019). The next three 
sections of this chapter take up an intersectional method in order to demonstrate the approach’s 
ability to better understand the conditions in which sex discrimination occurs (particularly in the 
context of Title IX and sports). I first critique the zero-sum game framework that current legal 
debates regarding sex discrimination set up when pitting the interests of cisgender women 
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against those of trans women. Then, I turn to a broader question, enabled by an intersectional 
method, of why there are so few trans girls and women in interscholastic and intercollegiate 
athletics. Finally, I push Title IX’s conceptualization of protections from sex discrimination in 
sports to clarify who is being protected from what. The answers to these questions, I think, 
demonstrate why an intersectional approach to antidiscrimination law is incredibly necessary to 
better account for how multiple axes of power are always exerting influence over the ways in 
which marginalized groups of people experience discrimination.  
 
 C. Zero-sum games and the contest over cis/trans rights 
 Instrumental to the project of a legal complaint like Soule is the idea that the extension of 
rights to transgender girls and women is mirrored by an encroachment on the rights of cisgender 
girls and women. In other words, these kinds of arguments set up a zero-sum game when it 
comes to discussions of sex discrimination. The logic goes that we have to discriminate against 
transgender girls and women in order to preserve the rights of cisgender girls and women 
because to include trans women would lead to cis women losing something (opportunities, 
scholarships, sense of safety, etc.). The slippery slope of this logic, as noted in Chapter IV, 
becomes clear quickly: if we do not discriminate against trans girls and women then the very 
recognition and inclusion of them as women constitutes a form of sex discrimination in and of 
itself. When presented within the context of antidiscrimination law, and particularly protections 
against discrimination on the basis of sex, Soule’s zero-sum framework suggests that we should 
not only discriminate against trans girls and women but also establish that the very legal 
recognition of them is a form of sex discrimination against cis girls and women.  
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 This zero-sum framework, though, is unsound. As I described in Chapter IV, at least in 
the context of sports, the extension of the ability to participate to trans girls and women in no 
way encroaches on the rights of cis girls and women because all of them are girls or women. To 
deny that trans girls and women are not who they say they are is to fundamentally misunderstand 
gender and transness and constitutes an act of violence. So, despite what Soule would like us to 
think, girls and women are not losing opportunities when trans girls and women are included in 
sex/gender-segregated sports because being trans does not negate people’s experience of being a 
girl and/or a woman. The law, then, should not accept this kind of zero-sum framework in its 
interpretation of protections against sex discrimination (and antidiscrimination law more 
generally) because to do so would be to inevitably deny trans girls and women their gender 
autonomy. 
 Furthermore, the law cannot embrace a zero-sum framework when it comes to cisgender 
and transgender women’s rights, at least in part because of the Court’s ruling in Bostock. As I 
noted in Chapter V, the Court’s textualism binds itself when confronted with the project of 
distinguishing between sex discrimination and trans discrimination. In its equivalence of the two, 
the Court effectively recognizes that trans girls and women are girls and women, at least to some 
extent (Bostock does not say anything about trans identity, and would seemingly still subscribe to 
language like “assigned [‘x’ sex category] at birth”). Yet, the Court’s textualist approach to the 
language of “sex” implies it still holds onto some kind of essential notion of “male” and 
“female” as markers of identity. A textualist approach to Soule’s sex discrimination claim would 
thus seem to accept the complaint’s assertion that trans girls and women are simply “biological 
males;” however, to accept that argument would require that we subsequently treat trans girls 
and women worse than cis girls and women. And Bostock’s inclusion of discrimination on the 
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basis of transgender status under the umbrella of sex discrimination means that such worse 
treatment would itself constitute a form of sex discrimination. The legal logic here is circular. It 
is sex discrimination all the way down. The zero-sum game falls apart. 
 While the law cannot currently embrace a zero-sum framework, at least when it comes to 
protections against sex discrimination being afforded to both cis and trans girls and women, that 
does not mean that the game does not exist elsewhere and/or may reconfigure itself within this 
particular context. As a result, we should remain focused on why we should not embrace a zero-
sum framework on this issue: because trans girls and women are girls and women, experiencing 
similar (though not always the same) kinds of discrimination and navigating patriarchal, 
misogynistic, and heteronormative spaces in similar (though, again, not always the same) ways. 
We should therefore understand the experiences of trans girls and women in a more 
intersectional manner, considering their experiences as both girls and women and trans people. 
 
D. Where are all the trans student-athletes? 
 An intersectional approach to sex discrimination claims regarding the (in/ex)clusion of 
trans student-athletes in sports would also consider the ways in which the relevant parties have 
operated, and perhaps experienced prior forms of discrimination, in school-sponsored sports. In 
other words, it would evaluate how discrimination (sex-based or otherwise) may have operated 
prior to the moment of the discriminatory action that triggered the claim at hand. This kind of 
approach would, perhaps, help answer an important question essential to both the Soule 
complaint and HB 500: to what extent are trans girls and women actually competing in 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics? The answer to this question is relatively simple: not 
much, if at all. Indeed, when legislators attempt to pass laws that would ban trans girls and 
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women from playing school-sponsored sports, nearly none of them can name a trans student-
athlete in their state or an instance in which a trans student-athlete’s presence has caused a 
problem (Crary and Whitehurst 2021). HB 500 thus reacts to a problem that is not there, and the 
Soule complaint insists that a (necessary) policy of inclusion is too inclusive (and, subsequently, 
discriminatory) despite only two student-athletes taking advantage of said policy. 
Despite what claims like that presented in Soule and HB 500 would suggest, there is no 
wave of “males claiming transgender identity as girls and women” in order to play school-
sponsored sports (Soule et al. 2020, 21). An intersectional answer to Soule’s insistence that this 
kind of displacement is, in fact, happening would call attention to the means by which trans 
students already experience a number of barriers to entry prior to the potential of participating in 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics.  
In school, trans youth regularly experience forms of discrimination like being denied 
access to restrooms consistent with their gender identity, bullying and harassment from students 
and teachers, and gender-based dress codes (Human Rights Watch 2016; National Center for 
Transgender Equality n.d.). This puts trans youth at elevated risk for physical and/or 
psychological harms, makes them more likely to miss school for fear of harm, makes them less 
likely to continue their education, and decreases their overall academic success (Human Rights 
Watch 2016; National Center for Transgender Equality n.d.). Outside of school, trans youth 
experience a lack of access to healthcare, gender-affirming and otherwise—and even when they 
have access to healthcare, trans kids tend to underutilize such opportunities (due to fears of 
transphobia, for example) and generally report poorer health outcomes (Downshen et al. 2018; 
Rider et al. 2018). And there a number of ongoing efforts across the country to restrict, outlaw, 
and/or criminalize gender-affirming care for trans youth despite the overwhelming evidence 
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suggesting such care is essential for their mental and social wellbeing (Conron et al. 2021; 
Harvard Law Review 2021; Schneiberg 2021).  
 Given this context, it does not seem incredibly surprising that trans youth are not racing 
to participate and compete in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics. The circumstances that 
young trans people are made to navigate because they are trans, including forms of 
discrimination, could operate as barriers to entry for school-sponsored sports. There are other, 
perhaps more important, material conditions that trans people must address prior to engaging 
with the world of sports. This sentiment is not to diminish sports—certainly, athletics possesses 
an unique opportunity for trans people in particular to engage in exploration and celebration of 
one’s sense of embodiment—but rather to contextualize the experiences of trans folks in schools 
prior to their engagement, or lack thereof, in competitive athletics.  
 The engagement in an intersectional approach to sex discrimination in school sports is 
important here, then, because it reveals broader ways in which discriminatory intents and actions 
are playing out alongside those sports-specific claims. So, for instance, an intersectional 
methodological approach to the Soule complaint might be suspicious of how Title IX is being 
rhetorically and legally deployed against two trans girls (and trans youth more generally) who 
most likely already experience forms of sex discrimination outside of the sports-specific context. 
And like section C of this chapter discussed, an intersectional approach would also put gender 
and transness at the center of its analysis of protections from sex discrimination in sports under 
Title IX. In other words, intersectionality’s multiple-axis framework would insist that we take a 
more holistic approach to cases of discrimination, and develop necessarily nuanced means by 




E. The subject of protection 
 Finally, an intersectional method of antidiscrimination law would think more critically 
about how discrimination operates under the law. In particular, an intersectional approach would 
be more direct in thinking about who is the subject of protection under a given antidiscrimination 
law. Crenshaw’s analysis of DeGraffenreid v. General Motors does this kind of work through its 
critique of the single-axis framework of discrimination: white women have been understood by 
the law as those needing protection from sex discrimination and Black men have been 
understood by the law as those needing protection from race discrimination (Crenshaw 1989). 
That is, protections from discrimination on the basis of sex have historically been (re)articulated 
as means to protect white women from discrimination and protections from discrimination on the 
basis of race have historically been (re)articulated as means to protect Black men from 
discrimination. Thus, Crenshaw’s intersectional process illumines the particular position of 
Black women before the law, a position that is vulnerable to possible forms of discrimination 
without legal recourse due to the law’s inability to perceive how discrimination on the basis of 
race and sex can have unique effects for Black women.  
 In this regard, Crenshaw’s work can provide a more radical reading of how the Soule 
complaint targets Terry Miller and Andraya Yearwood and its refusal to acknowledge trans 
identity. The complaint argues that sports are an unique space in which sex and gender end up 
meaning a lot due to physiological differences between the sexes (a claim I have already 
refuted). Outside of the explicitly biological ramifications of Soule’s claim are three important 
axes of power at work: the regulations of transness, gender, and race. The Soule complaint 
delegitimizes transness by exclusively referring to trans girls and women as “biological males,” 
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language that is not only incorrect and. inaccurate but also, as Chapter IV explains, is very 
dangerous given its deployment in a legal context of antidiscrimination. Then, the complaint’s 
targeting of Terry Miller and Andraya Yearwood (re)invests in a (trans)misogynoir-esque culture 
in sports, as Chapter V briefly points out.  
Conceptualizations of gender and race are bound up with one another in the complaint, 
then, because it deploys antidiscrimination law protections against sex discrimination—
protections historically articulated for (cisgender) white women—in the context of two Black 
trans girls being allowed to compete in school-sponsored sports. The complaint cannot escape 
this context, and an intersectional method of antidiscrimination law would insist that we evaluate 
the sex discrimination claims in said way. Further, when we understand Soule as engaging in this 
particular context of contestation, we can more explicitly name what it is doing. In its 
delegitimating of trans identity, the complaint effectively claims that trans girls and women—
particularly the Black trans girls called out in its text—are “actually” boys/men. And given the 
case’s claim of sex discrimination (due to CIAC policy but also, in practice, the inclusion of 
Terry Miller and Andraya Yearwood), it is implicitly engaged in a narrative that Black boys and 
men are invading spaces meant for white women. 
This narrative that the inclusion of transgender student-athletes in interscholastic and 
intercollegiate athletics inevitably permits Black boys and men access to spaces meant for white 
women has two significant implications. First, the narrative decides that there is some “hidden 
truth” that trans folks are protecting from the rest of the world. For the Soule complaint in 
particular, this “hidden truth” is “biological sex.” In the figurative world of the complaint, trans 
folks are reducible to some kind of truth, and that is their sex—their genitals, their hormones, 
their chromosomes. In reality, though, we know that (1) there is rarely any singular “truth” to 
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anyone or their identity and (2) transness is not reducible to something like “sex,” whatever that 
means in any given context. Second, though, the complaint’s narrative subtly takes advantage of 
tropes that hypersexualize Black men and construct them as threats of violence to, in particular, 
white women. So not only are Black boys and men gaining access to a space meant for white 
women (here, interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics) but in doing so we are, according to 
the complaint’s narrative, putting cis white women at risk of violence because of the threat Black 
men pose to them.  
This is, as I said, a radical reading of the Soule complaint, and perhaps pushes the bounds 
of intersectionality as method a bit too far. Nevertheless, contextualizing the Soule complaint 
within the very specific fields of sports and antidiscrimination law protections from sex 
discrimination quickly reveals increasingly pernicious lines of thought behind what appear to be 
somewhat straightforward legal claims. This project of contextualization also reveals how much 
is at stake in a case like Soule. It shows that a sex discrimination case is not always simply about 
discrimination on the basis of sex; rather, these cases are often bound up with other systems and 
axes of power that operate together, complexly and nuancedly. And an intersectional approach to 
antidiscrimination law provides us with the tools necessary to see all this context, in all its 
complexity. Ultimately, an intersectional method of antidiscrimination law is desirable because it 
helps us better explain how discrimination operates beyond single-axis frameworks. If we are 
truly invested in bettering the law’s understanding and protection of marginalized groups of 
people, then it seems like intersectionality provides a good method with which to begin. 
 
F. Title IX, intersectionality, and pushing towards an affirmative rights framework 
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 To return to Crenshaw and MacKinnon’s discussion of an Equality Amendment, 
antidiscrimination law requires affirmative action from legislative and administrative authorities 
in order to actually dismantle systems that prop up and preserve an unequal socioeconomic order 
(Crenshaw and MacKinnon 2019). In this final section, I want to briefly explain why Title IX 
and its authority over interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics might help push us towards a 
more prescriptive approach to antidiscrimination law, particularly if we start with the project of 
transgender equity in schools. 
 As I discussed in Chapter III, Title IX’s scope has been disputed a number of times since 
its inception, in cases like National Collegiate Athletic Asso. v. Califano, University of Richmond 
v. Bell, Haffer v. Temple University, and Grove City College v. Bell. This history of Title IX’s 
scope, particularly as it relates to discrimination on the basis of sex in school-sponsored sports, 
was effectively resolved through the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, which clarified that 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics were indeed subject to Title IX regulations. Though 
Title IX’s scope is certainly still subject to legal challenges, its historic impact in sports could for 
all intents and purposes be described as affirmative and/or prescriptive in nature. Indeed, though 
Title IX constitutes a form of antidiscrimination law, and its language supposedly only provides 
for negative rights (protections against sex discrimination), it has led to the affirmative creation 
of girls’ and women’s sports teams, the affordance of scholarships reserved for girls and women, 
and the creation of girls’ and women’s leagues at the scholastic and collegiate levels of 
competition. Indeed, OCR’s three-part test for Title IX compliance is itself a mechanism by 
which Title IX prescribes certain policies and actions in order to prevent sex discrimination rom 
the out-set (“Intercollegiate Athletics Policy: Three-Part Test -- Part Three Q’s & A’s” 2020; 
Simon 2004, 126).  
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Title IX is thus an unique statute within antidiscrimination law because it demands 
preemptive action be taken in order to avoid instances of sex discrimination, its history in school-
sponsored sports being a prime example of said approach. As a result, we might wonder how 
Title IX’s prescriptive approach to interscholastic and intercollegiate sports would change if it, 
and antidiscrimination law more generally, were to engage in a more intersectional method of 
analysis. In other words, Title IX currently operates through a single-axis understanding of sex 
discrimination that primarily centers the experiences of cisgender white women. But, if we do 
away with the single-axis framework and engage in more intersectional praxis, Title IX’s 
prescriptive approach in sports might change.  
For instance, an intersectional approach to Title IX grounded in Crenshaw’s original 
analysis of Black women’s positions vis-à-vis Title VII might start asking critical questions 
about the opportunities afforded to Black girls and women in school-sponsored sports. 
Furthermore, considerations of class, transness and gender identity, religion, ability, and other 
identity categories would come to the fore were an intersectional method be embraced by those 
interpreting Title IX. This does not necessarily mean the interpretation and implementation of 
Title IX policies and regulations would focus on ever-specific categories of people and their 
participation in sports so as to ensure sex/gender equity within the space. Rather, practicing Title 
IX in a more intersectional manner would think about what institutions, systems, and structures 
perpetuate specific forms of sex/gender discrimination that target marginalized groups of people. 
An example of this kind of thinking might be that we not only encourage the participation of 
trans folks in sports but we also become more critical of the regulations surrounding trans 
participation in the first place. Indeed, if we are truly invested in preventing discriminatory 
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action on the basis of sex, questionable medicalized prerequisites for participation imposed on a 
specific class on individuals (in this case, trans young people) should be highly suspect.  
The other meaningful contribution that an intersectional approach to Title IX and its 
effects on interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics could provide is a rethinking of what 
constitutes equity or equal opportunity in sports. Often, Title IX’s impact on school sports is 
understood through mechanisms like the number of student-athletes who are girls and women vs. 
the number of student-athletes who are boys and men, equal distribution of scholarship funds 
between the genders, and/or equal access to sports-related facilities. Again, though, these 
measurements of equity often rely on a single-axis framework for understanding sex 
discrimination and a narrow definition of what it means to be treated “disparately” or 
“differentially.” Intersectionality might help us reimagine ways for sports to be more equitable—
from eliminating sex/gender-segregated teams to increasing access to gender-neutral bathrooms 
at sports venues or more actively recruiting trans student-athletes to earn scholarships and 
compete on teams at the collegiate level, to provide a few examples. 
In this way, perhaps a more intersectional approach to Title IX can imperfectly—or 
impurely, as Isaac West might put it—engage with Dean Spade’s radical trans politics. That is, 
the inclusion of transgender student-athletes in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics may 
not immediately present itself as an arena for substantive, transformative change to the material 
conditions necessary to sustain trans lives, but it could perhaps expand the ways in which school-
sponsored sports understand their dedication(s) to equity. And in that expansion of what it means 
to prevent discrimination on the basis of sex, the realms of interscholastic and intercollegiate 
athletics could come to increasingly benefit the lives of trans folks. Furthermore, an 
intersectional approach to Title IX could mark the beginning of larger, broader changes to how 
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we create, interpret, and engage with antidiscrimination law as a whole, slowly encouraging 
more intersectional, prescriptive methods of understanding and preventing discrimination. Title 
IX is already a powerful means by which the law aims to codify equality. Folding in an 










































 This project has attempted to discuss the ways in which legal contestations over the issue 
of transgender inclusion in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics are ever-fraught. In part, 
tensions over inclusion are the product of subpar understandings of sex and gender. But, the 
law’s inability to effectively account for the experiences of trans folks in the context of sports, 
and remedy the harms they face within said space, also demonstrates a larger problem with 
antidiscrimination law. That is, antidiscrimination law is failing to adequately respond to the 
needs of queer and trans folks simply seeking out means to live without fear of persecution 
and/or discrimination. The legislative and legal persecution of trans youth in the past year—
through efforts to bar them from playing sports and attempts to criminalize their healthcare—
reveal just how limited antidiscrimination law is in scope and practice. 
 I have thus suggested that we take a new approach to antidiscrimination law, at least in 
the context of school-sponsored sports. This approach would be increasingly intersectional and 
prescriptive, attending to the ways in which discrimination and oppression operate in 
multifaceted ways that have especially dire consequences for queer and trans youth, particularly 
those of color. Taking up an intersectional method in our interpretations of “sex discrimination” 
under Title IX would, in my view, open up new possibilities and (re)imaginings of what equity 
looks like in education and school-sponsored sports. In other words, this project has not only 
invested in the need to include trans youth in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics but also 
taken up a mandate to restructure our very understanding(s) of how antidiscrimination law 
should function in order to best sustain the lives of those who are most vulnerable. 
 At the end of this issue, it bears reminding everyone that most at stake in conversations 
about whether trans young people should be allowed to compete in school-sponsored sports are 
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the livelihoods of kids. Legal arguments like those presented in Soule and Hecox do not exist in a 
vacuum, they permeate throughout and outside of the legal system, into media and culture, into 
sports and schools. These legislative and legal attacks, then, should not be underestimated or 
disregarded because they could have, and probably are already having, real effects on the lives of 
trans kids in the US. No child should have to go before the law and defend their right to exist, yet 
trans kids across the country have testify in front of state legislative bodies. Kids have had to 
defend their rights to gender-affirming healthcare and their ability to play on sports teams with 
their friends. Something has gone awfully wrong with our conceptualizations of the law and the 
promise of antidiscrimination if we are creating conditions in which trans kids have to defend 
their right to exist. It is thus imperative we move to reorient ourselves and our approaches to the 
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